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THE CONTENTIOUS MILLENNIUM

François Duchêne *

MUCH of the dread of the coming technological society is based on the belief that it will be thoroughly, even scandalously, élitist. Sometimes the élite is the machine itself: 'the first ultra-intelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, providing that the machine is docile enough to tell him how to keep it under control'.[1] Usually the élite is the small cast of computer-controlling technocrats, as in Zbigniew Brzezinski's familiar picture of managers working themselves to death and of 'spectacles (mass sports, TV) providing an opiate for increasingly purposeless masses'.** The very nature of the industrial system nurtures such feelings: there is 'the newspaper that *must* be filled; the plant that *must* be used; the institutions that *must* grow'.[2] Why not, then, the battle cry of the New Left against the military-industrial complex, that there *must* be Vietnams? Doctrines of manipulation build on paranoid patterns of thought latent in wide sections of society. Administrations proliferate. Legislatures decline. Heads of government steal the limelight more and more from their most senior colleagues. The memory of Caesar, and of bread and circuses, in the breeding grounds of Western culture stirs again. The progress of technology promises to centralize power still further. Lasers, test-tube life, artificial intelligence, data banks, mind control, and so on, become futuristic nightmares previously only the province of fiction. The dreamer stirs uneasily. Yet nightmares are ambiguous: do they represent the power of the danger, or the power of the human reaction against it?

The paradox is that the late 1960s have demonstrated *not* the strength, but the growing weakness, of governments. In America, a determined and initially isolated minority, opposed to the stagnating Vietnam war, compelled the incumbent President to give up his otherwise automatic second term in office. In France, in May 1968, student riots and labour strikes nearly toppled that apogee of charisma, General de Gaulle, as if the year had been 1848 and the leader a mere Louis-Philippe. General de Gaulle's career, superficially an epitome of the trend

* This is a part of the introductory essay to the book based on a conference organized by the International Association of Cultural Freedom at Princeton, a book which is to be published shortly by Simon & Schuster.

** Quotations without a note come from the conference record.

[1] Irving John Good, Fellow of Trinity, Oxford, in 'Advances in Computers', quoted by Arthur Clarke in Gunn, ed., *Man and the Future* (Kansas University Press, 1968), p. 262.

[2] Sir Geoffrey Vickers, 'The End of Free Fall', *The Listener*, London, 4 November 1965, p. 691.

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towards authoritarianism, in fact provides a text-book instance of its limitations. For all his quasi-absolute power, de Gaulle has been effective only while public opinion was behind him. With its support, he could quell the colonels and settle the Algerian war by what seemed no more than a flux of television speeches. Without it, as in the long-forgotten miners' strike of 1963, the farmers' agitation in the middle sixties, the early phases of the *évènements* of May 1968, and again in the shopkeepers' demonstrations of spring 1969, he has been helpless. It may be argued that he was no real dictator and the totalitarian regimes are made of sterner stuff. But these too have been so shaken in Eastern Europe that without Russian bayonets they would have been swept away. Society may be slow-moving, and the need for violence to shake the complacency of government disquieting, but the fact remains that authority seems entrenched only in countries, like the Soviet Union, which combine a powerful state tradition with political backwardness in the public.

Daniel Bell has pointed out that what matters is not 'who' governs, but 'how'; and that so long as the structure of power remains, changes of personnel are secondary. But if the powers-that-be are vulnerable to anything that stands for resistance to the abuse, or even exercise, of authority, this alone changes the 'how' of government. The American bureaucracy was as roundly defeated as Johnson in the presidential campaign. Something of the same principle even applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to industry. Big business cannot long afford to ignore the signs of the times if the apparent disaffection of the young for science, engineering and management persists.[3] In the USA it is already trying to adjust to the moral fervour of the young and the new climate of independence. 'It's much easier to work with a beard or at night for IBM than for General Motors, because they need mathematicians more.' In short, the changing ways in which people feel, however hard to quantify, are a major factor in the 'structure' of society. Though the apparatus of administration grows ever more monstrous, the Establishments in open societies seem less and less able to perpetuate the old élitist traditions of government. The mass educated society is not the old largely passive one: an innovation which is already turning into anachronism many inherited assumptions about it.

[3] *The Times*, 28 March 1969, reported statistics used by Dr H. G. Judge, Principal of Banbury School, Oxfordshire, in a lecture at the Royal Society of Arts to the effect that, in Britain, 'the number of sixth-form students reading science dropped from 32,700 to 31,700 between 1962 and 1967, while the number in the non-science group doubled from 38,300 to 76,100'. Sixth forms are the top forms in British secondary schools. The latest evidence suggests (*The Times*, 31 July 1969) the number of science students may now be rising again. But Dr Nevitt Sanford, Director of the Institute for the Study of Human Problems at Stanford University, in his *Campus 1980: The Shape of the Future in American Higher Education* (Delacorte Press) notes the increase among students at Stanford of the proportion stating a preference for teaching and government as against business. Less than three per cent of the freshmen at Stanford in 1966 stated a preference for business.

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RECOGNIZING this does not necessarily lead to heartening conclusions. The vulnerability of the 'system'—both public and private—to social processes it very partially controls can be used as evidence of the growth of an ungovernable society, a kind of New York City magnified to continental proportions. Daniel Bell has suggested, at Princeton and elsewhere, that basic changes are becoming perceptible in advanced society, and American society in particular. The 'post-industrial' development is the best-known part of his thesis. In its simplest form, it means that services are coming to dominate the economy; and, more significant, that theoretical knowledge is becoming the engine of progress in society. It follows that the universities hold a key place in society and hence, increasingly, in politics too. But the 'post-industrial' is only one of three 'dimensions' in Bell's analysis. The second, and very important one, is that America is becoming a 'communal' society. In the nineteenth century wealth and benefits were distributed impersonally by the automatic operations of the market. If a man succeeded or failed, he alone seemed responsible. But as the realization began to spread that this justice was too rough, government took over more and more of the responsibility for full employment, welfare, education, research and, through them, for whole industries, regions and classes of people. At the same time, deprived minorities like the blacks have become more and more insistent that 'equality of opportunity' is not enough, and have demanded 'equality of result'. More and more pressure groups, ethnic minorities, farmers, labour unions, localities, educational and scientific establishments, the military and others, have come to expect the federal government to arbitrate their competing claims, and to blame it for their frustrations. This plurality of thrustful minorities and factions generates a clamorous and contentious form of corporate politics. It is possible even to conceive of a point where conflicts cease to be local to their sector and polarize all society around the issue of violence itself.

This danger is increased by the third dimension of change in Bell's thesis. He has tellingly illustrated this by the example of 'Coxey's Army' of unemployed who, in the winter of 1893–94, set out for Washington from various parts of the United States. Only 400 arrived. Seventy years later, the civil rights movement delivered 250,000 demonstrators to the gates of the White House. America has always had a record of local violence, for instance in labour struggles, but since the Civil War these have rarely affected the overall political stability of the country. Bell's argument is that America has been protected from its own vitality, as European countries have not, by the sheer size of the continent relative to the means of communication. This cushion of 'insulated space' no longer exists.[4]

[4] See the 'Notes on the Post-Industrial State' which appeared in the issue of Winter and Spring 1967 of *The Public Interest*. The phrase about 'equality of result' is Nathan Glazer's quoted by Bell.

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In some ways this may only mean that American political structures and problems are growing more like those of other countries. The relatively small and centralized states of the Old World have long been 'communal', from lack of 'insulating space'. Central governments there have for some time been umpires between rival groups because the political systems have long been unified and focused on the capital, and state responsibility for welfare in particular has been growing for over half a century.[5] In fact, America's unique problem, underlined by Kennan, is that its chaos of local authorities is almost eighteenth-century in European terms. The 'communal' or corporatist system works well in Europe only in highly disciplined states like Sweden or Switzerland. But it is relatively inefficient, rather than violent, in others, though violence is growing. Bell's analysis in itself may simply point to the need for new institutional arrangements in the United States—a greater federal involvement in social affairs and, as he suggests, a devolution in details to regional and local bodies. What gives it an alarming air is partly that, as Harold Cruse pointed out at Princeton, the American melting-pot has not finished cooking yet—the blacks, the browns and the reds, Negroes, Mexicans and Indians, are still not truly in the mixture—and partly the streak of irrationalism in the New Left.

Some of the behaviour of the New Left is 'rational' enough by traditional standards—the revolt against paternalism, the fervour for social and racial equality. But these do not explain the life-style of the movement—its passion for passion's sake, its cult of the immediate moment, its contempt for analysis and piecemeal reform. Students today remind George Kennan of their revolutionary predecessors in Russia before 1917, and do seem at times to have walked out of the pages of Dostoevsky. If the accounts of people teaching and studying in Paris and Bologna are to be believed, large parts of these universities have been reduced to chaos. In many places anarchy is seeping through to the secondary schools. The strident hunt for tyranny even in the 'repressive liberal tolerance' of the Anglo-American universities overflows into histrionics and psychodrama. If all these were disciplined by a programme they might still not be regarded as central. But the only point made by an elder and taken up by one of the most articulate spokesmen of the radicals at Princeton, Sam Brown, was Anthony Hartley's objection that the New Left seemed more concerned to mount guerrilla raids on society than to elaborate a programme of government by which it might be judged itself.[6] In fact, there is a religious rather than political ring about the ideal of 'participation' described by Edward Shils:

[5] Social security expenditures represent about 15 per cent of GNP in all the EEC countries and Britain as against approximately half of this figure in the United States. See the EEC Commission's 'Selected Figures: the Common Market Ten Years On'.

[6] Sam Brown denied he, or his fellow radicals at Princeton, are adequate spokesmen for the New Left.

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> Participation is a situation in which the individual's desires are fully realized in the complete self-determination of the individual and which is simultaneously the complete self-determination of each institution and of society as a whole. In the good community, the common will harmonizes individual wills. . . . Participation is the transformation of expanding sentiments and desires in which all members realize their sentiments simultaneously. Anything less is repressive.

In this light, student disturbances are a passion play for 'the dream of a regime of plenitude' present, but only distantly present, in the old laisser-faire and socialistic visions of economic fulfilment and fraternal love.[7] True, student movements since the romantic upheavals of pre-industrial Germany in the 1830s have all tended to have this millennial quality. The difference now is that the students, once a small minority, are becoming numerous enough to be the affluent society's equivalent of the old factory proletariat.[8]

Thus, together, corporatist politics and millennial emotions for instant utopia can be composed into a disturbing picture of the future, particularly if one assumes a close relation between students' behaviour at college and their later attitudes as paid-up members of society. Early industrialism produced anarchism and fascism, and recoiled from both after paying a heavy price for the latter. The post-industrial society might have to accept them as endemic, and face recurring outbreaks, much as traditional society suffered the plague. Urban society is infinitely more self-aware and alive to social injustice than the traditional society, but it could be inherently less stable. The steady abuse of privilege in a world of scarcity could be replaced in a world of plenty by the periodic aberrations of the many.

However, any social movement worth its salt is only the tip of an iceberg. This works two ways. It means that authority is paralysed in dealing with the minorities when these manage to identify

[7] Edward Shils, 'Of Plenitude and Scarcity', *Encounter*, May 1969, pp. 42 and 57.

[8] An exaggeration: there are seven million students in the United States and 24 million industrial workers. Nevertheless, the upheavals of 1968 reflect the social and demographic rise of youth. The young mature earlier, have more freedom, enough money to be a powerful consumer market and are absolutely and relatively more numerous than in the recent past. Forty-six per cent of Americans were under 25 years old in 1965; 39·5 per cent were under 20, as against only 31·5 per cent in the EEC in 1966. About half of the young each year now go to some kind of college in the United States. Even in most of Europe, where the percentages are lower, there has been, and is, a hectic growth in the number of students. Indeed, the most glaring contrasts between the changing student body and the unchanging university framework are probably in Europe, particularly in France and Italy, where they have played a major role in recent troubles. The trend will continue unless there is a reaction of improbable proportions. *Le Monde* reported on 2 April 1969 that the French government plans to raise the student population in the birthplace of French industrialism, at St Etienne, to 25,000 by 1980. The whole of this provincial agglomeration has already three to four hundred thousand people. Such, and higher, concentrations already exist. As time goes on, the students may gain in ideological self-confidence. So far, in New York and Paris, they have retreated in face of refusals by blacks or workers to go along with them. This may not last.

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with mass attitudes or frustrations. But it also means that once the moderates are satisfied, the fanatics are thrown back where they came from, on the fringe. Bomb-throwing anarchists frightened established society out of its wits in the 1890s, but accomplished nothing permanent because they shocked the working class itself. The anarcho-syndicalists of the next decade also made the bourgeois tremble at the thought of a revolutionary general strike; but were unable to unleash one. In the 1930s communism throve because the unemployed were desperate, and in the 1940s because of the disgrace and ruin of the *anciens régimes* in war, but once the workers prospered, its odious politics became the kiss of death. Anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists and communists did not change that much: what changed a great deal was their invisible basis of support. On all the evidence and precedents, the same holds true of the world's latest excitements. It was calculated in 1968 that the militants represent about two per cent of the student body in the United States, their immediate circle of support some 8–10 per cent more.[9] The proportions become larger only occasionally, on well selected issues. Student violence hits the headlines; the many examples of student restraints upon violence, even at Berkeley, in Paris, at the LSE, do not. Again and again, in the university politics of the past two years, the focus of the struggle between the administrations and the militants has been the uncertain centre of student, and to some extent faculty, opinion. It may seem a strange centre, as the workers seemed half a century ago; but its motives and standards are not those of the extremists. It will not accept leadership from elders simply because they are senior; it may take a freer attitude than previous generations towards sex (perhaps) and drugs (certainly). But this centre can be mobilized to carry out tasks which fulfil its ideals of social justice, the quality of living, and even efficiency. People who have worked closely with radical, but not extremist, youth often agree that they are far more competent and mature than anyone assuming traditional standards had reason to expect. If the motives and aspirations of the invisible majority of the young are even partially met, the spectacular militants are likely to be left high and dry, as other apparently triumphant irrationalists have been in the past.

IT is not, then, simply the power of technocrats, nor the millennialism of youth, bored by affluence, which can explain the upsurge of conflict in societies many assumed to be pacified by wealth.

> We face in this society, and indeed in all advanced industrial societies, a basic contradiction between, on the one hand, the enormous reliance on educated, qualified scientific personnel and the apparatus for providing it, which trains people in the critical modes of the intellectual and causes them to question the subor-

[9] *New York Times*, reporting a survey of 860 campuses by the Educational Testing Service of Princeton, New Jersey, 10 November 1968. Quoted in Arnold Beichman's 'Letter from Columbia', *Encounter*, May 1969, p. 15.

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> dination of personal to public goals; and, on the other, the disciplines, including the disciplined belief, required by the peculiarly massive organization, public and private, of the modern industrial state (*Galbraith*).

That is one way of putting it, at least at the political level. There are others, but all turn on the 'massive' character of modern society, the large numbers of a citizenry awakened on such a scale initially for the first time, and the endless ramifications of industry and government. This mass society is indeed a new phenomenon. In practice, industrial civilization clung to old oligarchic features long after these disappeared from the political vocabulary. It is only now that in the richest countries the acutely poor have become minorities and the numbers of students are creeping up to large fractions of their age-groups. The distance between the image of democracy and the reality of social stratifications has only now begun to shrink enough for the tribulations of the mass society to emerge in their own right. One of those tribulations is simply due to the *mass* of society as such.

There were masses in traditional society, of course. But until the eighteenth century the vast majority were peasants scratching the soil for food, on the margin of subsistence. There were *disettes* and near-famines right through the eighteenth century in a country as rich as France. Such people were far too bowed down by the struggle with nature to be active members of society at all. They were the substratum on which the small active society of the time, the ruling classes, rose. To judge by Gregory King and Vauban, whose estimates around 1700 were accepted as plausible by contemporaries, the oligarchy in England and France then numbered less than 100,000 families each.[10] Scattered across ill-communicating provinces, this governing class was largely local despite the incipient centralization on Paris and London. In the Germany of near on 300 'states', and in Italy, it was even more so. Its frame of reference was essentially small. Gentry exercised real but limited power. Rivals at court knew each other's strengths and foibles with often bitter intimacy. The exercise of privilege and competition for power were as earthy and constraining in their way as poverty and personal subordination for the subject masses. Neither lord nor peasant had need to prove themselves by *actes gratuits*, except possibly the military, and even these had periodically to justify their heroic sense of honour on naked steel.[11] There was no room for the Victorian vagueness of

> *Infinite passion and the pain*
> *Of finite hearts that yearn.*[12]

[10] Gregory King's table can be found most conveniently on p. 25 of G. N. Clark's *The Later Stuarts* in the Oxford History of England series. Extracts from the preface of Vauban's *Dime Royale* (1707) can be found on pp. 70 ff. of *Les Ecrivains Temoins du Peuple*, edited by F. and J. Fourastié in the 'J'ai Lu' series.

[11] Significantly enough, the first writer to popularize the *acte gratuit* was the cossetted and hypochondriac bourgeois, André Gide, in *Les Caves du Vatican*.

[12] 'Two in the Campagna', Robert Browning.

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If there is room for it now (though in angrier ways), this is largely because of the emergence of a vast middle-class mass equally far from the extreme constraints of both poverty and power.

The triumphs of the highly productive industrial society have turned the submerged nine-tenths of the traditional society, the old 'subjects', into the majority of self-conscious citizens of today. The immense diffusion of education and the emancipation from personal subordination to social superiors, made possible and even required by the wealth-producing system, have also given individuals an autonomy of outlook on themselves and the world, a novel inner sense of mastery and rights. '*L'appétit vient en mangeant*': the revolution of rising expectations which is more effective in rich than poor societies has made people more demanding than ever before. It is not surprising that the 'belief felt' of the times is a kind of individualistic expansionism impatient of trammels and restraints. Yet the very division of labour which has freed the individual from personal bonds is increasingly coming to limit his freedom of action in impersonal ways. The fact that the old subject nine-tenths of society have emerged into the light of citizenship means that even if the population had not hugely increased (which it has), the community would, in a sense, be up to nine times larger than two centuries ago. This whole order of magnitude of change makes the old automatic 'participation' of the few as anachronistic as the isolation of the rural masses. Both are replaced by a vast number of people crowding into the middle stations of society where the natural pride of personal self-determination is frustrated and insulted by the mediocrity of one's responsibility and power. This goes further than politics, as much of the discussion at Princeton implied. The frustration of individual ambitions when crowds of people pursue them simultaneously is typified just as much by urban sprawl as by the 'manipulation' stressed by the New Left. The division of labour and the centralization that goes with it work in what might be called the 'achievement gap' quite as clearly as in the bureaucracy resulting, as Ralf Dahrendorf and Daniel Bell showed, from the protection of social and political rights.

One of the troubles of the mass society is that a crowd of people all seeking the same objectives may, and indeed often do, produce results that more or less frustrate the objectives of each individual in the crowd. The extraordinarily rapid increase in the number of cars, roads, garages, used-car dumps, secondary residences, seaside and inland resorts, airports, and so on, reflects an ever-growing demand for greater physical and psychic space. The millions of people who buy motor-cars to express their yearning for mobility and freedom do not do so in order to queue in traffic jams. Nor do the settlers in the suburbs consciously intend to increase the wastelands and rubbish-dumps, which the Civic Trust in Britain estimated in 1964

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were growing at a rate there of 3,500 acres a year.[13] Urban sprawl is, in fact, an embodiment of the complications and distortions of individual purpose in a mass society. People pour into the great centres to make the most of their personal chances of wealth, power, romance, 'the golden life in the culture', and even of 'togetherness'. But either because they want a larger private kingdom or relief from the stresses of the cities, great numbers of those with means move as far out of town as easy transport will allow. Inexorably urban and semi-urban areas fan out till in the end most surburbanites have the worst of both worlds: the clutter of urban life, and the relative isolation and cultural poverty of the rural one. They even have disadvantages which belong to neither: the one-class suburb with, especially in the United States, a very high turn-over of inhabitants, commuting raised to the level of a major activity and, above all, the loss of the sense of 'community'. This is often treated as a nostalgic left-over from rural utopias that never were, a Jeffersonian dream ignoring the nasty realities of the past. But evidence is beginning to accrue that

> extreme lack of contact with other human beings causes extreme and well-defined pathologies like schizophrenia and delinquency. . . . The way of life we lead today makes it impossible for us to be as close to our friends as we would really want to be. The feeling of alienation and the modern sense of the 'meaninglessness' of life are direct expressions of the loss of intimate contact.[14]

The question of mass in society has been examined mostly in material terms. It has been asked how fast food production can be raised to meet demands, and what are the maximum numbers of people earth can feed. It has been pointed out that only seven per cent of the world's land surface is used for living by men; and even that the whole population of the world could still be stood on the Isle of Wight. The emphasis in town planning has been to run after growth which has already occurred, and provide overdue facilities of transport, welfare and housing. But if the problem is psychological and results from the contradictions of the growing demands of individuals on the one hand for the services great centres provide, and on the other for the 'psychosocial space' great centres tend in part to constrict, purely material factors take second place.[15] It may be socially

[13] There were 150,000 acres of heaps, holes and miscellaneous wasteland in Britain that year, and the rate of growth is increasing.

[14] Christopher Alexander, Center for Planning and Development, University of California, Berkeley, in William R. Ewald Jr., ed., *Environment for Man* (Indiana University Press, 1967), pp. 67 and 102, and comments by others following. Professor Alexander's essay is interesting not only for its own thesis but for the evidence collected from other sociologists' essays.

[15] Food and Agricultural Organization, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Studies 1956*, Pt. I (Rome 1957), for the seven per cent figure. It is quoted in Michael Barratt Brown, *After Imperialism* (Heinemann 1963), pp. 1–2.

It is usual in discussing the pressure of population on space to extrapolate growth rates and curves of the number of people. But given the probably at least

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dangerous as well as uncomfortable to let things ride until many luxuries of space and freedom now taken for granted have been lastingly impaired. But to act may ultimately mean policies going as far as disincentives on the growth of population and certain forms of economic expansion. The issue of cities is more complex, difficult and explosive than society—no doubt defensively—has been content to assume.

Another effect of mass society—insidious because it makes it hard for the individual to come to terms with himself—is the achievement gap. This is the contrast between his sense of potency, standing high up on the giant shoulders of the culture, and a half-conscious vertigo about his impotence to operate in person at such heights. Television, radio, universities, travel, books, records and the other paraphernalia of modern mass culture give more people than ever before an apparent view of the commanding heights of the present, past and future, of politics, art and science, of the inner mind and outer space. In fancy, it has never been easier to imagine oneself into any experience or to embrace reality from a great height, 'as the hawk sees it or the helmeted airman'.[16] Lifton said of the 'Protean style' at Princeton that 'one can, in a sense, be anyone and no one', and shift from experience to experience 'with relatively diminished psychological cost'. But this is only true locally; for the personality as a whole there is a considerable cost. The visions are borrowed visions: 'the one thing' Proteus 'had great difficulty in doing . . . was to carry out his own authentic function'. When the individual has to face his personal challenge and opportunity, the odds are that these may seem both trivial and daunting. This has always to some extent been so, but now, as in so many other areas, the ancient scales of comparison have been fantastically overloaded. The modern logic of the division of labour, combined with extreme centralization, changes supply and demand and may well reduce the individual's statistical chances of success. A century ago, before Wagner and others professionalized the orchestra, the middling pianist devoted to his art might win modest local fame and, in those days, be fairly content with it. Now he is mentally competing with the Barenboims (or Beatles, as it may be) from the first time he buys a record. There are far more aspirant competitors these days, but world communications reduce the relative numbers needed to reach into every corner of the market to the superlative, or happy few. They have not, as in Stendhal's day, been automatically selected by

equal and possibly much superior growth, in advanced societies, of the individual's desire for space, this second factor must also be taken into account. It could be interesting and useful to set up an index of the marginal rate of growth in the demand for various kinds of use of space, particularly those associated with urban and suburban activities. Along with birth and fertility rates, this would provide a much more accurate measure than now exists of the trend of pressures on land resources in developed societies, especially in highly settled areas.

[16] W. H. Auden, *Poems*, 2nd edition 1933, Poem XXIX.

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the injustices of the social order. As Crozier pointed out at Princeton, this deprives the individual of the psychological protection of ignorance or alibis. In this way the culture of self-awareness democratizes both self-dramatization and the secret fear of failure. It is particularly alarming for youth: their histrionic radicalism, thinly overlaying anxiety, is almost to be expected.

Moreover, when man is regarded as a bundle of molecules and genes, and his psychic life is seen as a war of the energies of self and environment, the logic of his own outlook drives the individual to see himself as a temporary fusion of larger forces indifferent to himself. The erstwhile 'subject' has been released, and now feels himself merely an object. He may at the political level be taught to believe he is a sovereign citizen; but his own imagination reinforces his insignificance in society by an isolation in the mind. Human beings become, on such assumptions, aggressive lonely animals seeking out their own purposes. Though greedy for 'love', they seem so many predatory egos even to themselves. Their loves are an accidental coming together, their constant departures a proof of their self-absorption. It is striking how much of modern art is consumed by themes of self-devouring consciousness. The theatre of non-communication—Beckett, Pinter, *et al.*—is almost purely an essay in the logic of such a culture. Man's acquisition, through molecular biology, spare-part surgery and test-tube genesis, of the knowledge to control himself as a machine might possibly aggravate, but has not created, this loss of certainty about himself. As Pierre Emmanuel put it at Princeton: 'We tend to accept more and more the idea that man is not a person looking for his unity, his oneness, but is a succession, or even a simultaneity of fragmentary perceptions in a fragmented surrounding. And at the same time we accept the idea of "scientific" control of this fragmented individual!'

Man in middle-class mass society has doubts about his significance in the community; and, no less painful, doubts about his significance in his own eyes, within his mental universe. This loss of stature is potentially dangerous: fascism is a disease of people who feel insignificant. Yet 'crisis' is not a proper word for the situation. It suggests a limited problem, and specific solutions applied over a finite period. This is not the challenge. The metamorphosis of the past two centuries has given men the ability to mould their environment almost at will, and transformed the *condition humaine* without their knowing quite what such power implies. The vacuum is less in the frequently quoted loss of traditional values, which are inapplicable today, than in the need to generate new ones, matching the changed character of society and the greater self-awareness of mankind. In the nature of things, changing all the time, 'solutions', complete and definitive, do not exist. There are only ways, more or less creative and constructive, of learning to adapt to, and even anticipate, the ever more complex consequences of man's own choices.

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DANIEL Bell suggested at Princeton that the problem was 'how you humanize the technocrats and how you tame the apocalypse'. If one is to tame the apocalypse, it will certainly be necessary to humanize the technocrats. It is no accident that, as Lifton remarked in the debate, the quality of living is 'a terribly hard subject to talk about because most of our social science and psychological systems exclude it'. Today's Establishment is humanitarian enough in one sense; but by today's standards, it is a very narrow sense. The élite has been raised to the pinnacle of a pyramid based on everyone's hope of salvation through wealth; and it necessarily reflects these values. 'We can guess, though we cannot prove', has said one well-known town planner, trying to define criteria for open spaces in urban areas, 'that filling in San Francisco Bay would raise the temperature of the metropolitan area by five or ten degrees and blanket it with a layer of smog which could cost tens of millions annually. But these arguments will command little support until they can be scientifically demonstrated and measured.'[17] When it seems necessary to discuss the ruin of one of the natural wonders of America in terms of the dollars lost which might balance the dollars gained by wealthy real estate men or municipalities, one is nearing the threshold of historic gaffes like Marie Antoinette's about cake. One day, no doubt, this kind of accounting will seem as brutal as the early factory owners who herded their workers in slums. They too were serving a kind of progress. The world has long since moved beyond dogmatic economic laissez-faire when it violates full employment. The time is approaching when its impact on cultural priorities must be disciplined as well.

There are, of course, huge economic interests to be overcome (such as the automobile and oil industries and real estate interests which favour highways rather than rapid transit in cities), but they have been overcome before when political awareness has reached a sufficient pitch, as in the New Deal. However, the awareness must crystallize intellectually before it is possible for it to affect political choices. To have Keynesian policies, it was necessary first to have Keynes. Now that the need is in many ways to go beyond the Keynesian categories of the administrators, it is necessary to elaborate new ones. The sheer volume of society has driven the administrators down the path of least resistance to think in aggregates, whereas the voter thinks mainly of himself. That leaves a rich field for cross purposes and tangled wires; and may explain much of the diffuse dissatisfaction in society which sours the triumphs of Keynesian economics. There must be much more investigation of the paradoxes of the disparity between individual wishes and collective consequences in the mass society; more study of loneliness and community in different environments, and of changing demands for psychosocial

[17] William L. C. Wheaton in *Environment for Man*, p. 176.

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space and the consequences for work, leisure and town planning; more research into the population problems of megalopolis and the effects of different approaches to social welfare, as the floor of rights steadily rises, on social behaviour; in general, an improvement in social accounting comparable to the improvement in economic accounting in the last generation.[18] There is a limit to what benevolent doctors of social science can achieve. The Dutch Provos have shown that the human hunger for spontaneity and testing limits revolts against the most benevolent organization. Eliminating 'élite rule' cannot eliminate this; majority rule in a highly ordered society would seem equally paternalist and stifling. Nevertheless, it will be difficult to go beyond generalized measures inherently insensitive to individual aspirations, if new concepts and basic data are not developed.

Ultimately, the aim should be to serve the diversity which the coming of a service-society and of the age of leisure should in any case encourage. The age of leisure has had a surprisingly bad press. Dennis Gabor's verdict, in *Inventing The Future,* is that 'of all the dangers confronting civilization . . . only the Age of Leisure will find man psychologically unprepared'. Like him, Kahn and Wiener, in *The Year 2000,* quote Keynes's *Essay in Persuasion,* which dwells 'with dread' on the

> readjustments of the habits and instincts of the ordinary man, bred into him for countless generations, which he may be asked to discard within a few decades. . . . Must we not expect a general 'nervous breakdown'? [19]

Visions of a passive majority rotting on the hoof in front of television and of a dynamic majority wreaking vengeance on the herd by periodically running amok no doubt account for much of the current alarm. If, in the real-life utopia, people want not the old work-weary dream of idleness, but to feel fully alive, almost anything is possible, including the burning down of society. But fears of the future may well be rooted in too narrow a notion of what 'work' is, and a consequent under-rating of its tendency to survive in all conditions.[20] In the

[18] The growth of social indicators will probably be as important to the post-industrial society in testing its tensions as economic indicators are to the Keynesian economist trying to manage growth today. The use of computer consoles will greatly help the spread of questionnaires so that it will be possible to obtain information now out of reach or too expensive to gather. A recent study in a New York ward, seeing crime as the victims saw it, produced events startlingly different from the police records. Such developments could lead to referendum politics and further eat into the role of the representative political system and legislatures inherited from the past. See *Towards The Year 2018,* ed. by the Foreign Policy Association (Cowles Educational Corporation, 1968), pp. 89–90.

[19] Dennis Gabor, *Inventing the Future* (Pelican Books, 1963), p. 10; Kahn and Wiener, *The Year 2000* (Macmillan, 1967), p. 198.

[20] Hours of work have fallen very little in the advanced industrial countries since the Second World War. Kahn and Wiener have calculated (*Year 2000,* p. 125) that if the trend continues, Americans would still be working an average of 1,700–1,900 hours a year by the turn of the century against about 2,000 hours annually for

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Middle Ages, chess was regarded as a licentious form of leisure, leading knights to brawl and gamble; today, Soviet grandmasters allegedly train for gruelling matches by cross-country running. The example may seem slightly rococco, but it demonstrates an important principle: anything which seems important enough to some people for them to concentrate their energies on it, and to society to encourage them to do this, of itself constitutes 'work'. Work, in fact, is any substantial activity supported by society.

This allows for an extraordinary range of work—a diversification already reflected in the rapid growth of 'services'—and for a complete transformation in its way of life. There are vast ranges of occupation in which many people could find fruitful purposes: education, all the kinds of welfare, artisan production, international relations, culture, tourism, entertainment in all forms, highbrow and low—even, no doubt, politics and sitting on committees. The common characteristic in all these is that they tend either to fulfil the individual or to seek to improve relations between people. In the past, men have concentrated on accumulating the goods they lacked. The result is, today, that even in a humanitarian achievement like the British Health Service, there is a serious lack of personalized care; as, more domestically, it grows harder and harder to buy good bread or find a good plumber. There is no reason why a great many men should not find satisfaction in being good bakers or good plumbers, if their dignity therein were acknowledged. Any society in which nurses and teachers are among the worst-paid professions has plenty of scope for evolution along these lines. An immense effort of education and new kinds of incentives, particularly in terms of status, will be needed. At the same time, a society focused on the relations between its members does not suggest a hell of boredom. For a civilization obsessed by the soullessness of the conveyor-belt, it should even have substantial attractions.

the average full-time worker today. (According to the EEC Commission, hours in Western Europe are roughly the same, varying between 1,900 hours in Britain, Germany and Italy, and a maximum of nearly 2,100 hours in France.) This change would be only half the rate of change in the last century if Fourastié's estimate is correct (*Les 40,000 Heures*, Laffont, Paris, p. 12) that in France, hours of work fell from 3,900 hours a year in the nineteenth century to about 2,250–2,350 hours a year in the 1960s. It is possible, even probable, that when enough people have begun to sate their first-generation hunger for goods, they will then turn to leisure more than they have, so that the drop in working hours, when it comes, may be quite sudden. But leisure is expensive, except for drop-outs, and this may continue to slow the trend. In any case, the working year could be greatly cut and still remain one important focus of people's use of time. A person working seven hours a day four days a week, taking 10 public holidays and eight weeks' vacation a year, and a sabbatical every seventh year, would still be working the equivalent of 1,000 hours a year. Yet that is not unlike what many American academics could do today if they wished. Moreover, if one takes hours worked not in a year but in a lifetime, years spent in education and retirement are important. An individual working 1,000 hours a year from the ages of 25 to 55 will furnish a lifetime of 30,000 hours' work; another doing 2,000 hours from 15 to 65 will have furnished 100,000 hours—more than three times as much. The Age of Leisure may come more slowly than some have speculated.

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GROWING leisure, in short, is likely to be only one aspect of a 'post-industrial society' becoming more centralized in some ways and more diverse in others. The trend towards centralization is evident in the development in all industrial countries of a whole series of government-industrial-scientific complexes, of which the military-industrial is only a prototype. The American conglomerates, which throve on defence and space contracts, are now following federal funds wherever they lead, notably into urban and social fields where they claim the market may swell to over $250 billion a year by 1980.[21] This, tending to reinforce the fusion of economic and political powers in society, will reanimate fears of being ruled by roundheads; but the diversification of work and the greater education of the many can provide a counter-balance and shift society's scale of values. Orlando Albornoz remarked at Princeton, for instance, that the United States Negro always appears in Latin America as an entertainer or a sportsman, never a leader of society. But in a world where leisure values rank higher, leisure may serve him 'doubly as a source of symbolic achievement and as a literal resource in his middle-class status'.[22] As society climbs out of the worst economic constraints and as activities diversify, so should the avenues multiply to prestige, private fulfilment and even power.

Political institutions will need to reflect these complex changes. 'Participation' expresses the new sensibility of a society more and more suspicious of external authority and élite rule and may even, within limits, satisfy it. Trade union forms of participation will no doubt develop in the coming years in plant, university and elsewhere. Voluntary associations will play a larger role. 'Noise Begins to Count' was the title of a recent article in *The Economist*, for instance, describing the growing influence of the noise abatement lobby in Britain.[23] Voluntary associations will also be needed to maintain a far closer watch, and, in part, control, over local authorities. In the man-made and unmade society, politics should come nearer the heart of the man-at-the-driving wheel than, say, a balance of payments crisis or Keynesian macroeconomics, which remain obdurately the preserve of specialists.

There are, nevertheless, limits to participation through decentralization in a society where communications and the scale of operations inevitably centralize issues. Even 'quality of living' conflicts frequently defy decentralization. London's third airport, '*le Bang*' of Concorde,

[21] 'With the federal investment in urban renewal for 1968–78 amounting to $250 billion, predictions that the market for urban civil systems will reach somewhere between $210 and $298 billion by 1980 may prove accurate' (Ida R. Hoos, Space Science Laboratory, UC Berkeley, *Systems Analysis as a Technique for Solving Social Problems—A Realistic Overview*, p. 1). The 'predictions' Dr Hoos mentions are to be found in *Finance Magazine*, January 1968. Staff, V-P. Marketing, North American Aviation, 'The Economic Spectrum as related to National Goals—Identification of New Business Opportunities' 1967.

[22] *Futures*, vol. I, no. 2, 'Leisure as an Issue for the Future', by Max Kaplan, pp. 94–95 (Iliffe Publications Ltd., 32 High Street, Guildford, Surrey, England).

[23] *The Economist*, 22 March 1969, pp. 66–67.

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or the effects of large numbers of nuclear power-stations on the ecology of the Mississippi basin are not local, but national, issues. Oil-slicks fouling hundreds of miles of coastline are not national, but international, issues. Moreover, most citizens, quite rightly, want to 'participate' only selectively at certain times and on certain subjects. Compulsive participators are born politicians, the anti-élite of today preparing to take over the Establishment of tomorrow. Some system of occasional and differentiated participation at the national level is needed for citizens who are not primarily politicians but do feel strongly about specific issues.

Theoretically, legislatures should provide this. For a variety of reasons, they have in most nations become less and less representative of their electors, more and more part of the élite system of government at the centre. They are also patently the weaker party in that system, as the executive widens the scope of its activities; and they are increasingly by-passed by new technologies of direct contact between the head of government and the voters. Television gives the president or prime minister unrivalled means of showing himself to the viewers, but, while the means of communication from the top to the base of the pyramid are so good as to produce symptoms of Caesarism, the channels upwards are almost non-existent (though opinion polls do act as red and green lights on politicians). The result is that a static electricity of irritation builds up out of which, in critical periods, opposition groups, or demagogues, can make capital, often by violence, or by provoking the police to violence, on television. In this way, opposition groups establish excellent communications between themselves, but this takes place outside the institutional system. There is no normal channel of communication within it. Minorities must be able to make their demands for reform more effectively within the system. As Eugen Loebl pointed out at Princeton, 'times have changed since the old days when the minority oppressed the majority'. The majority can (as about the poverty of the old) be passively or (as about race) actively oppressive. The fact is that most Establishments, when forced to face an issue, are more flexible and less conservative than the voters. To that extent, they do lead and educate, and should not be by-passed by, say, a Swiss form of referendum.[24] On the contrary, they need to be stimulated to exercise their function more often. One way to provide this stimulus might be to introduce an institutionalized system of petitions. Assuming a minimum number of signatures, formal petitions could compel public hearings of given issues in congressional or parliamentary and even external, but officially recognized, commissions. They would not, like the referendum in Switzerland, seek to enforce decisions; they would

[24] Thirty thousand signatures can force a referendum on an issue in Switzerland. The Swiss electorate has nearly always voted against innovation (some of the innovations are admittedly rather eccentric). This works in a highly cohesive society like Switzerland. It might merely make matters worse in countries where there is more open conflict.

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only make governments face the fact that they alone cannot decide what issues should be given an airing, and when. That, particularly in the European context, would already go some way to filling what is increasingly felt as a gap. In the 'open' society, debate is the great solvent of politics and a tremendous form of pressure on government. In America, where congressional hearings are already a political institution, a public television network to broadcast hearings may be more urgent. Neither is a panacea, but both would help to give a fresh sense of communication, within the system, between electors and elect and to adapt politics to the new technologies. They might even give a new force to legislatures as effective critics of government.

SOCIAL and political prescriptions are important, but they should not obscure, as they sometimes do, the equally formative cultural factors. It always looks more practical and positive to seek concrete explanations of events and suggest precise action on the structure of society and the state. Yet the flavour of a civilization is again and again determined by large, irrational and unexpected movements which capture the imagination. Socialism, communism and fascism were all surprises in their day. The life-style of today's young is often taken as a sign of the unexpended energies of youth in an affluent society. But in fact, the revolt against all allegiance to father, teacher, king or God has roots in two centuries of romanticism, most of them spent in a far from affluent environment. The systematic straining against the known limits of life has been part and parcel of the explosion of the agricultural, nature-dominated civilization into the technological, man-made one. This is even true of the romantic image of materialism: 'the materialist's idea of progress is an idea of *progress without limits*'.[25] Potential limitlessness is the hall-mark of romantic culture, as instant limitlessness is that of today's student radicals. But if there are no clear limits to technology, there are limits to the relevance, for instance, of communications more instantaneous than satellite TV. There are also, more importantly, limits to the human personality. While a small but spectacular minority try desperately to breach the limits of the ego, it is striking that many of the literary masterpieces of the century—Shaw's *Heartbreak House*, Eliot's *Four Quartets*, Auden's *The Sea and the Mirror*, Sartre's *La Nausée*, even in a negative way Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*—all tend to demonstrate the frontiers of the ego, or at least to uncover a world in which the cultivation of the ego appears infantile. Indeed, it is precisely through a refusal to contemplate their own limits that several of these artists were forced into acknowledging frontiers they had thought to ignore. Auden's and Sartre's works, for instance, turn on a kind of nervous breakdown. At one point in the

[25] E. F. Schumacher, scientific adviser to the National Coal Board, article on 'Economics in a Buddhist Country', in *Roots of Economic Growth* (Gandhian Institute of Studies, India), 1962.

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curve of romantic self-cultivation, the ego fails to live up to expectations and collapses under the strain. There follows a period of 'alienation', at the end of which the artist comes back to life through a minimal but intense and concentrated awareness of the fact of 'existence' as such. Sartre's anti-hero, Rocquentin, for instance, apprehends existence by suddenly perceiving the mammoth immobility and immanence of a great tree root in a municipal park, and forms from this a kind of rededication to living, almost without enthusiasm, but acceptant, even 'committed', and with a hard core of unsentimental respect, which is almost but not quite gratitude, for being alive. '*Une petite mélodie s'est mise à danser, à chanter*' at the back of the jazz record played in the café which has been his nearest place to home: '*derrière ces sons qui, de jour en jour, se décomposent, s'écaillent et glissent vers la mort, la mélodie reste la même, jeune et ferme, comme un témoin sans pitié*'.[26]

The work of all such writers replaces the romantic worship of the ego by a sense of contract, of the restraints of life and relationships. It goes beyond both the utilitarianism of the 'scientific observer', and the dionysiac romanticism which has been its compensation in art. This is true even of Eliot or Auden, whose Christianity might be thought to hark back to an older age of family, church and state. The strength of their best poetry is that it stands up, as an argument about experience, and specifically modern experience, without their faith having to be accepted. The key notion, in all such works, is that of dialogue, of relationship. This is, interestingly enough, the same concept philosophers of the computer, such as C. West Churchman at Berkeley, have been reaching, and have been forced to reach for, to distinguish humanity, or man working with the computer, from the man-like computer able to react *objectively* like a human being.

The obvious objection is that such writers are too singularly eminent, all high-brow and some dead, and that whatever they are or are not, their values are middle-aged; but this is precisely the point. Industrial, mass civilization is indeed new; and, as Shils suggested at Princeton, in psychic terms newness strangely resembles infantilism. The religion of life without limits does not merely complicate living in society; it also, and more importantly, destroys any standards by which the individual can live with himself. It is viable as a temporary expression of youthful vitality; inherently unstable, as a permanent value. Youth is likely to go on being dionysiac in a man-made, mass society freed from the constraints of nature, but this cannot continue into later life without being personally as well as socially disintegrating. Mature industrial civilization may well evolve a culture which explicitly recognizes the ages of man, like the Greeks and Hindus, or Shaw, in his own peculiar way, in the last part of *Back to Methuselah*. If so, the dionysiac side of youth can be recognized, but its transience stressed, which would limit its pretensions. The condition is that there should be

[26] Jean-Paul Sartre, *La Nausée* (Livre de Poche edition), pp. 245–46.

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some visible progression from the values of youth to those of maturity. Given the values of the utilitarian establishment, this is at present lacking. To influence the young of the future, it will be necessary to have an older generation more alive to spiritual factors, both in thought and in action. This is perhaps the most important challenge to intellectual leadership in the new civilization of Man face to face with himself.

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BLACK AND WHITE

*Walter Kaufmann**

IT is time to move beyond black and white and to start thinking in colour. Dualism is as colour-blind in ethics as it is in aesthetics. Those who approach the riches of the moral life with the traditional dichotomies of good and evil or just and unjust are like aestheticians who know only two terms, 'beautiful' and 'ugly', and possibly pride themselves on their progressiveness because they actually recognize degrees of beauty and ugliness.

The radicals of the New Left, who see the world in black and white, lend this issue intense urgency. Were it not for them, the problem might seem merely philosophical.

Radicalism facilitates progress by pushing old errors to the extremes of absurdity, making plain what is wrong with ideas that had seemed quite tolerable as long as they were taken none too seriously. Traditional morality had become reasonably comfortable by means of endless compromises, and it had come to be taken less and less seriously. Our new radicals remind us that millions have long found security in world views that reduce an inexhaustible variety to black and white, and many will not even suffer shades of grey.

It is by no means clear that this is an inveterate and ineradicable habit of the human race that only rare sophisticates have managed to escape. Those interested in a pluralistic reconstruction of morality should try to see this Manichaeism in historical perspective.

Men cannot stand the staggering diversity of life. Threatened by a chaos of sounds, colours and nameless impressions, and by a frightening whirl of possibilities and options, they seek order and stability. Yet the early Greeks and Indians were pluralists. Not blessed with any major prophets, their religions picked up gods and goddesses from neighbour tribes and conquered populations, and they wound up with many sun gods and with a jumble of divine genealogies. They did not count their deities or draw clear lines between the gods and men, but were content in practice that it was sufficient to pay heed to relatively few. The greatest powers in the world were frequently in conflict with each other, but none was always right or always wrong.

Let us consider the Greeks first and then ancient India before we turn to Zarathustra and the Manichaean heritage that our student radicals are—let us thank them for it!—leading to the absurd. Good riddance!

THE Greeks' power to organize the chaos has rarely been equalled. During the century bounded by Winckelmann's pioneering studies

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of Greek art and Matthew Arnold's effusion about 'sweetness and light', this Apollonian genius was so widely and so fervently admired that those other aspects of Greek culture which Nietzsche lumped together as 'the Dionysian' were largely ignored.

In keeping with a German tradition that had played off against each other classical and romantic, naïve and sentimental poetry (Schiller), and representation and will (Schopenhauer), Nietzsche sought to understand the Greeks in terms of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. Following the precedents that had inspired his contrast, he did not paint his two principles black and white; more nearly, blue and red.

My view of the Greeks differs decisively from Nietzsche's.[1] It would be hazardous, and there is no need, to offer sweeping generalizations about ancient Greece. But we do know the *Iliad* as well as 14 of Aeschylus' and Sophocles' tragedies, and these poems are outstanding in the craftsmanship of their design. From Homer to Aeschylus and Sophocles we witness a crescendo of economy. Conflict is at the very core of all these works, but never are the adversaries coloured black and white. The immensity of this achievement ought to give us pause.

In the *Iliad* we do not encounter any great concern with moral problems. Homer built the *Iliad* around contests, stressing the humanity of both sides. The gods participate, but some on this side and some on that, and like the heroes they are neither wholly good nor altogether evil. One might feel tempted to call the *Iliad* pre-moral, but it is merely pre-moralistic: the poet does not moralize; but his insistence on the humanity of Hector no less than Achilles, of Sarpedon no less than Patroclus, and of the Trojans no less than the Achaeans, is anything but pre-moral or amoral; it puts to shame the morality of later ages.

This Homeric attitude left its mark upon Greek tragedy. In Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers* Orestes actually says: 'right clashes with right' (line 461). Hegel's notion that it is of the essence of tragedy that it represents a collision in which both sides are justified was based squarely on Greek tragedy, although Hegel overshot the mark when he occasionally insisted that both sides were *equally* justified.

In Greek tragic poetry, from the *Iliad* to the *Bacchae*, it was recognized that nobility and even divinity did not imply that all right was on one side and all wrong on the side of those who opposed Apollo, Dionysus, or even Zeus.

Greek philosophy, too, was nourished by the spirit of Homer. Plato did not cast his philosophy in the straight didactic or homiletic mode but preferred to vie with the tragic poets, having been one himself before he met Socrates. And although some figures in Plato's dialogues say little but 'yes' and 'obviously', 'that necessarily follows', 'true',

[1] See my *Tragedy and Philosophy* (1968), on which the following account of the Greeks is based.

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'certainly', and 'I think so', the ethos communicated by most of the dialogues of Plato is that of a common quest for knowledge in which even the most intelligent men make mistakes and must go back and try again. Here Socrates' influence pointed in the same direction as Sophocles', for Socrates had insisted that he did not know the answers to the most important questions and that if he was wiser than other men it was solely because they thought they knew what they did not know.

The great Greeks from Homer to Socrates were not fanatics, and bequeathed to us a spirit that is anything but Manichaean.

READING the Vedas, which belong to the period before 1000 B.C., and looking at the temples built in India during the Middle Ages, one may feel that here is a world in which the Dionysian was never subdued by the Apollinian. It has been claimed that the Hindus have literally millions of gods, yet only a totally untrained eye will mistake this colourful world of abundance for chaos. However remote the sculptured façades of India's temples are from Greek simplicity, they are structured with extreme care, and the rigours of self-discipline were extolled in India far more than they ever were in Greece or China.

It was because the Greeks were so prone to the temptations of excess that they revered the adage 'nothing in excess', and the Indians developed elaborate systems of austerities because they felt that they needed them. Yet Hinduism absolutized neither the inexhaustible multiplicity of the world nor the means by which holy men might try to exorcise the chaos. There were always many means, many ways, many Yogas; and the sages of the Upanishads taught that the multifarious world of appearance was illusion and that ultimate reality was One.

Dualistic metaphysical systems made their appearance during the age of the Upanishads—in Jainism, for example—but classical Hinduism, or proto-Hinduism, rejected them. Even in the moral realm it preferred something less simplistic and more pluralistic while insisting that in the last analysis all moral distinctions were illusory and man must eventually rise above good and bad to enter the undifferentiated unity of Brahma.

Any conception of Hinduism that is based only on the Upanishads, supplemented by the Bhagavad-Gita, is as wide of the mark as any picture of Christianity based exclusively on the New Testament. Such readings would not prepare anyone for the realities of India or the 'Christian' world. One Hindu scripture that helps at least a little to bridge the gap to historical reality is *The Laws of Manu*. In its present metrical form it may be barely older than the New Testament, but its substance goes back to the age of the Upanishads. In these laws we find the caste system as well as detailed provisions for the outcastes. Many of the rules and the whole ethos that they implement

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are paradigms of what almost all modern students of religion would consider social injustice; hence they are generally omitted from modern anthologies. For these collections of scriptures are generally designed to create highly favourable rather than truly representative images of religions.

Manu's caste system differentiates three twice-born castes, which correspond to the three classes in Plato's *Republic*. At the top are the Brahmins, a caste of priests and sages; then come the Kshatriya, the warrior caste; and next the Vaisya. The distinctions between them cut deep and are hereditary and inviolable. Even more profound, however, is the gulf that separates the twice-born from the fourth caste, the Sudras, the slaves. The Brahmins were light-skinned and largely managed to remain that way down to the twentieth century (Nehru was a Brahmin), while the Sudras were dark-skinned, a conquered population reduced to servitude.

Few, if any, transgressions were considered more outrageous than for a Sudra to beget children with a Brahmin woman, and the offspring of such unions were Chandalas, outcastes, living abominations, not fit to be treated like human beings. They were not the only outcastes; there were other kinds, traced to different types of miscegenation (chap. x). Outcastes, of course, did not carry their certified pedigrees with them: rather were they presumed to be the products of sin, however remote in the past, and hence it was considered proper to despise them.

The belief in transmigration of souls reinforced this cruel attitude and served as another form of rationalization. If men are reborn in accordance with their deserts, then the soul that is reborn as an outcaste, or as a Sudra, deserves to be treated as such men and women are treated traditionally. And the Sudras are assured explicitly that if they are good slaves in this life they may hope to be reborn as members of a higher caste (ix. 334 ff.).

The differences between the three upper castes were also rooted in colour; *Varna*, the Indian term for caste, literally means colour. The Indian way always remained very different from the dualism of the American South, and in time the pluralism of Manu developed into an incomparably more complex system of innumerable castes and sub-castes. There even are a few black Brahmins.

Those who see the world in black and white, with pluralistic India coloured white and the dualistic West coloured black, are not only involved in a logical absurdity but also out of touch with the facts. Hinduism *is* probably the most pluralistic of the world's major religions, and its metaphysical tolerance is as admirable as its caste system is outrageous. But the religious tolerance of Hinduism has often been exaggerated: the Buddha, who based his teaching on argument and refused to read his ideas into the Vedas, as the sages of the Upanishads did in his time, was considered a great heretic for denying the authority of the Vedas: Buddhism was not tolerated and survived

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only in Ceylon, in South-East Asia, and in the Far East, but not in India; and the less we say of the Hindu attitude towards Islam the better. The Muslims, to be sure, divided mankind into believers and infidels, but both Buddhism and Islam transcended distinctions of caste and colour. The point here is not to give marks but rather to counteract any inclination to see some of the great religions as good and others as wicked.

ANCIENT Greece and India refused to see the world in black and white. Halfway between both countries, Zarathustra, the great prophet of Persia, taught that there were two great cosmic forces, that of light and good and that of darkness and evil, Ohrmazd and Ahriman. He called on man to help the former vanquish the latter. We do not know for sure when he lived, but most scholars now consider him a contemporary of Jeremiah and believe that it was in part his message that electrified his people and set them to conquering the Babylonian Empire, thus bringing to an end the Babylonian exile of the Jews.

No sooner did the new religion come to the attention of the Jews than the Second Isaiah countered its dualism: 'I am the Lord and none else, that forms light and creates darkness, makes peace and creates evil. I am the Lord that does all this' (xlv. 6 ff.).

Some Zoroastrian ideas gained entrance into Judaism without achieving any great prominence in Old Testament times: notably the notions of the resurrection of the dead and the last judgment. But the concept of the Lord of Darkness made no headway in the light of Isaiah's impassioned pronouncements. In the Book of Job, Satan could accuse Job before the Almighty, but neither Job nor his friends, neither Satan nor God, even considered the possibility that God was not responsible for the sufferings of the blameless Job. Nor can we discount the possibility that the folktale of Satan and God antedated Zarathustra, and that the Persian prophet raised a relatively minor figure to a status almost equal to that of the Lord of Light.

The *morality* of the ancient Hebrews was not free of dualism. Towards the end of the Law of Moses we find this summing up:

> See, I have set before you this day life and good, death and evil. If you obey the commandments of the Lord your God which I command you this day, by loving the Lord your God, by walking in his ways, and by keeping his commandments and his statutes and his ordinances, then you shall live and multiply. . . . But if your heart turns away, and you will not hear, but are drawn away to worship other gods and serve them, I declare to you this day, that you shall perish. . . . I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse; therefore choose life. . . . (Deuteronomy xxx. 15 ff.)

Monotheism is here accompanied by a morality of good and evil. There is only one way to be good—at least for those addressed here—

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and that is to love the Lord and obey his laws. All other ways and worship of other gods are evil. In a later age, humane rabbis allowed for the just among the Gentiles. The distinction between the moral core of the law and the statutes and ordinances made it possible to recognize that men could be moral without worshipping the Lord. But there were not two moral laws but one, and those who followed it were considered good, and those who did not were not good.

In many ways the Gospels are more dualistic and come much closer to a black-and-white view than the Law of Moses. This may have been due in part to Zarathustra's influence: Moses and most of the prophets had come before Zarathustra, and the religion of the Old Testament had gained its distinctive character before it came into contact with Persian and Hellenistic ideas, while the New Testament is a product of the Roman Empire and was written in Greek in a period in which some Persian and Greek notions had become common coin.

Moses and the prophets had been concerned largely with a way of life, and a large portion of the Pentateuch was given over to minute legislation. The central concern of the Gospels is with salvation and the terrifying question what one must do to be saved or, to put the point negatively, to escape eternal damnation. There are the sheep and the goats, and according to both Matthew (xii.30) and Luke (xi.23), Jesus said: 'He who is not with me is against me.' The Devil became a far more powerful figure in Christianity than Satan had been in the Old Testament; he became the Evil One, the Lord of Hell; and mankind was divided into two camps, those headed for heaven and those headed for hell.

EVEN so, Christianity did not follow Zarathustra all the way. In the third century another Persian prophet, Mani, arose in southern Babylonia and preached what might be called a more Zoroastrian version of Christianity. He was martyred at the instigation of Magian priests but was survived by the doctrine that still bears his name: Manichaeism. For a while its impact in the Roman Empire rivalled that of Christianity, and Augustine came under its spell. Eventually the church condemned the Manichaean heresy, and as a religion it died. The details of this form of Gnosticism are now known only to a few historians of religion, yet Manichaeism is far from dead if we use the name inclusively to label that view in which history is a contest between the forces of light and darkness and men are divided into two camps, with all right on one side.

Metaphysically, the great advantage of Manichaeism over Christianity is its ability to solve the so-called problem of evil. If God is omnipotent as well as unsurpassable in goodness, love of man, and justice, then the suffering that we actually find in the world cannot be accounted for, and the innumerable attempts of Christian theologians

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and philosophers to solve this problem represent a vast 'expense of spirit in a waste of shame'. Indeed, the position of the Christian is even worse than most Christian writers on this subject realize: there is yet the doctrine of hell and eternal damnation. Historically approached, the problem becomes clear: you can no more endow God with the virtues of Ohrmazd while denying the existence of Ahriman, and square this conception with the Persian notions of the last judgment and eternal damnation, or with the suffering in this world, than you can square the circle.

The Second Isaiah had voiced the spirit of the Hebrew Scriptures: the one Lord and none else forms light and darkness, 'makes peace and creates evil'. This had been the view of Jeremiah mourning the fall of Jerusalem: 'Is it not from the mouth of the Most High that good and evil come?' (Lamentations iii.38). And in the eighth century Amos had asked: 'Is a trumpet blown in a city, and the people are not afraid? Does evil befall a city, and the Lord has not done it?' (iii.6). This was how the ancient Hebrews met the problem of innocent suffering.

The friends of Job, like generations of Christian theologians, insist that God is good and just beyond compare and conclude that Job's suffering proves that he is guilty and deserves punishment, although the Bible insists that Job was in fact blameless. Job never questions God's power, but he does question his justice; and in the end the Lord reproaches Job's friends, saying twice: 'You have not spoken of me what is right, as my servant Job has.' But most readers have felt so certain that God's moral perfection is above question that they have refused to recognize what the Book of Job actually says, and when Christian theologians and philosophers have tried seriously to offer arguments to solve the problem of evil they have almost invariably sided with the friends of Job and have moreover implied without saying so outright that God is not altogether omnipotent.

It is understandable how in the context of this problem some of the philosophers of the French Enlightenment became interested in Manichaeism. And a modern Bayle scholar has said: 'Perhaps, after the catastrophes of the 20th century have shaken our Pelagian confidence to its roots, and the strength of theological and metaphysical monism has been further eroded, a new Bayle will appear to show how *really* plausible Manichaeanism is in the context of recent human history.'[2]

Yet anyone who reads up on Manichaeism can scarcely find this late product of gnostic syncretism '*really* plausible'. Anyone with a developed critical spirit must find this system of beliefs utterly incredible. The mere fact that Mani was not confronted by an insoluble problem of evil does not establish any strong presumption for his

[2] Richard H. Popkin, 'Manichaeanism in the Enlightenment' in Kurt H. Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr., eds., *The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse* (1967), p. 54.

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message. After all, that is also true of most other religions, including Biblical Judaism as well as Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism, Taoism and Confucianism, Homer's religion and Plato's; and for the non-religious the problem of squaring God's goodness and omnipotence with the facts of life does not arise.

The perennial appeal of Manichaeism is not due to the fact that if we postulate an evil deity a traditional problem of Christian theology dissolves: that much Mani's doctrine has in common with most religious and non-religious world views. The Manichaean heresy will not die because it invites men to see themselves as the children of light and their foes as the forces of darkness. This dualism was not invented by Mani: 'the children of light' are encountered earlier in the New Testament [3] and in the Dead Sea Scrolls, and the moral dualism can be traced back at least to Zarathustra.

In the last chapter of his *Ecce Homo* (section 3), Nietzsche remarked two years after the publication of *Beyond Good and Evil* that 'Zarathustra was the first to consider the fight of good and evil the very wheel in the machinery of things: the transposition of morality into the metaphysical realm, as a force, cause, and end in itself, is *his* work'. Thus the historical Zarathustra was 'just the opposite of' Nietzsche's Zarathustra: 'Zarathustra created this most calamitous error, morality; consequently, he must also be the first to recognize it.'

Here the idea is dramatized so much that one is apt to miss it: morality as a 'calamitous error' sounds so shrill that Nietzsche's point is not heard. And 'beyond good and evil' is such a brilliant phrase that generations of readers have been blinded by it and did not absorb the plain declaration in the second section of that book that it was intended as an attack on 'The fundamental faith of metaphysicians [which] is *the faith in opposite values*'.

Let us speak of Mani and Manichaeism rather than Zarathustra and Zoroastrianism because 'Zoroastrianism' would suggest an ancient religion, and 'Zarathustra' would invite confusion with Nietzsche's mouthpiece, while 'Manichaean' is a term *often* used figuratively. In the following pages, 'Mani' is not a third-century martyr but a symbol for that outlook which reduces the world and moral collisions to black and white.

THE virus of Mani has taken a fearful toll in Christianity, but in our time the churches are going far towards ridding themselves of this disease—or the plague is leaving the sinking ship of Christianity to smite our ideologues. When Manichaeism struck the Right in the nineteenth century, it was apparent that the infection had come from the church. In the Dreyfus affair the clerical background of anti-semitism met the eye, and even in the nazis' leading anti-semitic journal, *Der Stürmer*, no text was quoted more often than Jesus's dictum in the

[3] Luke xvi, 8, John xii, 36, Eph. v, 8, 1 Thess. v, 5.

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fourth Gospel that the Devil was the father of the Jews. Joe McCarthy and the Birch Society left anti-semitism behind and cast the communists in the role of the forces of darkness, while still trying to explain all social evils in terms of conspiracies; but the nazis had destroyed the intellectual respectability of the far Right, and few have taken McCarthy or the Birchers seriously on an intellectual level. Their attempts to explain events in Manichaean terms have not been dignified with the name of philosophy.

When the New Left appeared, the dreadful silence, apathy and despair of the McCarthy period gave way to a new ferment in the intellectual community. Students and young faculty formed the vanguard, and the fusion of intellectual and moral concerns roused premature hopes. But almost at birth the New Left succumbed to the virus of Mani.

Why? However unfortunate it is that the New Left swallowed the basic scheme of the Old Right, merely reversing the value signs, the case is anything but exceptional. When the tables are turned, the tables themselves are not subjected to critical scrutiny.

It may seem as if the Old Right could not have had that much influence. But precisely its Manichaeism triumphed internationally, and the young radicals of the New Left grew up during the period of the Cold War. For those whose memories extend back to before the Second World War, McCarthyism was a shameful interlude that is either forgotten or recalled only as a brief and wretched excess. For those who entered colleges and universities in the 1960s, it was neither brief nor an interlude nor an excess. Nazism and Pearl Harbor happened before their time. The student radicals were born under the aegis of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, their childhood was dominated by the Cold War and, if they are Americans, by McCarthyism, and their adolescence by the civil rights struggle. It is all too understandable that democracy seems much sicker to them than it does to their parents who lived through the Second World War.

To understand the New Manichaeans, who reduce the most complex issues to black and white, one must further consider the colour problem. Like the Cold War, it is international; but one must begin somewhere, and we shall focus on the United States first.

American Negroes are visually a heterogeneous group and look much less alike than do the whites, but they have been treated and continue to be treated without any regard for the actual colour of their skin. Whether that is black, dark brown, light brown, or white, they have been classified as Negroes and made to see the world in black and white, whether they liked it or not; and until the middle of the twentieth century few of them did.

At the same time, black and white were by no means neutral terms. In Horace's *Satires* ' he that backbites an absent friend ' is called black, *niger* (I. iv.85), and Horace also speaks of ' the whitest souls earth ever

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bore' (I. v.41). In his *Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche surmised that the Latin *malus* (bad) was probably related to Greek *melas* (black), and that such words reflect the ancient contempt of blond conquerors for the black-haired native population. Perhaps there is some truth in this hypothesis; but the notion that darkness is uncanny, dangerous, and the enemy, while the light dispels threats and is friendly, a saviour and the force of good is probably far older.

Clearly, 'black' hearts, 'black' days, 'blackmail', 'blacken', and the connotations of 'dark' were not invented by American whites to make the Negro feel inferior. Nevertheless, the value judgments embedded in the language did undermine the self-esteem of American Negroes. To regain that, it would not do to suggest a more pluralistic perspective and insist that men do not fall into one of two categories, that there are an indefinite number of shadings, and that it is arbitrary to lump the almost white with the truly black. While that approach would have come closer to the Latin-American way, it would have left intact the vicious notion that black is bad. There was nothing for it but to insist that 'black is beautiful'.

Why should millions of people model themselves on an alien ideal of beauty, admire light skin and straight hair, despise their own looks, and either try to change them by straightening their hair or feel ugly and hopeless? Taken out of its historical context, 'black is beautiful' is as silly as the insistence that white is beautiful. In its context, it was a long overdue cry of humanity. Nor is it any wonder that it was often accompanied by the charge that white is wicked and that white men are devils. This turning of the tables by some of the radicals is one source of the Manichaeism of the New Left, but it is not the major source, not even in the United States.

One might discount these facts altogether because the virus of Mani has struck the New Left in Europe, too, where no comparable colour problem exists; but this would be a mistake. The white man's oppression of the non-whites furnishes the prime example of the kind of conflict that lends itself to a black and white diagram. White radicals could agree with Negro rebels that the way white America had treated the Negroes for centuries was indeed wicked and inexcusable. And then the question arose whether the A-bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not of a piece with this wickedness: were not the Japanese also coloured people? The Algerian war could be seen in the same perspective: non-white people fighting successfully against their white oppressors. And the Vietnam war fell into place.

Intellectuals did not suppose that all whites were devils or that all non-whites were beautiful or virtuous. But many did come to see the world divided into two camps: white oppressors who did not shrink from using atom bombs, napalm, and torture against the oppressed, mostly non-white, who were fighting for their freedom. Given this model, one could readily cut through the complexities of Latin American

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politics and the Palestinian situation. One need hardly wonder at the popularity of a world view that makes so many crucial and exasperating problems so simple, that makes it so easy to choose sides, and that provides the assurance that, having done that, one is wholly in the right and in the company of the vast majority of struggling humanity.

ANYONE grounded in Greek tragedy and philosophy, in history or literature, must respond to such simplicity with a conditioned reflex of mistrust. And the more he knows about the issues, the more will suspicion give way to stunned surprise that anyone who claims to be devoted to the life of the intellect should actually believe in such a Manichaean view.

In the summer of 1963 I attended some religious services in a Zen monastery in Kyoto. They always began at 7 a.m. and lasted an hour. The first 20 minutes were marvellous: chants accompanied on drums by the master's sons. During the next 20 minutes I became conscious of my legs, squatting on the floor, listening to recorded music that I could also have heard at home. But the last 20 minutes truly tried my patience: every morning we listened to a tape of a voice with an unmistakable New York accent, reading us passages from the writings of D. T. Suzuki that I had read before—contrasting East and West and explaining how Westerners are aggressive and feel impelled to dominate, while the Japanese are totally unaggressive and have no desire to dominate but seek harmony with nature.

Anyone who had lived through the invasion of Manchuria and the rape of Nanking, through the tide of Japanese aggression and the Second World War could scarcely swallow this; but the students who started 'digging' Zen in the sixties had no memories of any of these events. Their impressions of Zen are wholly bookish and yet utterly unhistorical. They are apt to come to Suzuki by way of Erich Fromm and his arch-Manichaean contrast of authoritarian and humanistic religions in which Zen is adduced as a prime example of humanistic religion.

In fact, Zen does not acknowledge the authority of either the Buddha or the ancient scriptures that transmit his teaching: what matters is the experience of enlightenment which can be acquired without such intermediaries—by going to a Zen monastery and submitting entirely to the authority of the master. It was thus by means of Zen that the originally pacifistic message of the Buddha was transformed into the religion of the Samurai, for whom war was a way of life.

One can and should grasp the profundity of Zen, delight in its whimsical charm (the Chinese contribution, the injection of Taoism into Buddhism), and still comprehend its historical and sociological function. Similarly, the Bhagavad-Gita is one of the great religious scriptures, but it does sanctify the caste system. Conversely, one can and should criticize the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and

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Nagasaki without seeing the Japanese in 1945 as a peace-loving and innocuous Asian people who suddenly became the innocent victims of American brutality. The bombing of Nagasaki was even more inexcusable than that of Hiroshima, but it is by no means clear that the fact that the Japanese are Asian or non-white influenced these two decisions. The fire-bombing of Dresden was also inexcusable, and there was far less reason, if any, to suppose that it would greatly shorten the war.

The world is full of outrages, and it is easy to sympathize with the indignation of those who paint them black. It is less easy to follow such rhetoric when it goes on to paint the other side white. As a rule, wrong clashes with greater wrong.

ALL this is so plain that it seems difficult to understand how large numbers of students in many different countries can fail to see it. But even when the world was less complex, many people found peace of mind in simplistic world views. Now that the world situation and the societies into which youth finds itself thrown are of truly frightening complexity, the hunger for Manichaeism is greater than ever. As social and international problems become more involved and unmanageable, the prospect of finding security in a world view that reduces everything to black and white becomes more attractive.

One despairs of finding solutions through study; one does not feel up to it; the outcome is too uncertain. The Manichaean need not despair: he knows the solution before immersing himself in the problems; he studies to find corroboration; and he has the faith that his side will win, even if he does not happen to know how and when.

But is not Manichaeism too simple to be intellectually respectable? It would certainly be of inestimable advantage if a philosopher could be found who, without spoiling the simplicity of this ancient scheme, had brought it up to date with suitable references to Marx and Freud, adding enough jargon and obscurity to make everything seem very academic and profound. It is easy to imagine the joy of the European students who discovered such a philosopher. Carried away by their understandable delight, they proclaimed their prophet as the third member of a rather unlikely trinity—so unlikely, in fact, that the slogan was picked up by the mass media and spread to the four corners of the globe (the world of Mani could hardly be round): 'Marx, Mao, Marcuse'. As long as a sense of proportion was considered irrelevant anyway, a slightly different trio would have been more illuminating: Mani, Marx, Marcuse.

Herbert Marcuse's books had never attracted one-tenth of the attention lavished on Jean-Paul Sartre's. An immensely likeable professor at a new branch of the University of California at La Jolla, he was approaching 70 when lightning struck. And suddenly he was cast in the role for which Sartre had prepared himself for 20 years. Even

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in France the students did not hail Sartre as their prophet. Yet Sartre had tried much more conspicuously to make philosophy 'relevant' and to bring together Marxism and existentialism. And in ever so many ways, Sartre was incomparably less bourgeois and more outside 'the Establishment'. Why, then, did the students prefer Marcuse?

Sartre's complexity is not of the surface only but of the very essence of his work. He is subtle to a fault. *Les Mains Sales* is a fine example of his mistrust of all simple answers. He does not offer any security; he calls into question every perspective by exploring two more. In one of his first attempts to deal with social questions he attacked anti-semitism—for reasons and in words that are no less applicable to many student radicals:

> The rational man seeks the truth gropingly, he knows that his reasoning is only probable, that other considerations will arise to make it doubtful. . . . But there are people who are attracted by the durability of stone. They want to be massive and impenetrable. . . . They want to exist all at once and right away. They do not want acquired opinions, they want them to be innate; since they are afraid of reasoning, they want to adopt a mode of life in which reasoning and research play but a subordinate role, in which one never seeks but that which one has already found. . . . If you insist too much they close up, they point out with one superb word that the time to argue has passed. . . .[4]

Sartre went on to point out that this type of man is afraid of solitude and that 'If he has become an anti-semite, it is because one cannot be anti-semitic alone'.

Sartre has never ceased to exemplify the arch-individualism of an intellectuals' intellectual who has a profound mistrust of mass movements and those who join them. In the 1960s, to be sure, he came to hail Marxism as the philosophy of our age, while disparaging existentialism as merely 'a parasitical phenomenon on the margins of knowledge'.[5] But it was also during the sixties that he refused to accept the Nobel Prize, giving as one of his reasons that he must stand alone and that even the tag 'Prix Nobel' after his name would compromise him. Clearly, he was objecting not only to the establishment that wanted to confer the Prize on him but to any bond to any organization. And his depreciation of existentialism has to be seen as a repudiation of his following. His tribute to Marxism did not balance these negations; his version of Marxism is so eccentrically individual and at the same time so long-winded, tortuous, and forbidding that *Critique de la raison dialectique* could scarcely have become a rallying point for the New Left.

Marcuse's earlier books on Hegel and Marx (*Reason and Revolution*), on Freud (*Eros and Civilization*), and on *Soviet Marxism* had not

[4] 'Portrait of the Anti-Semite' (*Réflexions sur la question Juive*, 1946), translated by Mary Guggenheim, in Walter Kaufmann, ed., *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* (1956), pp. 274 ff.

[5] *La question de la méthode* (1960).

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made any great splash. Nor was *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (1964) reviewed very widely or prominently. But after a delay of two years *One-Dimensional Man* came to the notice of thousands of radical students, probably in large measure because during that interval Marcuse published an extraordinary essay on 'Repressive Tolerance'[6] and gave some lectures in Europe in a similar vein. In the summer of 1966 he was still hoping for fame and recognition in his life time; by the following summer he was one of the most famous of living philosophers, but had passed the peak of his popularity with the students because in May 1967 he said that in the universities there was probably more freedom than anywhere else in our society and that he did not approve of the disruptions.

What concerns us here is not Marcuse's philosophy but the light his international acclaim by the radical students throws on *them*. We shall therefore concentrate on 'Repressive Tolerance'. This essay of 30-odd small pages is fascinating because it would be hard to find a more Manichaean tract by a philosopher of any standing; and that is the secret of Marcuse's popularity.

MARCUSE attacks 'the active, official tolerance granted to the Right as well as to the Left, to movements of aggression as well as to movements of peace, to the party of hate as well as that of humanity' (p. 85). This tolerance he calls '"pure" inasmuch as it refrains from taking sides' (p. 85).

Clearly, if there were really two parties, 'the party of hate as well as that of humanity', it would be unpardonable not to take sides. The implication seems to be that the former party is the Right and for aggression while the forces of light are 'the Left' and for peace.

The critique of 'pure' tolerance proceeds to charge that 'the stupid opinion is treated with the same respect as the intelligent one, the misinformed may talk as long as the informed' (p. 94). Again, the case is easy if the intelligent are also informed and, of course, for peace and humanity, while the stupid are also uninformed and for aggression and hate. But suppose this Manichaean scheme did not hold. After all, some people are intelligent but misinformed; and some are intelligent or informed—either one or both—but for aggression. And there is a lot of hate on the Left and among the blacks. The moment Mani's perspective breaks down, Marcuse's argument against pure tolerance does, too.

He advocates 'the withdrawal of toleration of speech and assembly from groups and movements which promote aggressive policies, armament, chauvinism, discrimination on the grounds of race and religion, or which oppose the extension of public services, social security, medical care, etc.' (p. 100). And he goes on to say that 'the distinction between

[6] *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, three essays by Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr and Herbert Marcuse, 1965.

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liberating and repressive, human and inhuman teachings and practices . . . is not a matter of value-preference but of rational criteria' (p. 101). Three pages later this becomes the 'distinction between true and false, progressive and regressive (for in this sphere, these pairs are equivalent)'. The suggestion that all criticism of the extension of social security, medical care, etc., must be suppressed depends entirely on the claim that such criticism is linked indissolubly with ignorance, stupidity, hate, inhumanity, aggression, and whatever else is evil.

If the crucial distinction—the singular here is significant; there is no need for many subtle distinctions; all we need is the power to tell darkness from light—'is not a matter of value-preference but of rational criteria', who can be trusted to handle these criteria correctly? 'Everyone "in the maturity of his faculties" as a human being, everyone who has learned to think rationally and autonomously' (p. 106). The emphasis on maturity and on having *learned* to think rationally and autonomously makes it odd that the students should ever have invoked Marcuse in their battles at the universities; but then adults, too, rarely *know* what they like.

Three pages later we are told that 'liberating tolerance, then, would mean *intolerance against movements from the Right, and toleration of movements from the Left*' (p. 109, italics supplied). Here Marcuse's Manichaeism stands revealed full-blown—and this is what accounts more than anything else for his immense, though short-lived, popularity.

Marcuse's criticism of our society contains little that is new. The same complaints stud the books of such fellow refugees from Germany as Hannah Arendt and Erich Kahler, Paul Tillich and Erich Fromm; Marcuse explicitly relies on Vance Packard; and his critique of analytic philosophy, which today dominates the Anglo-American scene, adds little to what others have pointed out earlier. What distinguishes Marcuse's stance is his threefold claim that all the ills of which he makes so much are closely connected; that they are all due to one evil force; and that there is a chance of redemption if we resolutely fight this force, alias the Right. Instead of complaining or viewing with alarm, Marcuse has the contagious vitality of a vigorous fighter who issues a call to battle. It is an ancient battle: the war of the children of light against the children of darkness.

WHAT humanity needs is hardly 'a new Bayle' who will show 'how *really* plausible Manichaeanism is'. Nor do we need more theologians like Tillich or ideologues like Marcuse who mix the new wines of Marx, Freud, and existentialism and then pour this heady brew into the dry skins of some ancient scheme. Our need is rather to question traditional schemes and to reconsider the dualistic tables we have inherited. In so far as a 'revaluation of all values' means calling good what has been called evil, and vice versa, we have had more than enough of that during the nazi period and now from the new radicals.

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But the idea of going 'beyond good and evil' and questioning the old faith in opposite values has scarcely been examined as yet.

Nobody could have persuaded millions of adults that we are witnessing a vast, possibly world-wide clash of two parties if so many people were not preconditioned to think in terms of two parties. Being used to a two-party system, to the Cold War, to believers and unbelievers, good and evil, right and wrong, healthy and sick, just and unjust, 'us' and 'them', people are quite willing to believe that our social problems are due to, or marked by, the collision between white and black or those over and those under 30. But these two suggestions are incompatible unless we reinterpret them to mean, for example, that one party consists of all non-whites as well as all whites under 30, while the other one is composed of all whites over 30. That would be logically possible, but it is obviously false.

There are tremendous tensions among non-whites in Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America. China and Taiwan come to mind, Korea, Vietnam, India and Pakistan, Nigeria and Biafra; and there are immense upheavals in China, enormous conflicts in Pakistan, and anything but serene harmony in India. The American Negro community is so profoundly split that the very word 'community' may be quite inappropriate, and most Negroes certainly do not feel any great sense of solidarity with Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, and Indians. Nor are the whites under 30 one party: they are scattered over the whole spectrum from George Wallace to Eugene McCarthy, as their fathers at one time ranged all the way from Joe McCarthy to Henry Wallace.

Even the radical students are far from forming a single party: the SDS tends to be shunned by most radical Negro groups, which in turn are often on bad terms with each other—Malcolm X was shot by the Black Muslims, Eldridge Cleaver and the Panthers are against the Muslims, all these groups are against the movement started by Martin Luther King, Jr, and Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young have different ideas yet. Meanwhile the SDS is deeply divided, too, and the Hippies' revolt against the Establishment is something else again. More radical in some ways than most of the other groups, the Hippies call into question the Manichaean intolerance that most of the rebellious groups share with so many reactionaries. But even they do not go all the way towards tolerance and pluralism: in practice they represent another extreme conformism in hair-style, dress, and way of life; and most of them seem to consider themselves the children of light and the non-Hippies children of darkness.

It is crucial for any informed and sensitive analysis of the contemporary situation to have some sense of this infinite variety and to think of a multitude of interesting spectra instead of reducing such colourful multiplicity to black and white. But the courage to face chaos is only a beginning and no substitute for an analysis.

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LET us begin with a brief analysis of intolerance. The word has two meanings that must be distinguished sharply. Of course, it has more than two meanings, but the frequent confusion of two senses is calamitous. Intolerance can mean opposition to the free expression of some views. Let us call this *political intolerance* and distinguish it from *emotional intolerance*, which means detestation of some groups of human beings (usually called prejudice). When Marcuse advocates 'intolerance against movements from the Right', making it quite clear that he means 'censorship, even precensorship' (p. 111), he advocates political intolerance.

Political tolerance is exhibited by one who defends the right of others to express and publish views that he detests, usually with the proviso that he and others have to be allowed to criticize these views in public because the clarification and discovery of truths as well as political freedom depend on the free interplay of ideas. But it is common for people to claim that men of this type are intolerant because they sharply criticize the views of others. Marcuse's argument is infected by this confusion: he calls the kind of tolerance he attacks '"pure" inasmuch as it remains from taking sides' (p. 85). But it is possible and indeed essential to take sides without having recourse to censorship.

Vigorous criticism of theories and proposals should not be confounded with intolerance, nor need it be Manichaean. Only rigorous exercise of our intellect and examination of the evidence can show us what is tenable and what is not; and the result may well be that more than one view is defensible. It does not follow that *all* views are equally tenable. Those who find no fault with any view do not show tolerance but only that in some ways they resemble vegetables.

Emotional tolerance, or what is usually called lack of prejudice, consists in not detesting any human beings simply because they belong to a certain group. Whoever sees the Negroes, whites, Catholics, or Jews as sons of the devil or children of darkness or as pigs, displays emotional intolerance (prejudice).

A humane person distinguishes between the human being who holds and expresses views and the views themselves. But it may be objected that it is by no means inhumane to abhor some views and actions; and if we loathe a man's views and actions and find his habits and behaviour arrogant, cowardly, dishonest, and brutal, how can we refrain from the conclusion that *he is* arrogant, cowardly, dishonest, and brutal, and how can we help detesting *him*? To this question we must return later.

The case for political tolerance depends on pluralism. If all truth were on one side and nothing but error on the other; if there were good criteria for telling which was which but most of mankind were unable to tell truth from error, the case for tolerance would be weak indeed. And if we went one step beyond Marcuse to link error not only with wickedness but also with eternal torment, while associating

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truth not only, as he does, with goodness but also with endless bliss, the case for intolerance would be won. This is in fact how it was won in the Christian Middle Ages.

Anyone who actually believes that infidels like Spinoza and Voltaire, Marx and Nietzsche, Freud and Sartre, as well as those infected by their views, will probably be punished with eternal torment of some kind, *must* be for the suppression of such views unless he is brutally deficient in charity. But once the traditional beliefs about hell crumbled, the case for intolerance became weaker, and powerful arguments for tolerance can be found in Milton's *Areopagitica* and J. S. Mill's essay *On Liberty*. While it is odd that Marcuse does not come to grips with these arguments, they are familiar enough and there is no need to rehash them here.

Marcuse's basic error is his assumption that all right is on the Left, all wrong on the Right. The moment we cease to see the world in black and white, the instant we see it in colour in its inexhaustible variety, we find a multitude of groups and some hate, some aggression, some stupidity, some lack of information, and some errors wherever there are sizeable groups of human beings—but fused in ever different proportions with love and humanity, intelligence and information, and even some truth.

There is something highly artificial not only about 'the Right' and 'the Left' but also about the other pairs of opposites in Marcuse's essay: they all smell of Mani. It is because men think in terms of good and bad that they construct such pairs as love and hate, truth and error.

What is the opposite of love? Is it hate? Or rather lack of love, which could mean ignorance of a person's very existence? Or indifference to a person whom we might be expected to love or whom we did love at one time? Or near-indifference coupled with a little irritation? Or a definite aversion, either faint or strong? Or envy? Or resentment?

Many people would say: hate, of course. Others: no, hate is really much closer to love than is indifference; and as long as there is hate, love may be kindled. However that may be, hate and love are certainly not opposites; they are not even mutually exclusive, they often coexist and interpenetrate. Love and hate are neither two solid substances nor two liquids that can be mixed. 'Love' is a highly abstract term that can be applied to very complex configurations of feelings, thoughts, and actions, and many of these configurations bear very little resemblance to each other.[7]

There are no opposites in nature. What would be the opposite of this rose or that Austrian Pine? Of this rock? Of the sun, the sky, this shadow? This human being has no opposite, neither does the hue of his skin, the light on his hair, or the way he speaks.

Only human thought introduces opposites. Neither individual objects

[7] See my *Critique of Religion and Philosophy* (1958), section 29.

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nor classes of objects—such as roses, pines, rocks, and human beings—have opposites; nor do colours, sounds, textures, and feelings.

But are not hard and soft opposites? As abstract concepts, they are; but the feel of a rock and the feel of moss are not opposites. It is only by disregarding most of the qualities of both experiences and classifying one as hard and the other as soft that we *think* of them as opposites. Playing with fire and rolling in the snow are not opposites—far from it—but hot and cold are. No specific degree of heat or coldness has any opposite, only the concepts of hot and cold do. The starry heavens and a sunny sky are not opposites, but day and night are. And Mani's minions look everywhere for day-concepts and night-concepts.

Hot and cold are not like day and night. Temperatures are arranged on a linear scale, like hard and soft, fast and slow. Day and night, like summer and winter, form a cycle and have to be represented by a circle, like colours. And colours that are across from each other on a colour wheel are not called opposite but complementary colours. Black and white may be opposite, but no two colours are; nor are any two times of day, indeed nothing temporal, nothing living, nothing that is in process.

Hegel grasped this; also that only the understanding introduces opposites. But in the history of ideas what has influence is usually a misunderstanding: either a man's errors and prejudices prevail, or *he* is misunderstood. Hegel was soon taken to have taught that nature and history abound in opposites, and this was believed to be the essence of his dialectic. Marx liked this dialectic better than anything else in Hegel's thought and gave the world dialectical materialism.

Now that Marx's memory is sacred not only to billions of Marxists but also to millions of others, even as Jesus's name is sacred not only to Christians, it is bound to be resented widely if one points to the Manichaean elements in both. Jesus is held to have been love incarnate, and Marx a major social scientist, though both denied the bare integrity and decency of their opponents, substituting gross invective and vituperation for attempts at dialogue. They saw the world in black and white. 'Whoever is not for me is against me.'

The work of the understanding is of the utmost importance: to understand complex situations that initially strike us as chaotic, we need concepts and abstractions; we disregard what for the moment is irrelevant and focus our attention on a few factors that we idealize, ignoring, as it were, the imperfections of their actual existence. Hegel always associated this power of the understanding, which he hailed repeatedly, with the negative and even with destruction. Let us call it analysis.

Scientists and engineers and analytical philosophers do not need to be told how important it is, but growing numbers of young people see it as the enemy, along with the computer, and extol concrete existence and direct experience, intuition, feeling, confrontation. These

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neo-romantics fall pray to the virus of Mani much more often than do the devotees of analysis. Why?

As Hegel recognized, philosophy requires the understanding as well as intuition, and reason does not do its job as long as either analysis or direct experience are held to be sovereign. Although no other philosopher had made so much of this theme, the partiality of both approaches is felt widely, and the partisans of each feel a need for the other. Thus the analytically minded tend to leave the realms of faith and morals, if not politics, to feeling and intuition, while the prophets of direct experience indulge in a bare minimum of analysis and have a fondness for polarities.

Unimpeded, neither analysis nor experience stops with the recognition of opposites; both lead to pluralism, and so does any thinking that subjects even faith and morals to analysis, without ignoring the concrete experiences of the moral and religious life. Those who see things in black and white limp on both legs: they curtail both the understanding and direct experience, settling for a little of each.

ARE truth and error opposites? Or is *falsehood* the opposite of the truth? Or is the lie? These questions concern words or possibly concepts of the understanding. I say 'possibly' because the questions hinge on the meanings of English words. Since 'falsehood' cannot always be rendered by *Falschheit*, it is not clear how a German might refer to the concept that in English is designated by 'falsehood'. The concepts we use to understand our experiences are functions of our language and also of our historical situation and the science and philosophy of our time.

Mani's heirs suppose not only that truth and error are opposites but even that there is a party of truth and a party of error. This seems to mean, and some Manichaeans evidently believe, that the children of light believe only or mainly true statements while the children of darkness believe only or mainly false statements, and that true statements and positions are the opposites of false statements and positions. One is reminded of a true-or-false test. 'Abraham Lincoln was born on 11 February 1809: True or false?' False, but hardly the opposite of the truth seeing that he was born on 12 February 1809. Even a multiple-choice test would allow a little more subtlety: by adding further alternatives to the two dates mentioned, it would allow us to distinguish degrees of falsehood or approximations of the truth.

When we deal with more complex issues that involve philosophy, ideology, or evaluations, it becomes questionable whether the true-false dichotomy is at all applicable. When we are considering an essay, a book, or a position, it stands to reason that some of the propositions in it are true and others false, and that neither epithet should be applied to the whole. And even a single proposition—such as 'causality is a category' or 'x caused the First World War' or 'y is evil'—may

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require analysis before we can say that on one interpretation it is false and on another perhaps true.

When 'true and false' are proclaimed to be the 'equivalent' of 'progressive and regressive' (Marcuse, p. 104), it is clear that we are no longer concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of propositions. A distinction between mere correctness and truth is assumed, and this goes back to Hegel's dictum, in the preface to the *Phenomenology*: 'The true is the whole.'

Hegel went on to explain that propositions depend for their meaning on a wider context of definitions and explanations; that philosophical truth cannot be encapsulated in dogmas (say, 'the world is finite', or 'the will is free'): it requires a whole system in which crucial terms (e.g. 'world' and 'finite', 'will' and 'free') are analysed in detail and discussed along with other terms to which they are related. What is needed, according to Hegel, is a comprehensive philosophy, and in so far as each philosophy tends to be one-sided and concentrates on a few insights, these insights must be integrated in a more comprehensive philosophy that is in relation to these partial systems 'the whole'.

Lacking the faith that the future would bring us such an increase in intellectual power, or that he himself was so much more talented than his predecessors, that this integration could be brought off by a stroke of genius, Hegel taught that the search for truth must lead through historical studies. Only by learning from our predecessors could we hope to come closer to the truth than they did. Our successors in turn may use us in the same way, along with the writings of our critics. If we knew how, we could anticipate them; but as long as we cannot, we cannot predict their moves. This insistence that predictions were beyond his powers and beyond the competence of philosophy is one of the striking features of Hegel's decidedly un-Manichaean philosophy.

Marx retained Hegel's interest in history but thought he could predict future developments, although by now it is a commonplace that he could not. In another way, too, he did not share Hegel's resignation: he expected the millennium. One wonders how many of his minions share his grandiose faith in the future. Marcuse is one of the very few who have occasionally exceeded Marx's optimism.

When Marcuse equates the true and the progressive, his point is not that in a free contest of ideas truth may be expected to prevail eventually. Rather he claims that there is no really free contest of ideas and that it is hopeless to work within the present political framework. We cannot pin our hopes on labour, as Marx did, because in advanced industrial societies labour is conservative and mainly concerned with the continued gradual improvement of its standard of living. The party of the future is thus neither labour nor the proletariat, which no longer exists, but those who work for a revolution from 'the Left'. They are 'progressive' because they represent the

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wave of the future and because their outlook is close to his, while their opposition is 'regressive' and false and must be subjected to pre-censorship.

Granted a few absurd assumptions—or in one word the Manichaeism on which the whole outlook depends—it is all quite plausible. Two great oddities remain. That this black-and-white analysis should pass for 'dialectic' and be widely associated with Hegel's influence is possible only because so few of Marcuse's followers and critics have studied Hegel. And that this Manichaean world picture is acceptable to so many young people who pride themselves on their radicalism is possible only because most of them know so little history.

Even when we bear in mind the reasons we have given for the appeal of this simplistic world view, it remains stunning to hear the Left hailed as the party of humanity, as if Lenin's brutality, Stalin's terror, and Tito's long imprisonment of Djilas were irrelevant. One does not begin to understand history or philosophy until one shakes off the lure of Mani's mythology.

I AM prepared to push my anti-Manichaeism to the point of saying that we should not hate or detest any human being. You should always remain mindful of the other man's humanity and of the ways in which he is 'as yourself'. Why? I cannot invoke as an authority Moses' 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself' (Lev. xix. 18) or the extension of the same commandment to the stranger (xix. 34). If authority is out of the picture, what reasons remain?

Even if a man's views, actions and behaviour are detestable, it might be held that there is more to the man than his views, actions and behaviour and that we therefore ought not to detest or hate *him*. This argument admits of variations, but the refutation is the same in all cases: this reasoning proves too much. By the same token it would be unreasonable to admire a person whose views, actions and behaviour deserved admiration.

This refutation does not depend merely on our desire to go on admiring some people. Rather it shows that the first argument in its desire to protect the other person against negative feelings removes him altogether out of our world to the point where no contact between human beings remains possible at all. The refutation is thus intended as a reduction to the absurd. But those who find such extreme alienation from their fellow men true to their own experience are bound to reject the refutation and insist that we can respond only to behaviour, never to another person. They will neither love nor hate, admire or detest other human beings.

Another argument would allow us to admire but not to detest others, to love but not to hate. But it is a pragmatic argument, no strict proof; or, in Kantian language, it is merely a hypothetical imperative and not a categorical one. There are two good reasons for not hating any man but loving some.

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First, it is difficult to discover some of our own faults; they are much plainer in others. If we always make excuses and end up by not accounting them faults at all, we are almost bound to become lax with ourselves. But if we hate and detest as inhuman those in whom we find grievous faults we are more than apt to overlook the same faults or tendencies in ourselves because we do not see the continuity between 'us' and 'them'. Hence it is essential for our own moral health to see those who offend us in their full humanity while judging their faults clearly. Judge your neighbour and remember that he is 'as yourself'.

Secondly, our ideas and 'truths'—especially in faith, morals and politics—have an inveterate tendency to be one-sided. Even a strong dedication to bold thought experiments cannot wholly remedy this fault. What helps more than anything else is to go out of one's way to consider with an effort at sympathy the views of those whom we are tempted to detest. Without suspending our critical faculties, we should ask ourselves how human beings not essentially different from ourselves have come to see things that way. For the sake of truth, insight, and psychological understanding, it is important to cultivate the habit of not hating other men.

There is no parallel argument against love and admiration. On the contrary, the effort to become a better person and the quest for knowledge can be greatly helped by both. What obviously cannot be squared with my position is *blind* admiration or love. Even as we usually do not admire or love those with whom we agree, we need not agree with those we love or admire. Nor need we deny their faults.

THIS whole article is a plea for pluralism but not for indiscriminate relativism. We should not close our minds to the varieties of experience, and we should explore alternatives, asking what might be said for and against each. Many moral codes are muddled, inconsistent, full of ambiguities and hypocrisies, and riddled with false assumptions about facts. It does not follow that either all moral codes or all but one are in this sad condition. There might be several that are equally tenable, even as in science and historiography there sometimes are several theories that are defensible, although most theories can be safely rejected after scrutiny.

Political tolerance has promoted pluralism in religion and philosophy and, within limits, in politics. Actually, limits of tolerance are encountered in religion, too, and social respectability is even more restricted. Robert Paul Wolff's contribution to *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* concludes: 'pluralism answered a genuine social need during a significant period of history', but now we need to go 'beyond pluralism and beyond tolerance'. Wolff's 'Beyond Tolerance' is no more than a prolegomenon to a critique of tolerance, and the second of the three essays in the book is staunchly liberal. Only Marcuse offers the critique announced in the title of the book. But Wolff prepares the ground by

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arguing that pluralism means in practice that only established groups are 'in' while new groups or individuals that 'fall outside any major social group—the non-religious, say—are . . . relegated in practice to a second-class status' (p. 41). This is clearly true and important: pluralism is indeed 'a philosophy of equality and justice whose *concrete application* supports inequality by ignoring the existence of certain legitimate social groups' (p. 43). But at the top of the very next page, Wolff undermines his whole case against pluralism: 'With bewildering speed, an interest can move from "outside" to "inside" and its partisans, who have been scorned by the solid and established in the community, become presidential advisers and newspaper columnists.'

Quite so. Our pluralistic society does allow for these transitions. It does not do so mechanically, automatically, without all human exertion. There is no cause for complacency. But given great exertion or occasionally just good luck, outsiders get on the plateau. To facilitate and speed up changes of this kind is a legitimate goal of reform but does not require us to smash the Establishment. On the contrary, the cry that we must first of all destroy the present social order because anything is bound to be better than what we have now, brings back to mind the radical critics of the Weimar Republic who adopted the same stance and got Hitler.

We cannot go beyond pluralism because we have not yet attained pluralism. In at least two ways, our society falls far short of it.

First, too many of our fellow citizens are still Manichaeans under and skin. They are not as extreme as the radicals on the far Right and Left; they are given to compromises and comfort and do not care to go very far in any direction of thought, but they do not see anything wrong in thinking in terms of 'us' and 'them'. To a pluralist it should be obvious that I have much more in common with Marcuse, who happens to be an old friend, than I do with many people to whom I am closer in this respect or that. For a pluralist 'we' is a contextual term that refers now to one grouping, now to another. A pluralist can say 'we' dozens of times without referring twice to the same group.

Secondly, our present pluralism covers the whole spectrum—from orange to crimson. In any given year, our automobiles tend to look alike; and our colleges, too, come in very few models and are not as different from each other as one might wish. We need a far greater variety of institutions of learning, offering different academic programmes as well as divergent styles of life. There is no need for thousands of colleges to do badly what, given our material and human resources, few can do well. To some extent, neighbouring institutions can, and have begun to, pool their resources. But it is time to move beyond the melting pot and beyond homogenized education towards more pluralism.

This is not what student radicals demand. On the contrary, they

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want every college to make the same innovations and introduce, for example, black studies programmes, regardless of the quantity and quality of available teachers. The radicals on different campuses are as similar as Fords and Chevrolets.

To offer genuine variety is not enough; we also have to do far more to inform people of the options that are available. Even now students go to Berkeley or the University of Wisconsin and then are surprised at not finding the intimacy and the close contact with professors that actually are available at many smaller schools.

As long as most colleges try to do the same things, it makes at least some sense to try to rank these schools, if only we bear in mind that different departments at the same school are not always close to each other in rank and that there are many less tangible values. But if our schools offered some genuinely different ways of life and sought excellence along divergent lines, freedom would increase.

We must liberate the imagination even of the young. They now seek freedom by asking all schools to abolish the same requirements and to introduce the same options. They all want the same. We should encourage them to think and imagine for themselves instead of copying their peers.

For we need far more imagination than the middle-aged possess, and *we* are no longer likely to come up with bold plans for new institutions and new ways of life. Time is running out on us, and if our children and students show as little imagination as their elders have done, Western civilization could well come to an end around the year 2000. If those now young are even more inept than their elders, that is scarcely grounds for gloating.

Time is running out on us. Many of the students have very little patience. Their experience of time differs from ours. Even if we fly far more often than our students, we can also remember taking two weeks to cross the Atlantic in a boat, and longer than that to hitch-hike across the United States. Our sense of time was moulded by experiences like that, and we are prone to feel that the condition of the Negro in America has changed a great deal in the last two decades. But our students know that we have landed men on the moon less than 10 years after Kennedy proclaimed this as a goal, and the speeds reached by the rockets rushing towards the moon have a place in the experience of youth, while we still think in pre-rocket terms.

Time is running out on us. In a few more decades all who worry about student radicals will be dead, and those now young will run or ruin the world. We might use what little time is left us to say what most needs saying. And few messages are as urgent as this: It is time to move beyond black and white and to start thinking in colour.

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WILL THE USSR SURVIVE UNTIL 1984?

Andrei Amalrik

(*We received the article printed below, which will subsequently appear as a book published by Harper and Row, through the courtesy of the Alexander Herzen Foundation, an institution founded in 1968 by K. van het Reve, Professor of Russian Literature at Leyden University. Its purpose is the responsible publication of Soviet* 'samizdat' *writings,* belles-lettres *and other material. It has also provided us with the following autobiographical note by Andrei Amalrik:*

The author of this present article was born in 1938 in Moscow in a historian's family. In 1959 and 1962–63 he was a student in the History Faculty of Moscow University from which he was expelled for his work, 'The Normans and Kievan Russia'. Before and after the university he worked as a cartographer, laboratory assistant, building labourer, projectionist on news films, translator of technical literature, press proof-reader, timekeeper at motor-racing competitions, artist's model, teacher of mathematics and Russian. In 1963–64 he wrote five plays, including East-West, *about relations between the USSR and China. Not one of his plays was printed or staged. In 1965 he was imprisoned on the charge that his plays bore a 'patently anti-Soviet and pornographic character'. The criminal charge, however, was quashed and, instead of being jailed, he was exiled to Siberia for two and a half years. In Siberia he worked as a shepherd and drover on a collective farm. He has written the story of his exile in a book called* An Unwanted Journey to Siberia, *which has now been published in Holland. At the end of 1966 he was freed before completing his term by order of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and, on returning to Moscow, worked as a journalist, principally for the Novosti Press Agency, specializing in theatre and the arts. In July 1968, together with his wife, he picketed the British Embassy in Moscow to protest against arms being supplied to the Federal Government of Nigeria and to try to draw the attention of the Soviet public to the pitiful situation of the population of Biafra. At the end of 1968, on the insistence of the KGB, he was removed from the NPA job and worked as a postman. Now, in patient expectation of further imprisonment, he occupies himself growing cucumbers and tomatoes.*)

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THERE are basically three reasons that impel me to write. First, an interest in Russian history. Nearly 10 years ago I wrote a work on Kievan Russia; for reasons that had nothing to do with me I was obliged to interrupt my research work on the beginnings of the Russian state. Now, however, I am hoping that, as a historian, I shall be recompensed a hundredfold for this by becoming a witness of its end. Second, I have been able to keep a close watch on the efforts being made to create an independent social movement in the USSR, which in itself is highly interesting and merits some kind of preliminary assessment. Third, it has frequently been my lot to hear and read about the so-called 'liberalization' of Soviet society; these reflections can be briefly formulated as follows: at the present time the situation is better than 10 years ago; consequently, in 10 years' time it will be still better. I shall try here to show why I disagree with this.

I would like to emphasize that my article is not based on any kind of researches but merely on observations and reflections. From that point of view it may appear to be empty chatter but, for Western Sovietologists at any rate, it offers the same interest as a fish would for ichthyologists if it all of a sudden began to talk.[1]

AS it appears, in the course of approximately five years, from 1952 to 1957, a special kind of revolution at the top occurred in our country. It passed through such moments of intense strain as the creation of the so-called expanded Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, the case of the doctors, the mysterious death of Stalin, the purge of the

[1] I began to express [my] views about the imminent crisis in the Soviet system in the autumn of 1966, soon after returning from exile in Siberia: first, to my not very numerous friends, and [then] in November 1967 I set them down in a letter which I sent to *Literaturnaya Gazeta* and *Izvestia*, asking them to publish it. I received a polite reply to the effect that the editorial offices of both papers had no desire to do so, as they did not share a number of the views expressed in the letter. However, further happenings, both inside the country and beyond its borders, convinced me that many of my assumptions were well founded, so I decided to set them forth in a separate article. To begin with, I proposed to entitle it: 'Will the USSR Survive Until 1980', as I considered 1980 to be the nearest likely date in round figures. In March 1969 a reference to this appeared in the press: the Moscow correspondent of the *Washington Post*, Mr Shub, set forth in abbreviated, and not quite exact, form some of my views and gave the title of my future article, calling me 'a Russian friend' (*International Herald Tribune*, 31 March 1969). However, a specialist in ancient Chinese ideology, who is at the same time an admirer of contemporary English literature and whom I, in turn, must call 'a Russian friend', advised me to change 1980 to 1984. I was all the more willing to make this change, since my affection for round-figure dates has not suffered in the least: if one remembers that it is now 1969, then we are looking exactly one and a half decades ahead into the future.

My work on the article was somewhat held up and hindered by a search that was made at my home on 7 May, during which a set of materials I needed was removed. Still, I feel it my pleasant duty to thank the officials of the KGB and the Procuracy who carried out the search for not having taken from me the manuscript of this article, thus enabling me to carry the work on it through to a successful conclusion.

As I regard many of the conclusions of my article as open to question, I would be grateful for positive criticism of it. In such cases where readers of my article deem it practical, they may write to me direct at the address: Flat 5, 5, Vakhtangov St., Moscow G-2.

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state security organs, the rehabilitation en masse of political prisoners and the public condemnation of Stalin, the crises in Poland and Hungary and, finally, it ended with the complete victory of Khrushchev. Throughout the whole of this period the country passively awaited its fate: whereas 'up above' there was always a fight going on, 'down below' not a single voice was to be heard which echoed disagreement with what at any particular moment was coming 'from above'.[2] Apparently, however, the 'revolution at the top', by shattering Stalin's monolithic creation, made it possible also for some kind of movement to develop in society and by the end of that period there began to be discernible a new force independent of the government. It can roughly be called a 'cultural opposition'. Certain writers who had up till then followed the official line, or had simply kept silent, spoke out in a new fashion and some of their writings were published or were circulated in manuscript form; many young poets, artists, musicians and chansonniers appeared; typewritten magazines began to circulate, semi-legal art exhibitions started opening and young musical groups began to be organized.[3] This movement was directed not against the political regime as such but only against its culture which, however, the regime itself regarded as a component part of itself. The regime, accordingly, fought against the 'cultural opposition' and in each particular case won a complete victory: the writers 'repented', the publishers of underground magazines were arrested, the exhibitions were closed down and the poets were dispersed. Nevertheless, a complete victory over the 'cultural opposition' was not to be achieved; on the contrary, some of it gradually merged itself into official art and thereby became modified, but by also modifying official art it to some extent survived, if by this time, to a considerable degree, as a cultural phenomenon. The regime reconciled itself to its existence and, as it were, ignored it, thus depriving its oppositionism of the political element which the regime had attached to it by fighting it.

Meanwhile, however, from the inner depths of the 'cultural opposition' there emerged a new force which took its stand not only against official culture but also many aspects of the regime's ideology and practice. It arose as a result of the crossing of two opposite trends—the desire of society to obtain an ever greater supply of socio-political information and the efforts of the regime to process to an ever greater

[2] It is a fact that underground groups with opposition programmes, such as the Krasnopevtsev group, arrested in 1956, had begun to emerge. Because, however, they were illegal and, therefore, were given no publicity, the protest made by any such group became known only to its few members.

[3] I am thinking of such facts as the publication of *Doctor Zhivago* by Pasternak, Ginzburg's publication of the typewritten magazine *Syntax*, the public poetry-readings on Mayakovski Square, the exhibitions of such independent artists as Zverev or Rabin, the publication in the official press of several novels, stories and verses, which were later severely criticized, the appearance of a large number of works of song-writers and performers which have circulated in millions of tape-recordings, such as Okudzhava, Galich, Vysotski, etc. These were all phenomena of quite different types of culture but all equally directed against official culture.

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degree the information officially issued; this force was given the name of '*samizdat*'. Novels, tales, stories, plays, memoirs, articles, open letters, pamphlets, verbatim records of meetings and court hearings began to circulate all over the country in dozens, hundreds and thousands of typewritten copies and photostats.[4] Gradually, moreover, roughly in the space of five years, '*samizdat*' evolved from publishing belles-lettres to publishing documents with an ever more clearly defined socio-political complexion. It was natural for the regime to discern in '*samizdat*' a still greater danger to itself than in the 'cultural opposition', and it combats it still more resolutely.[5]

Nevertheless, '*samizdat*', like the 'cultural opposition', gradually gave birth to a new independent force which can now be regarded as a real political opposition to the regime or, at any rate, as the embryo of a political opposition. It is a social movement that has given itself the title of the Democratic Movement. It can probably be considered as a new stage in the opposition to the regime and as a political opposition for the following reasons: first, without assuming a clear-cut organizational form, it is conscious of itself and terms itself a movement; it has leaders and activists and is based on a large number of sympathizers; secondly, it deliberately lays down specific objectives for itself and chooses specific tactics, although both of these are rather diffuse; thirdly, it desires to operate in conditions of legality and publicity and it strives for this publicity, which is where it differs from small or even large underground groups.[6]

[4] '*Samizdat*' means that the writer publishes himself, and is in fact the traditional Russian method of evading the official censorship. As examples of '*samizdat*' one can cite the novels of Solzhenitsyn, the reminiscences of Aksionova-Ginzburg, Adamova, Marchenko, the articles of Krasnov-Levitin, the stories of Shalamov, the poetry of Gorbanevskaya, etc. It should, however, be noted that a large amount of '*samizdat*' is anonymous. '*Samizdat*' may also be taken as including material that was first published abroad and only later got into the USSR, such as, for instance, the books of Sinyavski and Daniel, as well as the books of foreign authors like Orwell or Djilas, which were typed out or reproduced on film, or articles from foreign newspapers and magazines.

[5] The following may serve as examples of such a struggle: the sentencing of Sinyavski and Daniel to seven and five years respectively in a 'strict regime' (labour colony) for publishing their books abroad (1965), the sentencing of Chernovil to three years for compiling a collection about political trials in the Ukraine (1967), the seven years' sentence passed on Galanskov for compiling the collection *Phoenix*, the five years' sentence on Ginzburg for compiling the collection of documents on the Sinyavski/Daniel case (1968), and the one-year sentence passed on Marchenko for the book about post-Stalin camps (1968). Severe measures are being taken also against persons distributing '*samizdat*' material. For instance, the typist Lashkova was sentenced to one year merely for typing material for Ginzburg and Galanskov (1968), Gendler, Kvachevski and Studenkov to four, three and one year, respectively, merely for reading and distributing uncensored literature (1968) and Burmistrovich to three years for the same offence (1969).

[6] Even though the court cases were held in secret, it nevertheless became known that there have been several such groups since 1956: the Krasnopevtsev-Rendel group (sentenced in 1956), the Osipov-Kuznetsov group (1961), the 'Kolokol' group (1964), the Dergunov group (1967), etc. The biggest of the illegal organizations known of up till now was the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People (in 1967–68 21 people were sentenced in a case against the Union, but the number of members of the Union was much larger).

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BEFORE looking to see how far the Democratic Movement is a mass movement and to what extent its objectives are clear-cut and achievable, i.e. whether it really is a movement and whether it has any chances of success, it is worth raising the question of the ideological basis on which any particular kind of opposition in the USSR can be founded.

Of course, as the writer himself very clearly recalls, even in the years 1952–56 there were large numbers of people dissatisfied with and antagonistic to the regime. But, quite regardless of the fact that this dissatisfaction was of a 'private' character, it was based to a large extent on a negative ideology; it was felt that the regime was bad because it did or did not do this, that, or the other, but at the same time no one, generally speaking, asked the question what was good; it was also assumed that either the regime was not living up to its ideology or that the ideology itself was worthless. It was, however, only towards the end of this period that efforts began to be made to find a positive ideology capable of opposing the official ideology.[7] It can be said that over the last 15 years at least three ideologies on which opposition is based have crystallized: 'genuine Marxism-Leninism', 'Christian ideology' and 'liberal ideology'. 'Genuine Marxism-Leninism' considers that the regime, by perverting or distorting Marxist-Leninist ideology for its own purposes, is not guided by Marxism-Leninism in its practices and that, if our society is to be restored to health, there must be a return to the true principles of Marxism-Leninism. The 'Christian ideology' considers it necessary to return in the life of a society to Christian moral principles, which are interpreted in rather Slavophil terms, with a claim for a special role for Russia. Finally, the 'liberal ideology' ultimately envisages a transition to a Western-type democratic society which, however, would maintain the principle of social and state property.[8]

All these ideologies, however, are distinctly amorphous; no one has formulated them sufficiently fully and convincingly and often they are

[7] This is a very interesting question and it may be that I am mistaken because of poor acquaintance with the facts. For reasons that are perfectly intelligible it is, for the time being, simply impossible to discover them; this will become possible only after publication of the post-war archives of the KGB. I do not in the least want to say that there were no people, or even small groups, with a specific positive ideology, but because of the extreme spiritual isolation and a complete absence of publicity or the slightest hope that any kind of changes were possible, the possibility of any kind of positive ideology existing was radically undermined.

[8] A. Kosterin (died 1968), P. Grigorenko and I. Yakhimovich may, for instance, be regarded as representatives of 'Marxist ideology'. 'Christian ideology' was the motive power behind the All-Russian Social-Christian Union, the most prominent figure in which was I. Ogurtsov. In order to be correctly understood, I want to emphasize that by what I have conventionally termed 'Christian ideology' I mean a political doctrine and by no means a religious philosophy or an ecclesiastical ideology, the representatives of which can more correctly be regarded as members of the 'cultural opposition'. And finally, P. Litvinov and, subject to certain reservations, Academician Sakharov can be regarded as representing 'liberal ideology'. It is an interesting fact that in a more moderate form all these ideologies penetrate even into circles close to the regime.

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only taken for granted, as it were, by their followers: the followers of each doctrine assume that they all believe in something common, but in exactly what is not known to anyone. Furthermore, these doctrines have no clear-cut boundaries and frequently overlap each other. And even in such amorphous form they represent the views of a small group of people. Yet there are many indications that in the broadest sections of the population and, above all, among the workers, the need is felt for an ideology on which a negative attitude to the regime and its official doctrine could be based.[9]

The Democratic Movement, as far as I am aware, includes representatives of all the three above-mentioned ideologies; thus, its ideology may be either an eclectic combination of 'genuine Marxism-Leninism', Russian Christianity and liberalism, or it may be basing itself on what is common in these ideologies (in their contemporary Soviet variants). Apparently, the latter is what is happening. Although the Democratic Movement is in a formative period and has not outlined for itself any clearly defined programme, all its participants take for granted at least one general objective: the rule of law, founded on respect for basic human rights.

THE number of adherents of the Movement is, generally speaking, just as indefinite as its objectives. It numbers several dozen active adherents and several hundred who sympathize with the Movement and are prepared to support it. It would be impossible to name any exact figure, not only because it is unknown but also because it is constantly changing.[10] More interesting, perhaps, is not the number of the Movement's adherents but its social composition. On this point I have managed to make a small calculation, taking as a typical sample the protests made in the case of Galanskov and Ginzburg.

Essentially, their prosecution was only a pretext for society to present the regime with demands for a greater measure of legality and respect for human rights; most of the people who signed the protests did not know Galanskov and Ginzburg at all. Accordingly, the active and rather numerous protests of the public against the violation of legality during this prosecution can, very likely, be regarded as the beginning of the Movement.[11]

[9] This is particularly apparent in several letters received by P. Litvinov from Soviet citizens in reply to the 'Appeal to World Public Opinion' made by him and L. Bogoraz and published in the West by Professor van het Reve. Possibly, though, the clearest example is furnished by A. Marchenko in his book *My Testimony*: as a labourer with a seven-grade education he was sentenced on a trumped-up political charge to a camp where, as he wanted to find some kind of ideological support, he read through all the 30-odd volumes of Lenin (presumably, there was no other political literature in the camp library).

[10] At the present time, when the regime is 'escalating repression', it will apparently go into decline—some of the participants of the Movement will go to prison and some will drop out of the Movement; however, as soon as the pressure weakens, the number of participants may quickly rise.

[11] Thus, it can be said to have begun in 1968. But attempts at mass legal action occurred even earlier, apparently beginning in 1965: the demonstration on 5

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Altogether 738 persons signed their names to various collective and individual protests. The professions of 38 are unknown. If we take the number of those known, we can compile the following table:

Academics	45	per cent
Artists	22	„
Engineers & technicians	13	„
Publishing employees, teachers, doctors, lawyers ...	9	„
Workers	6	„
Students	5	„ [12]

If this social breakdown is taken as typical of the Movement, it is clear that academic circles form its basic support. However, by virtue of their special kind of work, their position in our society and their style of thought, academics seem to me the group least capable of purposeful activity. They will be quite willing to 'reflect', but extremely indecisive in action.[13]

Further, it is obvious that in broader terms the intelligentsia constitute the basic strength of the Movement. Inasmuch, though, as this word bears a far too indefinite connotation, defining not so much the position of a person in society and not so much a given social group, but

December 1965 in Pushkin Square calling for the trial of Sinyavski and Daniel to be held in public (about 100 participants; no one was arrested but a group of students was expelled from Moscow University); collective letters to government departments in 1966, asking for alleviation of the fate of Sinyavski and Daniel, and also a collective letter protesting against the attempts to rehabilitate Stalin, and a collective letter protesting against the introduction of new articles into the Criminal Code (190/1 and 190/3), signed by eminent representatives of the intelligentsia (seemingly on this account no noticeable repressive action was taken); the demonstration of 22 January 1967 in Pushkin Square calling for the release of Galanskov, Dobrovolski, Lashkova and Radzievski who had a few days previously been arrested (about 30 participants; five were arrested and four sentenced to terms of from one to three years under the newly introduced art. 190/3 of the Criminal Code).

[12] The absolute figures are as follows: scholars—314 (doctors' degrees—35, candidates' degrees—94, no higher degrees—185); people working in the arts—157 (members of official unions—90, non-members—67); engineers and technicians—92 (engineers—80, technicians—12); people employed in publishing, teachers, doctors, lawyers—65 (editors—14, employees—14, teachers—15, doctors—9, lawyers—3, retired members of same professions—7, master of sport—1, clergyman—1, chairman of collective farm—1); workers—40; students—32. This breakdown, incidentally, is not completely reliable and is, therefore, approximate. I have compiled it from the 'Case of the Four'—a collection of documents on the cases of Galanskov, Ginzburg, Dobrovolski and Lashkova, compiled and annotated by Pavel Litvinov. I have counted each person only once, irrespective of the number of statements or protests he signed. I believe that if one counted the total number of those who signed declarations and letters calling for the observance of legality beginning with letters on the Sinyavski/Daniel case (1966) and ending with the protest against the arrest of General Grigorenko (1969), there would be more than a thousand (people, not signatures).

[13] I am aware that scholarly work, as a rule, calls for a great expenditure of effort and complete concentration; a privileged position in society restrains one from taking risky actions and a scientifically trained intellect is more speculative than pragmatic in character. Although workers represent at the present time a much more conservative and passive group than scholars, I can very well imagine that in a few years' time there will be major strikes in factories, but I cannot really conceive of a strike occurring in any kind of scientific research institute.

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rather the ability of particular representatives of this group to perform intellectual work, it would be better if I used the expression 'middle class'.

In point of fact we know that in all countries a group of persons with medium-sized incomes, practising professions that call for a considerable amount of training, require a certain amount of pragmatic and intellectual freedom for their activities and, like every property-owning group, the rule of law. In this respect it represents the basic stratum of society on which any democratic regime is based. As I see it, such a class is in process of being formed in our country, one that could also be described as a 'class of specialists'. After all, if the regime was to exist and to play an active part, it had, over the whole post-war period, to develop the country's economy and scientific forces. As the latter in contemporary society are becoming an ever more mass phenomenon, they are what has bred this numerous class. It comprises people who have secured for themselves and their families a relatively high, by Soviet ratings, standard of living,[14] practise a profession which gives them a respected position in society, possess a certain amount of culture [15] and the ability to form a more or less sound assessment of their own position and that of society as a whole. This class includes people in the liberal professions (e.g. writers and artists), persons engaged in academic and administrative-academic work, persons holding management posts in the economic field, and so on, i.e. as I have already said, it is a 'class of specialists'. This class apparently is itself beginning already to realize its unity and to make itself felt.[16]

Thus there is an influential class or stratum of society on which a democratic movement could, seemingly, be based; there are, however, at least three inter-related factors which will strongly counteract this trend.

Two of these come to mind immediately. First, the systematic removal from the life of society of the most independent and most active of its members, which has been going on for decades, has left an imprint of greyness and mediocrity on all sections of society—and this could not fail to be reflected in the 'middle class' [17] which is once again taking shape. Secondly, the section of this class which most clearly realizes the need for democratic changes is also that which is at the same time pervaded by the 'skin-saving' idea that 'anyhow there's nothing

[14] Regular good food, nice clothes, a co-operative flat with nice furniture and sometimes even a motor-car and, of course, opportunities for entertainment.

[15] For instance, the opportunity to listen to serious music or to take an interest in art or to go regularly to the theatre.

[16] This again is apparent from an analysis of the authors and participants in different kinds of petitions and protests in the Galanskov/Ginzburg case. By this I do not of course mean that the *whole* 'middle class' took up the defence of the two 'renegades', but merely that certain representatives of this class had already come to realize clearly the need for the rule of law and had begun, at personal risk to themselves, to demand it from the regime.

[17] This removal, whether in the form of emigration or exile from the country or of imprisonment and physical annihilation, has affected all sections of our people.

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we can do about it' or 'you're just beating your head against a wall'; in other words, a kind of belief in one's own impotence vis-à-vis the regime. The third factor has not so clearly emerged but is very interesting.

As is well known, the class of people in any country who are most disinclined towards changes and, in general, to independent action of any kind are the government officials. And naturally so, since each official feels himself to be much too insignificant beside the government machine, in which he is merely a cog, for him to demand of it any kind of changes. On the other hand, he has been relieved of all social responsibility; he carries out instructions, as that is his job. Thus, he can always have the feeling of having done his duty, even though he has been doing things which, if he had a choice, he would not have done.[18] For an official the concept of work is replaced by the concept of 'job'. In his office he is an automaton; outside it he is passive. The psychology of an official is therefore the most convenient one both for the authorities and for himself.

In our country, since all of us work for the state, we all have the psychology of officials—writers who are members of the Writers' Union, academics employed in government establishments, workers or collective farmers—just as much as KGB or MVD officials.[19] Naturally, the so-called 'middle class' is not only no exception in this respect but in their case, as I see it, precisely because of their middle social position, such a psychology is highly typical. Many members of this class also are simply functionaries of the Party and government machine and they look upon the regime as a lesser evil by comparison with the painful process of changing it.

Thus we are faced with an interesting phenomenon. Although there already exists in our country a social group which might be able to

[18] On the other hand, anyone who issues orders also loses a sense of responsibility in so far as the next lower grade of officials look upon these orders as 'good' because they come from above, which creates the illusion among the authorities that everything they do is fine.

[19] Hence many overt and covert protests in the USSR take the form of the junior clerk being dissatisfied with the attitude of his senior. This is particularly noticeable in the case of certain writers whose names are used in the West as a symbol of 'Soviet liberalism'. They tend to regard their rights and duties not as primarily the rights and duties of a *writer* but as the rights and duties of an 'official in the literary department', as a character in Dostoyevsky puts it. For example, after Solzhenitsyn's famous letter on the situation of Soviet writers, Mr Miller, the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent, asked a well-known Soviet poet in a private conversation whether he intended to join in Solzhenitsyn's protest. The poet replied in the negative. 'Don't you see', he said, 'the situation of the writer—that's our internal business; it's a question of our mutual relations with the state'. In other words, he regarded the whole business not as a question of the writer's conscience and the moral right and duty of a writer to write what he thinks, but as a matter of the internal departmental relations of the Soviet 'literary department'. He will also protest, but he will do so as a minor official—not against the department as such but against excessively low wages or a boss who is too rude. Of course, it is an 'internal matter' and should not interest people who have nothing to do with that department. This curious conversation took place in one of Moscow's foreign exchange shops.

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comprehend the principles of personal freedom, rule of law and democratic government, which has a practical need for these, and which already furnishes a basic contingent of members to the emerging democratic movement, nevertheless in the mass this group is so mediocre, its thinking is so 'bureaucratized' and the section of it which is intellectually most independent is so passive, that the success of a democratic movement based on this social stratum appears to me highly problematical.

IT has to be said, however, that this 'paradox of the middle class' is curiously combined with a 'paradox of the regime'. As is well known, the regime underwent very dynamic internal changes in the five years before the war, but subsequently the regeneration of the bureaucratic élite proceeded along bureaucratic lines through the selection of those who were most obedient and compliant. This bureaucratic 'unnatural selection' of the most obedient members of the old bureaucracy and the exclusion from the ruling caste of those who were bolder and more independent has produced, each time it occurred, a new generation of bureaucratic élite of a weaker and more indecisive type. Having become accustomed to obey orders without demur and not ask questions, in order to gain power, the bureaucrats, once having gained power, possess a brilliant capacity for keeping it in their own hands, but have no idea whatever of how to use it. They themselves are not only incapable of thinking up anything new but in general they even regard any kind of new idea as an assault on their own rights. We have, apparently, already reached the sad point where the concept of power has no connexion either with a doctrine, or with the personality of the leader, or with tradition, but only with power as such: no government institution or position has anything at all behind it except merely the realization that the function in question is an essential part of the existing system. Naturally, the sole purpose of such a regime, in internal politics at any rate, must be self-preservation.[20] That is just how it is. The regime has no wish either 'to restore Stalinism' or 'to persecute members of the intelligentsia' or 'to render brotherly assistance' to those who do not ask for it. It only wants everything to go on as before —authorities to be recognized, the intelligentsia to keep quiet, no rocking of the system by dangerous and unfamiliar reforms. The regime is not on the attack but on the defence. Its motto is: don't touch us and we won't touch you. Its aim: let everything be as it was. Probably this is the most humane objective the regime has set itself in the last half-century, but at the same time it is also the least attractive.

Thus we have a passive bureaucratic élite opposed to a passive

[20] Which is now taken as meaning the self-preservation of the bureaucratic élite since, if the regime is to be maintained, it must change, but if they themselves are to be kept on, everything will have to remain the same. This is particularly apparent in the case of the 'economic reform' that is being implemented as slowly and yet is, in general, so necessary for the regime.

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'middle class'. Incidentally, however passive the former may be, it really does not need to make any changes and, theoretically, it can go on maintaining itself for a very long time, getting away with the smallest of concessions and the slightest forms of repression.

Of course, a regime in such a quasi-stable condition needs to have a definite legal form, based either on tacit comprehension by all members of society of what is required of them, or on written law. In Stalin's and even Khrushchev's time there was an atmosphere emanating from above and felt by all, which permitted every official to be guided unerringly by considerations of the current situation (backed, however, by instructions) and enabled everyone else to understand what was wanted of them. There was, besides, the 'décor' of the laws, from which the officials always picked only whatever was needed at any given moment. Gradually, however, there began to be noticeable both 'from above' and 'from below' a desire for more stable—'written'— norms than this 'tacit consent' and this desire created a rather ill-defined situation.

The necessity of a certain modicum of the rule of law had already begun to be felt 'at the top' during the period when the role of the security organs was being cut down and mass rehabilitations were taking place. During the decade 1954–64 work was being done gradually, though very slowly, in the field of formal legislation and in that of the practical implementation of the laws—this took the form both of the signing of a number of international conventions and of an attempt to bring Soviet legislation into some kind of harmony with international legal norms, and also of a turnover in the ranks of our public prosecutors and judges. This rather slow movement in the direction of the rule of law was very greatly impeded by the fact that, in the first place, the government itself, for various reasons of current policy, promulgated edicts and orders which directly contradicted the international conventions that had just been signed and also the approved bases of Soviet legislation [21]; secondly, the turnover of cadres occurred within extremely narrow limits and inconsistently, and came up against the lack of an adequate number of administrative officials who understood the concept of the rule of law; thirdly, the professional egotism of the administrative officials led them to oppose anything that might in any way limit their influence and abolish their privileged status in society; and fourthly, the very idea of the rule of law had hardly any roots in Soviet society and was in blatant conflict with the officially proclaimed doctrines of the 'class' approach to all phenomena.

Although the movement towards the rule of law, begun 'from above', thus became gradually bogged down in a bureaucratic quagmire, voices were suddenly heard 'from below' about the need to obey the laws.

[21] For instance, the adoption in 1961 of an edict, not incorporated into the Criminal Code, on five-year exile with compulsory job allocation for persons with no regular employment or the extension of the penalty for foreign exchange transactions to include death by shooting and the *de facto* conferment on this edict of retrospective force.

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And indeed, the 'middle class'—the only one in Soviet society which had both an understanding of, and a need for, the idea of the rule of law—had begun, even though very timidly, to demand that they should be treated not in accordance with the current requirements of the regime but on a 'legal basis'. It now became clear that in Soviet law there exists, as it were, a broad 'grey category' of activities which, formally speaking, are not legally prohibited but in practice are considered to be forbidden.[22] There are today two tendencies visible: a tendency by the regime to 'blacken' this category (by making additions to the criminal code, conducting 'show trials', giving instructions to administrative officials) and the tendency of the 'middle class' to 'whitewash' it (simply doing the things which were earlier considered impossible and constantly referring to their 'legality'). All this puts the regime in a rather awkward situation, especially if one considers that the idea of the rule of law will begin to penetrate into the other strata of society as well; on the one hand, the regime is now obliged in the interests of stabilization to reckon all the time with its own laws and, on the other hand, it is all the time obliged to violate them in order to counteract the tendencies towards democratization.[23]

Still, if one looks back over the last 15 years, it has to be said that the process of regularizing the legal system has proceeded, perhaps slowly, yet steadily, and has gone so far that to turn it back by ordinary bureaucratic methods will be difficult. It is a moot point whether this process is a partial expression of a liberalization of the regime in our country that is, or at least until recently was, supposed to be taking place. After all, it is well known that the evolution of our state and society has proceeded not only in the field of law but also in the fields of economics, culture, etc.

[22] For instance, Soviet citizens mixing with foreigners, studying non-Marxist philosophy and practising art that is not socialist realist, trying to publish any kind of typewritten literary collections, oral or written criticism not of the system as a whole, which is covered by articles 70 and 190/1 of the USSR Criminal Code, but only of individual departments of the system, etc.

[23] This has given rise to two such curious phenomena as the mass persecution exercised outside the law courts and the selective persecution through the courts. In the case of the former, one should mention, above all, cases of dismissal from employment and expulsion from the Party; for example, within a single month more than 15 per cent of all the people who signed various petitions demanding that legality be observed in the Galanskov/Ginzburg case were dismissed and almost all the CPSU members were expelled from the Party. The aim of selective court persecutions is to frighten all those who might equally well be prosecuted; thus a person who has committed, from the regime's point of view, acts of a more criminal nature may go free, while a less guilty person will be jailed if his prosecution requires less expenditure of bureaucratic effort or because the circumstances of the moment make it more desirable. A typical example is the sentencing of the Moscow engineer, Irina Belogorodskaya (January 1969). She was accused of 'attempting to distribute' what the court held to be an 'anti-Soviet' appeal in defence of the political prisoner Anatoli Marchenko and was given a one-year sentence. At the same time the writers of the appeal, who had publicly declared that they had composed and distributed it, were not even summoned to the court as witnesses. Similarly, it is becoming more and more common to apply such a loathsome form of repression as compulsory confinement in a psychiatric clinic. This is done both in cases of persons who are slightly disturbed mentally but do

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In actual fact not only does every Soviet citizen nowadays feel that he is more secure and enjoys greater personal freedom than 15 years ago, but the director of an industrial enterprise also has the right to decide for himself a number of problems which previously did not depend on him, the activity of the writer or producer is confined within much broader limits now than previously, and the same situation is observable in almost all departments of our life. This has generated yet another ideology in society, possibly the most widespread one; it can be termed 'the ideology of reformism'. It is based on the view that by means of gradual changes and frequent reforms and by replacing the old bureaucratic élite by a new one with greater intelligence and more common sense a kind of 'humanization of socialism' will take place and a dynamic and liberal system will emerge in place of a rigid and oppressive one. In other words this theory is based on the belief that 'common sense will prevail' and 'everything will be fine', which is why it is so popular in academic circles and, in general, among those who are not badly off even now and therefore hope that others too will realize that it is better to be well-fed and free than hungry and enslaved. I think it is also in terms of this naïve point of view that all the American hopes connected with the USSR are to be explained.[24] We know, however, that history, and Russian history in particular, has by no means been an unbroken victory for reason and that the whole history of mankind has not in any way revealed steady progress.

not need to be sent to hospital and given compulsory treatment, and also in the case of entirely healthy people. As we now discover, the existence of 'Stalinism minus violence', as the fear of the former type of violence is dissipated from people's minds, inevitably produces a new type of violence: 'selective persecution', to begin with, against the malcontents and then 'lenient' mass persecutions, and what next?

[24] I would like to quote here a small, but typical, example concerning my friend Anatol Shub, the former *Washington Post* correspondent in Moscow. At the end of March he told me that, in his opinion, the situation of the regime was so complicated and difficult that in all likelihood there would be a plenary session of the CPSU CC in April at which, if a decisive change of leadership were not made, at any rate a more moderate and sensible policy would be adopted. Accordingly, he wanted to behave extremely cautiously until the plenary session so as not to be the last American correspondent expelled from Moscow before the liberal changes came in. No changes, however, were made in April—if one excludes the changes in Czechoslovakia—and Anatol Shub was expelled from Moscow in May 1969.

Anatol Shub, of course, is one of the Americans who has made the soundest assessment of Soviet reality and he may possibly have had some reasons for assuming that there would be a plenum in April. Nevertheless, he held the same excessive American belief in 'sensible changes', which are obviously possible only where life from the very outset is based, if only partially, on sensible foundations.

Apart from belief in common sense, Americans apparently also believe that the gradual increase in prosperity and the spread of Western cultural ideas and ways of life would gradually transform Soviet society, that foreign tourists, jazz records and mini-skirts would help to create 'human socialism'. Possibly, we will even get 'socialism' with bare knees, but certainly not socialism with a human face. In my view the growth of a civilized atmosphere in everyday life and of economic prosperity will not of itself safeguard us from violence or abolish it—look, for instance, at such a developed country as nazi Germany. Violence is always violence, but each individual country has its own specific features and a proper understanding of the causes which have produced it and which may lead to its collapse can only be obtained in the context of each country's history.

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In my opinion, however, the point of the matter is not even so much that the degree of freedom which we enjoy is still minimal as compared with that needed for a developed society, and that the process of this liberalization is not only not being accelerated all the while but is even, at times, being palpably slowed down, perverted and turned back, as that the very nature of this process obliges one to doubt its ultimate success. It would seem that liberalization presupposes some kind of deliberate plan, gradually introduced from above through reforms or other measures so as to adapt our system to contemporary conditions and lead it on to a radical regeneration. As we know, there was, and there is, no such plan; no radical reforms have been, nor are being, carried out—there are merely a number of disconnected efforts to 'plug the holes' somehow or other by different kinds of 'restructuring' of the bureaucratic machine.[25] On the other hand, liberalization could occur 'spontaneously'—as the result of continuous concessions by the regime to society, which would have its own plan for liberalization, and of continuous efforts by the regime to adapt itself to the storm of changing conditions all over the world; in other words, the regime would be a self-regulating system.[26] We find, however, that even this is not the case: the regime regards itself as the acme of perfection and so deliberately does not want to change its ways either of its own free will or, still less, by making concessions to anyone or anything. The current process of 'the widening of the area of freedom' would be more correctly described as one of the growing decrepitude of the regime. To put it simply, the regime is getting old and cannot now suppress everybody and everything with the same vigour and energy as before: the composition of its élite is changing, as we have already said; the conditions of life, in which the regime is already finding it very hard to find its bearings, are becoming more complicated; the structure of society is changing. Allegorically speaking, one might depict the situation as resembling that of a man standing in a strained pose with his hands raised above his head while another in an equally strained pose points a tommy-gun at his stomach. Naturally, they will not go on standing like that very long: either the second man will get tired and lower the tommy-gun slightly or the first man will seize the opportunity to drop his hands somewhat and relax a bit.[27] If, however, we consider the current 'liberalization' not as the regeneration but as the growing decrepitude of the regime, then the logical result will be its death, after which anarchy will follow.

[25] The so-called 'economic reform' of which I have already spoken is essentially a half-hearted scheme and is being sabotaged in practice by the Party apparat, since, if such a reform were pursued to its logical end, it would directly threaten the apparat.

[26] Difficulties in foreign and domestic policy, economic difficulties, etc., would constantly forewarn the ruling élite of changing conditions.

[27] We are now witnessing an ever greater yearning in all sections of society for a quiet life and for comfort, and even a kind of 'cult of comfort', especially in the upper and middle classes.

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IF, then, one looks upon the evolution of the regime as analogous with the process of entropy, the Democratic Movement, which I analysed at the beginning of my article, could be regarded as an anti-entropic phenomenon. One may of course hope—and this is probably what will happen—that the emerging movement, despite persecution, will succeed in becoming influential, will work out a sufficiently well-defined programme, will find the requisite structure and secure a large number of supporters. But at the same time, in my view, its social basis of support—the 'middle class' or, to be more precise, a part of it—is too weak and internally too beset by contradictions for the Movement ever to be able to engage in a real face-to-face struggle with the regime or, in the event of the regime liquidating itself or of it collapsing as a result of mass disorders, to become a force which could succeed in organizing society afresh. But perhaps the Democratic Movement will manage to secure for itself a broader base of support in the people?

This is a very hard question to answer, if only because no one, including even the bureaucratic élite, really knows what attitudes prevail among the wider sections of the population.[28] As I see it, the most correct way of describing these attitudes is 'passive discontent'. This discontent is directed not against the regime as a whole—most people simply have not given the matter a thought, or they think there is no alternative—but against particular features of the regime which are, nevertheless, essential elements of its existence. The workers, for instance, are annoyed by their lack of rights vis-à-vis the factory administration, collective farmers resent being completely dependent on the chairman (who himself is absolutely dependent on the district chiefs), everybody resents the marked inequality in wealth, the low wages, the severe housing conditions, the shortage or lack of essential commodities, compulsory registration in the place of residence or employment, etc. This discontent is now beginning to manifest itself more and more loudly and, in addition, many are already beginning to wonder: who, in fact, is to blame? The gradual, though still slow, improvement in living standards, due mainly to the intensive housing construction, does not diminish the irritation but in a sense neutralizes it. It is, however, clear that an abrupt slow-down in the growth of prosperity, a halt or a move backwards would evoke such strong outbursts of dissatisfaction, combined with violence, as would previously have been impossible.[29] Since it will be increasingly difficult for the regime,

[28] Of course, the KGB supplies the bureaucratic élite with information about the country's moods obtained by its own particular methods—and this information obviously differs from the picture that is given every day by the newspapers. One can, however, only conjecture how far even the KGB's information measures up to actual reality. The paradox is that the regime first devotes colossal efforts to forcing everybody to keep quiet and then expends efforts to find out what people are, nevertheless, thinking and what they want.

[29] This, in my opinion, explains why the regime decided against implementing the sharp rise in prices for many products planned for the beginning of 1969, and

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because of its ossification, to increase production, it is obvious that the standard of living of many sections of our society may come to be menaced. What forms will the people's discontent then assume? The form of legitimate democratic resistance or the extremist form of outbursts of individual or mass acts of violence?

As I see it, no idea can ever be put into practice unless it has, at least, been understood by the bulk of the people. Whether because of its historical traditions or for some other reason, the ideas of self-government, of equality under the law for all and of personal freedom—and the responsibility that goes with these—are almost completely incomprehensible to the Russian people. The average Russian will discern, even in the idea of pragmatic freedom, not the possibility of securing a good life for himself but the danger that some clever chap or other will make good at his expense. The very word 'freedom' is understood by most people as a synonym of the word 'disorder', as an opportunity of executing with impunity some kind of anti-social or dangerous actions. As for respecting the rights of an individual as such, such an idea simply evokes bewilderment. One can feel respect for force, authority or even, ultimately, for intelligence or education, but that human personality of itself should represent any kind of value—this is a preposterous idea in the popular mind. As a people we have not experienced the European era of the cult of human personality; in Russian history personality was always a mean, never in any sense an end. The paradoxical thing is that the actual concept 'period of the cult of personality' came to mean with us a period of such humiliation and suppression of human personality as even our people had never before experienced. In addition, the idea is constantly being propagated of seeking in every possible way to oppose 'personal' to 'communal', clearly stressing the utter unimportance of the former and the grandeur of the latter. Hence, any interest at all shown for 'the personal'—natural and inevitable—has acquired unnatural, egotistical forms.

Does this mean that the people have no positive ideas whatever, except the idea of 'strong government'—a government that is right because it is strong and which therefore must on no account weaken? The Russian people has, as can be seen from both its past and its present history, at any rate one idea that is apparently positive: the idea of *justice*. A government which thinks and acts for us in everything must be not only strong but also just; all must live justly and act justly. That is something worth being burnt at the stake for but never for the right to 'do anything you like'. However attractive, though, this idea may appear, when one makes a careful study of what lies behind it, it represents the most destructive aspect of the Russian's psychology. In practice, 'justice' is motivated by the wish 'nobody should be better

preferred instead a sort of creeping inflation. The possible consequences of a sharp rise in prices were brought home to the regime by the example of the 'hunger revolt' in Novocherkassk after Khrushchev's raising of prices on meat and milk products.

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off than me'.[30] This idea is motivated by hatred for everything that is outstanding, which they make no effort to imitate but, on the contrary, force into conformity with themselves, by hatred for any form of life that is more elevated or more dynamic than their own. This psychology is, of course, the one most typically found among peasants and the one least characteristic of the 'middle class'. Peasants and ex-peasants, however, constitute the overwhelming majority in our country.[31]

THUS, two ideas, both of them intelligible to, and close to, the people—the idea of force and the idea of justice—are equally inimical to democratic ideas based on individualism. To this should be added a further three negative and interconnected factors. First, the still very low cultural level of the greater part of our people, more especially in the sphere of everyday culture. Second, the predominant role of mass myths vigorously disseminated by mass information media. And third, the extreme social disorientation of the bulk of our people. 'Proletarization' of the countryside has engendered a 'strange class', neither peasants nor workers, with the twofold psychology of owners of their miniature homesteads and farmhands working on huge anonymous properties. What kind of consciousness this mass has about itself and what its desires are no one, I believe, knows. Furthermore, the colossal influx of the peasantry en masse from the villages into the towns has produced a new type of townsman also: a person who has broken away from his old environment, his old way of life and culture and who is finding it very difficult to acquire new modes of living, who feels himself very much out of place in them and is at one and the same time terrified and aggressive. He is also quite unable to understand to which level of society he belongs.

While the old forms of social structure both in town and countryside are being definitively destroyed, new ones are still only being formed. The 'ideological basis' on which they are being built is extremely primitive: there is the aspiration for material prosperity (from the Western point of view, highly relative) and the instinct of self-preservation, i.e. the concept 'profitable' stands opposed to the concept 'risky'. It is hard to make out whether the bulk of our people have, apart from these purely material criteria, any kind of moral criteria—'honourable' and 'dishonourable', 'well' and 'badly', 'good' and 'evil', the supposedly eternal principles which constitute the restraining and guiding factor when the mechanism of social compulsion starts

[30] This, though, is not the notorious 'wage-levelling' scheme, since they are quite happy to accept the fact that many people were worse off.

[31] As I have found, many peasants become more upset by other people's successes than by their own failures. In general, if the average Russian finds that he is having a hard life and his neighbour a good one, what he thinks about is not to try and get himself organized as well as his neighbour but to arrange somehow or other so that his neighbour too is as badly off as himself. Possibly, these reflections of mine may appear to some people to be very naïve, but I have been able to observe dozens of cases like this both in the village and in the town, and I look upon this as one of the typical features of the Russian psyche.

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moving and an individual is abandoned to himself. I have formed the impression, possibly a wrong one, that the people do not have or almost do not have such moral criteria. Christian morality with its concepts of good and evil has been dislodged and effaced from the popular conscience and efforts have been made to replace it by 'class' morality which can be formulated more or less as follows: good is what at the present moment is required by authority. Naturally, this kind of morality and also the implantation and the instigation of class and racial discord have completely demoralized society and deprived it of any really permanent moral criteria.[32]

Similarly, Christian ideology, which in Russia was generally of a semi-pagan, and at the same time state-departmental, character,[33] died out without being replaced by Marxist ideology. 'Marxist doctrine' had been far too often trimmed and re-trimmed to meet current requirements for it to become a live ideology. At the present time, the more bureaucratized the regime gradually becomes, the more of its ideology it loses. But the need for some kind of ideology is forcing the regime to look for a new ideology, namely, Great Russian nationalism with its inherent cult of force and expansionist ambitions.[34] A regime with such an ideology must have external and internal enemies that are not so much 'class' enemies, e.g. 'American imperialists' and 'anti-Soviets', as national enemies, e.g. Chinese and Jews. This kind of nationalistic ideology, though it will give the regime support for a time or so, is, however, highly dangerous for a country in which Russians form less than half the population.[35]

[32] As one of the examples of this I might cite the unusual spread of casual robbery (as against a decline in robberies by professional thieves). Here is a typical episode: two young workers were going along to visit friends and, as they walked down the street, they noticed one of the first-floor windows open; they slipped in and grabbed some trifle or other. Had the window they noticed been shut, they would simply have passed on without more ado. One constantly sees people entering a house without uttering a greeting, eating food without taking off their hats, using coarse swear-words in front of their small children. This is all normal behaviour and by no means exceptional.

[33] This is not the place to talk about it, but the fact also deserves to be mentioned that Russia took her Christianity not from the dynamic and developing young Western civilization but from the rigid and slowly expiring Byzantium, and this could not but leave a deep trace on the future of Russian history.

[34] Something similar happened also at the beginning of our century when the traditional monarchist ideology was replaced by a narrow nationalism; the Tsarist regime even introduced into everyday speech the expression 'genuinely Russian people' in contradistinction to those who were simply Russians and inspired the formation of the 'Union of the Russian People'.

[35] The need for a live nationalistic ideology is not only being increasingly felt by the regime but a similar ideology is already being formed in society, particularly in official literary and art circles (where it has obviously sprung up as a reaction against the considerable role played by Jews in official Soviet art). It is, however, spreading also in wider sections where it has a kind of centre—the '*Rodina*' (motherland) Club. This ideology might conventionally be described as 'neo-Slavophil' (not to be confused with the 'Christian ideology', partially imbued with Slavophilism, to which I referred earlier). Its characteristic feature is an interest in Russian-ness, a belief in the messianic role of Russia and also an extreme scorn for, and enmity towards, everything that is not Russian. Since this ideology has not been directly inspired by the regime but has been generated spontaneously,

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Well then, what does this people with no religion and no morality believe in and what is it motivated by? It believes in its own national strength which other peoples [36] must fear and it is motivated by the realization of the strength of its own regime of which it is itself afraid. This being so, it is easy to understand what forms popular discontent will assume and how it will all end if the regime loses all vitality. The horrors of the Russian revolutions of 1905–7 and 1917–20 will then seem simply like idyllic pictures.

There is, of course, also something to counterbalance these destructive tendencies. At this moment Soviet society can be compared with a kind of three-layered pie, with the ruling bureaucracy as the upper layer; a middle layer that we have already called the 'middle class' or 'specialists' class'; and the lower layer, the most numerous, consisting of workers, collective farmers, junior employees, service personnel, etc. It will depend on how quickly the 'middle class' and its self-organization develop—faster or slower than the decay of the system—how fast

the regime regards it rather suspiciously (the ban on the film *Andrei Rublev* may be taken as an example), coupled, however, with great tolerance—and it may at any moment emerge into the foreground.

In the light of what I said earlier about ideologies in contemporary Soviet society and their inter-relations with one another, one might depict this graphically in rather primitive and conventional fashion as below:



The connecting lines show the links between the various ideologies; it is fairly clear what separates them. 'Reformist ideology' should, if its 'ideals' are taken in the literal sense of the term, be linked closest of all with 'liberal ideology', but, because of its highly conformist method and adaptability, which can be expressed by the phrase 'It will all automatically improve later on but meantime one has to live', I have placed it in between all the other ideologies.

[36] Naturally, most of the country approved, or showed itself indifferent to, Soviet troops being sent into Czechoslovakia but, on the contrary, found it painful to stomach the 'impunity' shown to the Chinese during the March clashes on the Ussuri River.

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the middle layer of the pie increases in size at the cost of the other two—whether Soviet society will succeed in reconstructing itself peacefully and painlessly and survive the impending cataclysm with the minimum of sacrifices.

It should, however, be noted that there is still another powerful factor that works against any kind of peaceful reconstruction and is equally negative for all levels of society: it is the extreme isolation in which the regime has put society and itself; its isolation not only from society and of all levels of society from one another but, above all, the extreme isolation of the country from the rest of the world. It engenders among them all—starting with the bureaucratic élite and ending with the lowest levels—a rather surrealist picture of the world and their place in it. Nevertheless, the more this state of affairs helps to keep everything unchanged, the sooner and the more decisively will everything begin falling to pieces when the confrontation with actuality becomes inevitable.

TO sum up, one can say that to the extent that the regime becomes weaker and weaker and self-destructive it will find itself having to confront—and there are already clear indications of this happening—two forces operating for its destruction: the constructive movement of the 'middle class' (rather weak) and the destructive movement of the 'lower classes', which will take the form of extremely destructive, violent and irresponsible action, as soon as these levels of society feel they will be relatively immune from punishment. How soon, though, will the regime have to confront such perturbations and how long can it still hold on?

Apparently, this problem can be considered from two aspects: first, if the regime itself takes decisive and forthright steps to reform itself, and second, if it passively decides to make the minimum changes to retain its supremacy, as it is now doing. The second seems to me the probable line it will take, since it demands the least efforts from the regime, will appear to it the least risky and fits in with the sweet illusions of contemporary 'Kremlin thinkers'. It is, however, theoretically possible that there will even be mutations in the regime: for instance, a militarization of the regime and a transition to an openly nationalistic policy (this could happen through a military coup d'état or else by the gradual transfer of power to the army),[37] or, on the contrary, economic reforms and a relative liberalization of the regime consequent thereon (this could occur by strengthening the role in management of pragmatic economists who understand the need for changes). Neither of these

[37] That is, to the policy of quite barefacedly concealing its actions under a pretence of 'protecting the interests of the international communist movement' and thereby paying a certain deference to a number of independent and semi-independent communist parties. As for the role of the army, this role is continuously growing, as can be judged by anyone, even from such a curious example as the following: compare the relative numbers of military and civilian figures on the platform of Lenin's mausoleum when demonstrations are mounted nowadays with those of 10–15 years back.

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variants seem to be improbable, but the Party machinery against which both the coups would really be directed is so closely bound up both with the army and with economic circles that both these teams, even if they were to dash ahead, would quickly get bogged down in the same old quagmire. Any really genuine change would immediately mean personnel displacements from top to bottom, so it is understandable that the individuals who personify the regime would never agree to this: saving the regime at the cost of self-abdication would seem to them much too dear and unfair a price.

On the question as to how long a regime can go on existing, it is interesting to adduce some historical parallels. There exist possibly at the present time some at least of the conditions that led at the time to both the first and the second Russian revolutions: a caste-ridden and immobile society; the rigidity of the governmental system which had openly clashed with the need for economic growth; the bureaucratization of the system and the creation of a privileged class of bureaucrats; national dissensions in a multi-national state and the privileged position of particular nations. At the same time, though, the Tsarist regime would apparently have continued to exist for quite a long time and possibly have undergone some kind of peaceful modernization, if the upper ruling classes had not made a palpably fantastic evaluation of the general situation and its own strength and followed a policy of foreign expansion which resulted in overstrain. In fact, had Nicholas II's government not begun the war with Japan, there would have been no 1905–7 revolution, had it not begun war with Germany, there would have been no revolution in 1917.[38] Why every case of internal decrepitude should coincide with excessive ambitiousness in foreign policy is hard for me to say. It may be that, on the contrary, the ease with which any internal opposition is suppressed creates an illusion of omnipotence. Possibly the need, derived from internal policy aims, for having an external enemy induces such inertia that it becomes impossible to stop—particularly since every totalitarian regime becomes decrepit without itself noticing it. Why did Nicholas I have to wage the Crimean War, which brought about the fall of the system he had himself created? Why did Nicholas II need to have wars with Japan and Germany? The regime that now exists, oddly enough, combines in itself features of the reigns of both Nicholas I and Nicholas II and, in its internal policy, even of Alexander III. The best comparison, though, is with the Bonapartist regime of Napoleon III. In such a comparison the Near East will be its Mexico, Czechoslovakia the Papal States and China its German Empire.

THE problem of China needs to be considered in detail. Like our country China has experienced a revolution and a civil war and, like us, has made use of Marxist doctrine to consolidate the country. As

[38] Strictly speaking, it did not start both these wars itself but it did its utmost to see that they were started.

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with us also, the more the revolution has developed, the more Marxist doctrine has increasingly become a camouflage which more or less concealed national-imperialist aims. To put it in generalized terms, our revolution passed through three stages: (1) international; (2) national, linked with a colossal purge of old cadres; and (3) military-imperialistic, ending up with the establishment of control over half of Europe.[39]

As I see it, the Chinese revolution is passing through the same stages: the international period has been replaced by the nationalistic [40] and in the logic of events this must be followed by external expansion.

Objectors may tell me that China does not want a war and that, in spite of the very aggressive tone of her policy, China has since 1949 shown by her actions that she is a peace-loving, not an aggressive, power. That, however, is not the case. First, the logic of internal development is still only carrying China up to the stage of external expansion and, secondly, China has already demonstrated her aggressiveness at points where she did not reckon on meeting with strong opposition, for example in India.[41] Actually, though, the impression has been created that China would like to achieve her aims without herself taking part in a global conflict but by pitting the USSR against the USA, in which case she could then appear as the arbiter and supreme controller of the future of the world. This China has failed to achieve and the fact has long since become clear to the Chinese leaders; obviously this will lead, and is already leading, to a complete reassessment of Chinese foreign policy.

Meanwhile, the relentless logic of revolution will lead China into a war which, as the Chinese leaders hope, will solve the country's difficult economic and social problems [42] and ensure her a leading position in the contemporary world. Finally, too, China will regard such a war as a national revenge for the age-long humiliations and dependence forced on her by foreign powers. The basic hindrance in the way of achieving these world aims is the existence of the two present-day super-powers—the USSR and the USA. However, they are not joined together in opposition to China and are themselves antagonistic to one another. This is, naturally, taken into account by China which launches verbal attacks equally against 'American imperialism' and 'Soviet revisionism or social-imperialism'; the real conflict, however, and the possibilities of an outright clash are much more likely to develop between China and the Soviet Union.

[39] Then the 'revolution upstairs' began—the transition from the bloodstained Stalin dynamism, first, to relative stability and then to the present-day stagnation.

[40] By borrowing even the terminology from us—for instance, the term 'cultural revolution' introduced by Stalin.

[41] I am not referring here to the legality or illegality of China's territorial claims on other countries, more especially India, but to the methods of settling them.

[42] Above all, such factors as the extreme degree of overpopulation of certain regions, famine, extensive agriculture which requires to be developed not in depth but in width and which, therefore, needs new territories.

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Unless the USA itself starts a war with China—which it will not do—then in the immediate decades China will simply be unable to do so. She has no land frontier with the USA to exploit her superiority in numbers and practise the methods of partisan warfare, and she has also no fleet with which to land an expeditionary force. A nuclear-rocket duel—on the assumption that in 10 years' time China will amass an adequate nuclear-rocket potential—would lead to mutual annihilation, which would not serve China's purpose at all. Furthermore, China is primarily interested in expanding her influence and acquiring territory in Asia, not on the North American continent. Whether the Chinese will manage to attain freedom of action in Asia as long as the USA retains its might is another matter. Apparently, the USA is endeavouring on every occasion to prevent China expanding considerably her influence southwards and this may lead to exhausting local wars, as in Vietnam. China, however, will scarcely be interested in waging such indecisive wars which will solve nothing, inasmuch as the USA will remain undamaged. China will feel it all the more risky to get involved in such kinds of warfare so long as she has a treacherous enemy hovering over her to the north, ready to take advantage of every slip she makes. There is still another circumstance which may restrain China from expansion to the south and east: the over-population of these areas and the necessity of feeding or killing off their many-million population.

THE north is another matter. There lie the huge under-populated expanses of Siberia and the Far East that at one time were part of China's sphere of influence. These territories belong to a state which is the basic competitor of China in Asia, and China must in every case, somehow or other, finish it off or neutralize it, in order to be able herself to play the predominant role in Asia and all over the world. Moreover, in contradistinction to the USA, Russia is a much more dangerous rival which, as a totalitarian state with expansionist tendencies, may in one form or another strike the first blow.[43]

[43] China was already able to appreciate the methods adopted by its 'ally-enemy' during the so-called period of 'eternal friendship', when the USSR, taking advantage of the economic and military dependence of China, did its utmost to subordinate her completely to its influence and, when it failed to do so, completely cut off economic assistance and then tried to play on the nationalism of the small nations in China.

Apparently, Stalin, like Trotsky before him, now realized that with the triumph of the communists in China the USSR would, in the long run, acquire not an ally but a competitor and tried, on the one hand, to help to spin out the struggle between the communists and the Kuomintang, which was weakening China, and, on the other hand, to foment dissensions inside the Chinese Communist Party itself and, in particular, to oppose the influence of Mao Tse-tung. It is true that at one time the CPR and the USSR might have given the impression of being allies, more especially as they paid homage to one and the same ideology; however, the absolute antagonism between their national-imperialist interests and the conflicting features of the internal processes in each country—'proletarization' and the ascent along a fearsome 'revolutionary curve' in China and 'deproletarization' and a cautious descent along the same curve in the USSR, soon put an end to the pretence of unity.

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To begin with, China wanted to achieve her aim by 'peaceful absorption' of the USSR and, after the victory of the revolution in 1949, proposed uniting the two countries in a single communist state. Naturally, the threefold or fourfold numerical superiority of the Chinese would, if not immediately then gradually, have secured them a commanding position in such a state and, more important, have immediately opened up to them Siberia, the Far East and Central Asia for colonization purposes. Stalin did not agree and for several decades the Chinese deferred their plans, which they will obviously have to implement now by means of war. Moreover, as distinct from the above-mentioned case of the USA, China not only can wage war with the USSR but will also enjoy certain advantages in such a war.

Inasmuch as the USSR at the present time is a much stronger power militarily than China, the regime, by following a policy of imposing its will upon, and at the same time inspiring fear of, China, will from time to time blackmail China,[44] which will merely prompt the Chinese to begin the war first by the method that will favour them best. China will not, however, be able to begin war without having in advance accumulated considerable—even if smaller than the USSR—stocks of nuclear and conventional weapons. The dates for the outbreak of war will, obviously, depend on how soon China will succeed in achieving this. Reckoning five years as the minimum and 10 years as the maximum time-limit, we may conclude that war between the USSR and China will start sometime between 1975 and 1980.[45]

With a considerable nuclear-rocket potential at her disposal, China, as I see it, will nevertheless begin the war by using conventional, or even partisan, methods, trying to utilize her enormous numerical superiority and experience of partisan warfare—and will confront the USSR with the alternative: either to adopt the method of warfare imposed by China or deal a nuclear blow and thereby get a nuclear blow in retaliation. The USSR will probably choose the first method, since to launch a nuclear attack, even if anti-nuclear defence is available, would be extremely risky, not to say suicidal. At the same time the USSR's superiority in conventional weapons also may give the Soviet leaders the impression that it will be possible to dispose of the Chinese army, or at any rate repel it, by ordinary tactics. Besides, it may turn out that the actual moment of the outbreak of war will be impossible to pinpoint: as her nuclear capacity expands, so China will gradually carry out frontier skirmishes at the different ends of her seven-thousand-kilometre frontier with the USSR, infiltrate small detachments and engage in other types of local clashes, which will develop into general warfare at the moment China needs it. It will thus prove very difficult to determine when to launch a nuclear attack on China.

[44] Just as the Tsarist regime did to Japan at the beginning of the century.

[45] If anyone thinks that, because of her economic backwardness, China will not be able to achieve speedy success in the sphere of nuclear rocketry, he should compare the forecasts of US and UN experts about the USSR's deadlines for producing atomic and hydrogen bombs with the actual deadlines achieved.

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It is, however, logical to consider another variant also: as it considers China to be a potential nuclear competitor and aggressor, the Soviet leadership may decide to launch a preventive nuclear attack on the Chinese nuclear centres before China succeeds in amassing an adequate amount of nuclear weaponry for a powerful reprisal attack. The Soviet command is capable of dealing such a blow by itself, developing skirmishes at separate points along the frontier and presenting China as the aggressor in the eyes of its own country and of world public opinion. It seems unlikely that a bureaucratic regime would venture to take such a desperate step without, in addition, taking into account the position of the remaining nuclear powers, but, even if this does happen, it will serve not to avert war but as a signal for starting it. After all, China's vital rocket bases will be destroyed but not China herself, which will immediately reply by initiating an exhausting partisan war that will be equally terrible for the USSR, whether it is waged on Soviet or Chinese territory.[46] Will the regime in such an event decide on the total destruction by nuclear weapons of all Chinese villages and towns and of the eight-hundred-million Chinese people? It is hard to imagine such an apocalyptic picture but it is entirely conceivable, since we know that it is precisely fear which drives people to take the most desperate action. It is to be hoped that the other nuclear powers will not let this happen, principally because such action would mean a terrible threat to all the rest of the world as well.

It may be that China is conscious of the possibility of such a preventive blow and that she will in such an event, over the next five years, follow a more cautious policy and even flirt with the USSR—something she has not done previously for domestic policy reasons. There will then follow diplomatic, and possibly even Party, contacts (meaningless, of course) and ambiguous statements offering a prospect of reconciliation, and there will also be a slight dampening down of the tone of criticisms about 'Soviet revisionism and social-imperialism'. But at the same time the anti-Soviet campaign inside China will be carried on in order to keep the Chinese people always prepared for great events. At the same time China may try to secure closer contacts with the USA—and much will then depend on their relations.

I believe, though, that no preventive attack will be launched, for at least two reasons: first, because of the extreme danger of such a blow, so long as other means have not been exhausted; secondly, because the possibility of Chinese aggression is not so obvious as to justify adopting such risky measures. Accordingly, China will acquire sufficient nuclear potential to be able to blackmail the USSR by

[46] I refer further on to the consequences of such a war. Strictly speaking there is still another possibility to be considered: an attempt to put an end to China's might by an ordinary invasion and occupation of all or part of China. In view of the great numerical superiority of the Chinese and the complete control held by the Chinese government over the country, however, such an invasion seems to me improbable.

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reprisals, should it contemplate using its nuclear superiority for purposes of self-defence. So the Soviet Union will find itself involved in partisan warfare over a vast territory stretching along both sides of a seven-thousand-kilometre frontier.[47]

Although presumably plans have long since been drawn up for the eventuality of a war with China, the Soviet Union, in my opinion, is not prepared for partisan or semi-partisan warfare, either technically or psychologically. For the last two decades war has been thought of in our country as a clash between two technically equipped armies, almost as a 'push-button war', as a war in the West and with countries of Western culture and, finally, as a war with numerically smaller land armies. All this has unquestionably left a mark upon military thinking which it will be very difficult to eradicate. The public conscience, too, is more prepared for war with the 'Americans' or 'imperialists', for attacks from the air and for a land war in Europe.

It is naturally very hard to forecast how military operations will develop, whether the Soviet troops will succeed with a rush in bursting into Chinese territory and occupying a substantial part of China or whether the Chinese, on the other hand, will slowly but surely infiltrate into Soviet territory. It can, however, already be foreseen that the Soviet Union will have to cope in this war with difficulties which formerly were usually the very difficulties which its enemies had to tackle.

In the first place, the actual methods of partisan warfare, beginning with the seventeenth century, were always methods adopted by the Russians against compact armies that had invaded their territory and were almost never practised against Russian armies invading cultured Europe. Secondly, from the very outset the Soviet armies will have to cope with enormously extended lines of communication, since the war will be waged on its frontiers, thousands of kilometres away from the main economic and demographic centres.[48] Thirdly, the Russian soldier, while frequently inferior in the cultural sense to his enemies, usually surpassed them as regards undemandingness, sturdiness and endurance, whereas these advantages, which are so important in partisan warfare, will be on the side of the Chinese.[49] Finally, also, since the arena will

[47] The possibility is not excluded that, before attacking the Soviet Union, China will try out its strength against some small neutral country which was once part of her sphere of influence and which has a Chinese minority—a country like Burma; this would be a trial balloon for the future 'great proletarian revolutionary wars'.

[48] The extreme gravity of the problem of extended communications can be seen from the following example: during their advance on the Northern Caucasus in 1942 the Germans were compelled to bring up fuel for their tanks on camels. At the present time European Russia is connected with the Far East by only one main transport railway line which is, on many sections, still one-track. To create an air bridge would prove extremely expensive and highly unreliable in the long term.

[49] Efforts are already being made in the Soviet press to deride the Chinese soldiers as fanatics, but as puny and cowardly. Here, however, is the opinion of a Soviet military specialist who worked for several years in China: 'The Chinese soldier is superior to our soldier; he is hardy but is inclined to grumble; he is brave and has immense mobility. It is no trouble at all for a Chinese soldier to march 70 kilometres a day on foot. Our infantry-men were quite amazed by the Chinese

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be the Far East, Siberia, Kazakhstan, or the Chinese regions bordering them, the war will be waged in thinly populated areas or in those inhabited by non-Russians, which offers wide possibilities for partisan penetration and, on the other hand, presents difficulties in supplying large technically equipped armies.

ALL this, in any case, means that the war will be long-drawn-out and exhausting with no speedy victory for either side. From this angle it is of interest to consider three problems: the attitude of the USA to a Soviet-Chinese war, the development of events in Europe and the situation in the Soviet Union.

Since the Second World War the USA has seemed to show itself interested in an agreement and, thereafter, partnership with the USSR. The first step made in this direction, taken by Roosevelt, led to the division of Germany and the whole of Europe and the 10-year Cold War. This, however, did not stop the Americans and, both in the Khrushchev era and today, they continue to count on the possibility in the not too distant future of reaching some kind of agreement between the USSR and the USA and finding a joint solution for international problems. This approach is obviously not motivated by any special sympathies for the Soviet system [50] but by the fact that in the world today the USSR constitutes the only real force that approximates in its importance to the power of the USA. This genuine equality of rights is probably just what evokes the desire for agreement and collaboration. But from this point of view it is obvious that, as China intensifies her power and influence, there will also be an increasing inclination in the USA to seek agreement with China, and American liberals will begin to find that the regime of Mao and his successors has just as many attractive features as the regimes of Stalin and Khrushchev.

By pursuing the policy of encouraging communism in places where the people did not want communism and by combating it in countries where the people wanted it, the USA has contributed not only to the dividing-up of Europe but has also spoiled its relations with China. It can be said that the USA's national interests did not oblige it to pursue this policy but that, as regards China, it was motivated by the policy of 'containing communism'. In so doing it helped to draw the two communist giants—the USSR and China—closer together and it needed at least 10 years before serious divergencies between them emerged. The USA itself tied its own hands by supporting the regime of Chiang Kai-shek, which turned out to be unviable.[51] If, on the other hand, the USA had supported Mao Tse-tung during the civil war, it would have averted

foot-soldiers and came to the conclusion that they were the best infantry in the world . . .' (V. M. Primakov, *Diary of a Volunteer*, Moscow, 1967, p. 212).

[50] Incidentally, they greedily and eagerly seize upon every insignificant fact that bears witness to its 'liberalization'.

[51] Not viable because it could not hold out on the mainland of China and could not even exist on Taiwan without US support. It is possible, however, that economically Taiwan, thanks again to the USA, is much more developed than mainland China.

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the rapprochement between China and the USSR, would have avoided the Korean war and would also have helped considerably in mitigating the communist regime in China. True, the USA is, conceivably, beginning gradually to discard its former policy towards China, and it would be very difficult to forecast now its attitude to a possible military confrontation between the Soviet Union and China. Much will still depend also on the position which China herself will take towards the USA on the eve of war with the USSR, and also on a solution of the Taiwan and Vietnam problems.

If one examines the problems of a rapprochement between the USA and the USSR or the CPR on a broader historical plane, it has to be noted that any collaboration achieved must obviously be based not only on an equality of forces and the negative effort to conserve one's own exceptional status but also on a community of some positive interests and objectives. I believe, therefore, that a rapprochement with the USSR will only have any meaning to the USA when serious moves towards democracy occur in the USSR. Until then any agreement will be motivated in the case of the USSR either by a fear of China, or by an attempt to conserve its own regime by means of American economic assistance [52] or by a wish to take advantage of American friendship in order to impose or retain its influence in other countries and also by the desire of both states, by mutually supporting one another, to maintain their role of world leadership.[53]

Apart from individual benefits, such a 'friendship', taken overall, based as it would be on hypocrisy and fear, would bring the USA nothing but fresh difficulties such as resulted from the collaboration of Roosevelt and Stalin. Collaboration takes for granted mutual reliance one on the other, but how can one rely upon a country which over the centuries has been distending itself and disintegrating like sour dough and discerns no other tasks facing it. Genuine rapprochement can be based on a community of interests, of culture, of tradition and on mutual understanding. No such thing exists. What common link is there between a democratic country with its idealism and pragmatism and a country without beliefs, without traditions, without culture or the skill to do a job? The mass ideology of such a country has always been the cult of its own strength and immensity, and the basic theme of its cultural minority has been to enumerate its weaknesses and alienation, a vivid example of which is Russian literature. Its Slav state has been created in turn by Scandinavians, Byzantines, Tartars, Germans and Jews—and it has in turn destroyed its creators. It has betrayed all its allies as soon as it found the least advantage in doing so; it has never taken seriously any of its agreements and has never had anything in common with anyone.

[52] In the same way as the loans given by the French Republic prolonged for several years the existence of the Tsarist regime.

[53] As can already be seen from the example of collaboration in the sphere of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

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Nowadays in Russia one can hear such remarks as: the USA will help us because we are white and the Chinese are yellow. It will be most regrettable if the USA too adopts such a racist attitude. The one real hope for a better future for the whole world is not a race war but inter-racial collaboration, the best example of which could become relations between the USA and China. Unquestionably, as time goes on, China will considerably improve the living standard of her people and will move forward into a period of liberalization, which, in conjunction with her traditional belief in spiritual values, will make China a remarkable partner for democratic America. Here, of course, much will depend on the USA itself and on whether it will continue to pursue its rigid policy towards China or will correct its former mistakes and look for new directions.

If all this is realized by the USA, it will not help the USSR in a war against China, especially as we know that China will be unable completely to destroy the USSR. In such an event the Soviet Union will be left to face China on its own—and what will our European allies do?

After the Second World War the USSR was able to set up along its western frontier a network of neutral states, including Germany, and thus ensure its security in Europe. Such states with 'interim' regimes of a sort such as Czechoslovakia, for instance, had up until 1948, would have formed a kind of buffer between the West and the USSR and would have ensured a stable situation in Europe.[54] The USSR, however, by pursuing the Stalinist policy of territorial expansion and of increasing tensions, widened its sphere of influence to the utmost and thereby created a potential threat to itself. Since the situation that prevails at the present time in Europe is being maintained only by the constant pressure of the USSR,[55] it can be assumed that, as soon as this pressure weakens or is reduced to naught, considerable changes will occur in Central and Eastern Europe.

Evidently, as soon as it becomes clear that the military conflict between the USSR and China is assuming a protracted character, that all the Soviet forces are being switched to the east and that the USSR will be unable to defend its interests in Europe, Germany will be reunited.[56] It is hard to say whether this will occur through West Germany absorbing East Germany or whether the post-Ulbricht leaders of the GDR, understanding the reality of the situation, will themselves agree to a voluntary reunion with the FGR in order to retain for themselves a share of the privileges. In any case a reunited Germany with a sufficiently strong anti-Soviet orientation will produce a completely new situation in Europe.

[54] They would differ radically from the so-called 'buffer' states that existed between the two world wars in that they would serve not as a *cordon sanitaire* between the West and the USSR but as a connecting bridgehead.

[55] This pressure is sometimes deliberately intensified, as in the case of the Berlin crises, and sometimes assumes a purely hysterical character.

[56] It is entirely possible that the FGR, in order to accelerate this, will extend support in some form or other to China.

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Obviously, the reunion of Germany will coincide with a process of 'desovietization' in the East European countries and will considerably accelerate that process.[57] It is hard to say how it will proceed and what forms it will assume—'Hungarian', 'Rumanian' or 'Czechoslovak'—but it will obviously lead to national-communist regimes, representing in each country something akin to the pre-communist regime.[58] Moreover, some countries at any rate, such as Hungary or Rumania, will immediately adopt a clear-cut pro-German orientation. Obviously the USSR could prevent this only by a military occupation of all the East European countries so as to create a kind of 'rear' for the Far Eastern front, but in reality such a 'rear' would end up as a 'second front', i.e. a front with Germany which would be helped by the peoples of the East European countries—something that the USSR could no longer accept. Rather the contrary; the 'desovietized' East European countries will dash round like bridleless steeds and, finding the USSR powerless in Europe, will put forward territorial claims that have not been forgotten, though long hushed-up: Poland to Lvov and Vilna, Germany to Kaliningrad, Hungary to Transcarpathia, Rumania to Bessarabia. It is not excluded that Finland too may possibly advance claims to Viborg and Pechenga. It is highly probable that as the USSR becomes more and more involved in the war Japan too will present territorial claims—to the Kurile Islands, at first, then to Sakhalin and later, if China gains successes, even to part of the Soviet Far East.[59] In a word, the USSR will have to pay up in full for the territories grabbed by Stalin and for the isolation it has been plunged into by the neo-Stalinists. The most important events for the future USSR will, however, take place inside the country.

NATURALLY, the start of the war with China, who will be portrayed as the aggressor, will evoke an outburst of Russian nationalism—'We'll show them'—and will, simultaneously, hold out some hopes for non-Russian nationalism. Later on, both these tendencies will follow, the one a declining, the other a rising, curve. Actually, the war will go on for a long time without having any direct effect on the emotional perceptions of the people and on the routine way of life, as was the case during the last war with Germany, but all the while demanding ever newer sacrifices. This will gradually engender increasingly deeper moral weariness with a war that is waged far away and for no known reason. Meanwhile, economic difficulties, and especially food supply,

[57] Paradoxical though it may be, even now the USSR may more likely be relying upon Nixon, the leader of 'American imperialism', than on allies like Ceaucescu or Dr Husak. The situation in Eastern Europe is at present somewhat reminiscent of the situation after the 1848 revolutions when the anticipated democratization did not ensue but the old regime also was shattered.

[58] In Czechoslovakia—liberal democracy; in Poland—a military-nationalist regime, etc.

[59] Apparently the leaders of the regime realize the threat from Germany and Japan in connexion with the conflict with China and will even take feverish action to secure a rapprochement with them but, because of their bureaucratic nature, will still not decide upon any drastic measures.

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will begin to be felt all the more acutely, since in recent years the standard of living has slowly but steadily been rising. Since the regime is not lenient enough for discontent to assume any kind of legal form and so find release, and at the same time not brutal enough to exclude the actual possibility of protests, sporadic outbursts of popular discontent and local revolts, for instance about shortages of bread, will begin. They will be put down by the use of troops which will accelerate the collapse of the army.[60] As the regime's difficulties increase, the middle class will adopt an increasingly hostile attitude, as it feels the regime is incapable of coping with its tasks. The defection of the allies and the territorial claims advanced in the west and east will intensify the feeling of isolation and hopelessness. Extremist organizations, which will have made an appearance by this time, will begin to play an ever greater role. At the same time there will be an extreme intensification of nationalistic tendencies among the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, above all in the Baltic countries, the Caucasus and the Ukraine, and thereafter in Central Asia and along the Volga.[61]

Meanwhile, the bureaucratic regime, which will be unable by its habitual half-measures simultaneously to wage a war, solve the economic difficulties and suppress or satisfy public discontent, will retreat further and further into itself, lose control over the country and even contact with reality. A heavy defeat at the front or some major outburst of discontent in the capital—strikes or an armed clash—will suffice for the regime to collapse. If, of course, by this time power has been completely transferred to the army, a regime thus modified would carry on for some time longer but, if it failed again to solve the most vital, and in wartime the almost insoluble, problems, it would collapse in even more terrible fashion. If I have been correct in forecasting the beginning of war with China, this will occur sometime between 1980 and 1985.

Obviously, a democratic movement which the regime has by repressive action prevented from gathering strength, will be incapable of taking over control itself, at any rate sufficiently long enough for it to settle the problems facing the country. In that case the inevitable 'de-imperialization' will be an extremely painful process. Power will pass into the hands of extremist groups and elements and the country will begin to disintegrate in an atmosphere of anarchy, violence and intense national hatred. In such case the borders between the young national states which will begin to emerge on the territory of the former Soviet Union will be extremely difficult to determine; there may be armed

[60] Naturally, they will make use of the so-called internal troops, possibly of a different nationality from the population of the places where the disorders will occur, which will merely intensify national differences.

[61] In a number of cases the representatives of such tendencies may become the national party cadres who will take the view: Let Russian Ivan cope with his difficulties by himself! They will endeavour to achieve national independence also in order that, by avoiding the impending general chaos, they can maintain their own positions of privilege.

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clashes and this will be exploited by the USSR's neighbours and, of course, by China, above all.

Possibly, though, the 'middle class' will nevertheless prove to be sufficiently powerful to retain control in its own hands. Then independence will be accorded to the various Soviet peoples by peaceful agreement and some type of a federation will be set up, similar to the British Commonwealth of Nations or the European Economic Community. Peace will be concluded with China, which will also have been weakened by the war, and the conflicts with European neighbours will be settled on mutually acceptable terms. It is even possible that the Ukraine, the Baltic Republics and European Russia will enter an All-Russian Federation as independent units.

There is even a third possibility—namely, that nothing as above described will occur.

But what will happen? I have no doubt that this great eastern Slav empire, created by Germans, Byzantines and Mongols, has entered the last decades of its existence. Just as the adoption of Christianity determined the date of the fall of the Roman Empire but did not save it from the inevitable end, so Marxist doctrine has delayed the break-up of the Russian empire—the third Rome—but has been powerless to avert it.[62] But, although this empire has always sought to achieve the ultimate in self-isolation, it would hardly be right to consider its destruction out of context with the rest of the world.

It has become a commonplace to look upon the basic direction followed by contemporary development as scientific advance and to regard total nuclear war as the basic threat to civilization. And yet even scientific progress, which is yearly consuming an ever larger proportion of the world gross product, may be transformed into regress and civilization may perish without the need for such a dazzling outburst as the explosion of a super-nuclear bomb.

Although scientific and technical progress is changing the world literally before our eyes, it is really based on a very narrow social basis; and the greater the scientific successes achieved, the sharper the contrast between those who achieve and exploit them and the rest of the world. Soviet rockets have reached Venus and yet in the village where I live they harvest potatoes by hand. This should not be regarded as a comic comparison; it is a rupture which may deepen into an abyss. It is not so much a matter of how to gather in potatoes as that the thinking level of the majority of people does not rise above this 'manual' level. As a matter of fact, although in economically developed countries science demands not only more and more resources but also more and more people, the fundamental principles of contemporary science are understood in reality by an insignificant minority. For the

[62] To continue this analogy, one can assume that in Central Asia, for instance, a state will still continue to exist which regards itself as the USSR's successor and will combine traditional communist ideology, phraseology and ritual with the features of Oriental despotism—a kind of contemporary Byzantine empire.

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time being this minority, in collusion with the ruling élite, enjoys a privileged status, but how long will this continue?

Mao Tse-tung talks about the 'city', meaning the economically developed countries, being surrounded by the 'village', meaning the underdeveloped countries. In point of fact, the economically developed countries constitute a numerically small proportion of the world's population. Furthermore, even in those countries the 'city' is surrounded by the 'village'—a village in the real sense of the term or by yesterday's village inhabitants who have only recently moved into the cities. And even in the cities the people who are directing present-day civilization and who stand in need of it form an insignificant minority. And, finally, in our domestic world the 'city' is also surrounded by the 'village' subconsciously—and the first shock dealt to our customary values will be felt by us immediately. Does not this very gap constitute the greatest potential threat to our civilization?

The threat to the 'city' on the part of the 'village' is all the more powerful in that in the 'city' there is a noticeable tendency towards an ever larger degree of isolationism at a time when the 'village' is aiming at organization and unity. This gladdens the heart of Mao Tse-tung but the inhabitants of the world 'city' must, as I see it, be feeling worried.

In the meantime, we are told, Western futurologists are worried by the very fact of the growth of the cities and by the difficulties which arise in connexion with the headlong pace of scientific and technical progress. Apparently, if there had been a science of futurology in Imperial Rome where, as we are told, people were already building six-storey buildings and there were children's merry-go-rounds driven by steam, fifth-century futurologists would have been foretelling for the following century the construction of 20-storey buildings and the industrial utilization of steam engines. As we now know, however, in the sixth century goats were grazing in the Forum as they are doing now below my window in the village.

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Moscow, village of Akulovo.

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THE COMMUNIST 'MIDDLE CLASS' IN THE USSR AND POLAND

Zbigniew Byrski

THE liquidation of Stalinism as understood by Khrushchev, and its subsequent handling by Kosygin and Brezhnev, meant the conscious consolidation of the totalitarian system while at the same time an end was put to police terror on the scale practised by Beria and his apparatus. Under Stalin, that terror and the arbitrariness of the MVD began to endanger the existence of the communist system itself, since the activities of the Soviet security organs affected all strata, including the most dedicated adherents of communism. Some of the more enlightened leaders gradually came to realize that in a totalitarian state police terror may not only be harmful, but unnecessary, that the central authority, which controls all walks of life, including production, finance, the market, the press and education, can compel citizens to obey without resorting to constant police repression. In their opinion, drastic precautionary measures such as mass arrests and deportations should be employed only in especially critical situations, when the customary state control by the use of economic or administrative methods might prove inadequate. Since the middle of the 1950s communist totalitarianism without excessive police actions has become the norm of the improved post-Stalin system. Stalin's death was merely one element promoting and accelerating change. If there had been sufficiently strong elements in Soviet society interested in continuing terror, the dictator's death could not have put an end to the previous omnipotence of the security organs.

The new era brought about significant changes in the structure of the power apparatus and in the social profile of the ruling class. The middle stratum of the bureaucracy was permitted to express itself more freely than before. Its participation has become a characteristic feature of recent years. Under the post-Stalin system, particularly since Khrushchev's fall, power has not remained exclusively in the hands of the omnipotent Politbureau and Secretariat. Both these authorities must reckon with the opinion of the 'masses': not, of course, the masses of the people but of the communist bureaucracy. Khrushchev himself came to realize this; during the final period preceding his departure from public life he tried to rule like an autocrat, and this brought him into increasingly sharp conflict with the bureaucracy. It was precisely the bureaucracy which swept him out in the autumn of 1964, thus reinforcing the new power system. In a very restricted sense a kind of 'democratization of the system' then ensued.

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The middle stratum of the communist bureaucracy, which under Stalin was merely a pliable tool of the highest leadership, now exerts a certain influence on the course of government and the future of the Soviet state. But while setting itself against Stalinist terror, it most emphatically opposes any liberalization of the system and widening of the margin of freedom. It holds, not without reason, that moves of this kind would in the short run be tantamount to destroying the state monopoly and the communist bureaucracy which is its main underpinning. The predictions which were made fairly often in the Western press in the early 1960s about the evolution of the Soviet system in the direction of ever greater liberalization have proved groundless. The evolution of social systems does not fall from heaven. Nor is it in the nature of a spontaneous psychological escalation following an inexorable course, a process where only the initial step which sets the process in motion is of importance. Evolutionary or revolutionary changes towards the liberalization of the Soviet system could have come only as a result of actions by powerful social forces shattering the post-Stalin totalitarianism. There were no such forces. In particular, the Soviet technical intelligentsia cannot be reckoned among such forces. The Soviet technician or engineer is satisfied that, with the advent of the new era, he can work without fear of being sent to a camp for acts of sabotage which he has not committed. That such a situation has persisted for 15 years, and that the younger age-groups to whom the Stalinist terror is unknown have entered production, obviously increases these feelings of complacency and calm. Of course, Soviet technologists employed in scientific institutes and universities look at these problems differently from engineers working on construction sites or in the factories. Yet although their freedom of inquiry is less restricted than that of scholars in the liberal arts, the oppressive atmosphere in scientific institutions is a torment to all scientists. Soviet technologists and scholars in the humanities would no doubt greet with pleasure Dubcek's type of reforms in Russia, but it is one thing to applaud and another to act, especially now, when only memories remain of the Czechoslovak Action Programme.

The desires of Soviet technocrats are almost exclusively focused on the economic sphere and particularly on the rise in their standard of living. They have grown so accustomed to the totalitarianism of their system that they accept it as a necessary evil. Throughout Soviet history changes have come only from above. The only revolutions known to the Soviet system are palace revolutions in the Kremlin. In such conditions the gloomy realism of Russian society acquires fatalistic traits. Western analysts do not always understand properly the differences between the conditions of existence under a system of police terror and the living conditions determined by a state monopoly of political and economic power. It is impossible to become accustomed to the former condition, which involves the daily danger of deportation

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or physical annihilation. The latter can become the norm, especially for those who have known no other way of life. The gap between the Soviet technical intelligentsia and their counterparts in the West is widening, but the causal relationship between the position of the Soviet technician and the economic structure of his country is by no means clear to him. The main point here is not differences in political views (in most cases Soviet technocrats have no political views of their own) but the habitual conception of certain elementary principles of social relations deriving from the conditions of Soviet life and the social customs arising therefrom.

The same can be said (disregarding other differences) of the Soviet peasant. He, too, is interested primarily in his economic standing; to the *kolkhoznik* living in the countryside, with a generally low level of education, questions of political freedom are so remote as for all practical purposes to constitute a fourth dimension.

A DIFFERENT attitude towards these matters is held by the humanistic intelligentsia: Soviet scientists, writers, film workers, teachers and educators. Regardless of their material situation, their profession requires a strong flow of fresh air into the suffocating climate of the totalitarian state. The vocation they have voluntarily chosen is concerned in principle with establishing the truth and transmitting it to the younger generations. The present system makes it impossible for them to follow their calling, and this state of affairs is not changed either by the elimination of Stalinist terror or by higher living standards. Their high degree of ideological commitment derives simply from the nature of their social and professional obligations. Unfortunately, this group of people in the Soviet Union carries little practical weight, and is unable independently to exert any influence, still less pressure, on the direction of government.

In general it is not surprising that the long years of rule by the bureaucracy, its monopoly of control over all fields of activity, and the latent threat of repression have inevitably led to apathy. Another element inhibiting moves—or even the idea—of organized protest is the existing division of the world between the two super-powers. In view of all these factors, the degree of risk for a man involved in a conflict with authority is so great and the probability of defeat (entailing destruction of the foundations of human existence) so overwhelming, that it rules out any thought of struggle. Under such conditions conformism becomes the attitude of a man guided by common sense. Yet this does not mean that the prospect of confrontation between the population and the communist hierarchy has been buried for good. Embers of revolt have been smouldering and continue to smoulder without let-up.

However, if the humanistic intelligentsia can provide a focus of resistance, the specific weight of this class in the communist state can

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leave no doubt that it can act only as a detonator. If the current situation does not favour the stirring-up of other classes, attempts at rebellion are doomed to failure. What the communist bureaucracy fears most is an alliance between the intelligentsia and the workers. An active alliance between these two would radically alter the alignment of forces in every communist country. The swift action taken by the security organs during the student riots in Poland in March 1968, and the introduction at universities of the so-called Volunteer Militia Reserve made up of Party activists and allegedly representing the working class, prove that the communist bureaucracy is fully aware of the dangers lying in wait for it in the event of even a short-lived alliance between workers and intelligentsia. In Czechoslovakia, where this alliance was not merely a danger but became a fact, it was too late to use the People's Militia, which was itself threatened with disintegration. Intervention by the Warsaw Pact troops proved to be the only salvation.

TO the communist middle class, which is emerging as a significant political force in the USSR and Eastern Europe, the enemy need not be either on the right or on the left. He is to be found wherever protest arises against the communist establishment, or wherever the embers of such revolt are smouldering. The intermediate stratum, like all middle classes in history, desires to maintain at any cost the existing order and the way of life which has arisen on its foundation. It hates the intelligentsia not only for their criticism of the Party monopoly, but also because it fears any attitude inducing man in the communist state towards independent thinking, towards an assessment of his social environment and of the factors shaping it. The middle stratum is an advocate of deliberate intellectual pauperization of the population and wants to reduce it to a level at which the only skill it needs is the ability to absorb the dull diet of Party slogans. It hates innovation in literature, art and the humanities, since this can undermine the shaky ideological schemes by means of which it attempts to exercise 'thought control'.

The communist middle class has a different genealogy and its function in the structure of the communist state is different from that of the petty bourgeoisie under capitalism, but many of its features and customs are deceptively similar. Like the petty bourgeoisie, it is profoundly hypocritical and dreads the truth which can threaten its dogmas and beliefs. Like the petty bourgeoisie, it is a stronghold of the most deeply ingrained chauvinism and racial hatred, which it cannot manifest in public because of the officially professed slogans of international solidarity. These racial or national hatreds, suppressed for years, ripen under cover, to blossom forth suddenly in a favourable political situation in the form of anti-Chinese, anti-Jewish or anti-Russian outcries.

The narrow intellectual horizons of the middle class reduce its official propagandists to a state of such incredible stupidity that the

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man of average education living in the second half of the twentieth century who has no difficulty in detecting the primitive lies printed in communist newspapers, is unable to understand what purposes they serve.

The theses of the Marxist classics given in the form of a catechism represent its profession of faith. In the main, however, the communist middle stratum, like its predecessor the petty bourgeoisie, has no philosophy. It is capable of degrading any scientific theory which it harnesses for its purposes.

Yet, despite the striking similarity in habits, mentality and even way of life of the petty bourgeoisie and the communist middle class, there are profound differences in their position, their socio-economic roles and, above all, their historical genealogy.

Although it is numerically small in comparison with the population of the country as a whole, the bureaucratic middle class plays a far more important part in the communist state than does the petty bourgeoisie under the capitalist system, holding important positions in industry, administration, trade, finance, propaganda, information and the armed forces, where the middle-ranking officer represents an integral part of the new class. Taking Poland as an example, it can be said that by and large the middle stratum runs the entire Party apparatus in the provinces and the capital with the exception of the provincial executive committee and the Central Committee; they are the Party activists in administrative institutions, service establishments and factories, and the managerial personnel of the larger industrial plants; they also man the propaganda apparatus throughout the country. As regards the two privileged ministries, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one may also confidently include fairly low-ranking officials in the middle stratum of *apparatchiki*. The number of this stratum in Poland does not exceed 300,000, one per cent of the population. The same ratio holds in other East European countries and the USSR.

The different position of the middle stratum in the communist state, in comparison with the role of the petty bourgeoisie under capitalism, has also other consequences. Unlike the petty bourgeoisie, the middle stratum under the totalitarian system of communism is protected by a special kind of immunity. This immunity is so far-reaching that the very mention of the existence of a communist bureaucracy as a separate social force is banned and could not be referred to in print in any communist country. Denial of their own existence, so it appears, is the most effective form of protection for the representatives of the bureaucracy. In one of his earlier letters Leon Trotsky expressed amazement that Marxists, who specialized in analysing the processes in capitalist countries, should show such astounding ignorance when it came to tracing changes in their own society. It seems that this attitude is completely natural. The encouragement of ignorance of this kind is

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one of the typical features of the communist superstructure. The definition 'dictatorship of boors', employed during the famous January 1968 meeting of the Union of Polish Writers, faithfully reflects the fundamental educational shortcomings of the bureaucracy, and especially of its intermediate stratum, which makes full use of its immunity to criticism.

For many years the habits of the petty bourgeoisie, the moral code of the Philistine characterized by lies and hypocrisy, the narrowness of his horizons, and his greed and miserliness have been the object of sneering attacks and criticism by generations of writers, philosophers, artists and radical politicians.

The middle communist stratum is threatened by none of this. It now faces only some increasingly isolated manifestations of dissent by critical intellectuals who protest publicly, but without any great resonance in the mass of the population.

A twofold criterion must be applied in assessing the significance and consequences of protest in Soviet society. On the one hand, to a public accustomed to harsh discipline it is something new, and to some Soviet citizens perhaps even shocking, not just because of the content of the protest, but because of the very fact it has been made. On the other hand, it is quite clear that the authorities are in full control and could impose much harsher sentences on dissidents. These measures would discourage even the most daring, both from demonstrating in Red Square and from mimeographing leaflets. The fact is that the security organs, which at present are wholly subordinate to the Party leadership, *tolerate* the current manifestations of dissatisfaction and will continue to tolerate them so long as they do not exceed certain limits. This is the price the communist bureaucracy must pay for the elimination of Stalinist terror as a method of rule, and it is perfectly conscious of this fact.

The period of terror in the 1930s, which numbered hundreds of thousands of Party activists and functionaries among its victims, was an early stage in the development of the bureaucracy. It emerged as a new class with the increase of the industrial power of the state.

The characteristic traits of the middle communist stratum as a social factor first became visible in the USSR, but its aspirations were not so high as those of the same stratum in the satellite countries, for instance those of the Polish middle cadres. The reasons for this are various. First, there is the memory of the terror; the fear that it could be renewed still hangs like the Sword of Damocles over the Soviet population, particularly those in the Party apparat, which, as experience of the past has shown, would be the first to be hit. The second reason is that the growing dissatisfaction among Soviet bureaucrats with the despotism and extravagance of Khrushchev was dispelled in time by Brezhnev and Kosygin. They removed him before the discontent of the bureaucracy took on a more active form.

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The satellite countries never experienced the gruesome oppression endured by the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1939. Although they suffered the Stalinist terror of the early post-war years, this never reached the proportions of mass executions and deportations experienced in Russia. That is why the middle Party cadres of the satellite countries, like the rest of the population, never lived in such a terrible fear of their leadership as the Soviet *apparatchiki*.

The years after 1956 brought a weakening in Soviet tutelage over the governments of the satellite countries. It meant that the Kremlin tried to control the main directions of foreign and domestic policies without actually dictating the forms of their implementation as it did at the time of Stalin. It resulted in a greater degree of independence—not for the people but for their communist governments. Such a situation, while giving certain limited benefits to the people of these countries, created some unexpected results. Up to 1954–56 the leaders of the East European countries were virtually satraps of the Kremlin, executing not only its policies but also its detailed instructions. The greater autonomy which was later given to the governments of Eastern Europe, while making them more popular with their people as a whole, at the same time lowered their prestige in the eyes of the *apparatchiki* who ultimately are impressed only by strength. The First Secretary who is a pro-consul of Moscow is for obvious reasons more strongly entrenched vis-à-vis a Polish, Bulgarian or Hungarian *apparatchik* than one who, though tolerated by the Kremlin, is not, however, its fully fledged creature.

RECENT events in Poland have made this country a good example to illustrate the aspirations and the increasing role of the middle stratum of the communist bureaucracy. The former mechanism of change, consisting of decisions by the Politbureau to which the whole Party subjected itself without a murmur, has been replaced by a different one. The political crisis in Poland in the summer and autumn of 1968 made it clear that to achieve power shifts and political changes, it is necessary to secure the support of the broad mass of cadres in the Party and state apparatus.

The struggle for power forced the contenders to curry favour with the middle stratum. This found expression in the campaign preceding the Party Congress. This time the election of delegates did not proceed according to the long established pattern, whereby Party meetings and conferences obediently accepted the candidates proposed by the leadership. In some cases there was a fierce struggle, resulting in the rejection of such delegates as Kliszko and Starewicz, the former a member of the Politbureau and the latter of the Secretariat. In order to obtain the mandates of the Congress delegates, they both had to seek re-election in provincial conferences favourably disposed toward them. This was a blow to the prestige of Gomulka's leadership, and at the same time

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revealed the increasing influence of the middle stratum on the composition of the government and on policy direction. The second important point is what were the means employed by the contending factions of Gomulka and Moczar in the specific conditions of Poland, to acquire support among the masses of so-called activists.

The question of replacing older cadres by younger ones who have been waiting a long time for advancement, and the conflicts arising from this, are a phenomenon typical of many systems. When a hierarchy is established in any form of government, reluctance to quit and resistance to change are always exhibited by the older generation, which strives to preserve its position. This, however, was not the only element in the situation preceding the Party Congress in Poland. On the other hand, it was characteristic that the demands for changes in cadres against the background of the power struggle were accompanied by an eruption of nationalism and chauvinism, the traditional focus of which in pre-war Poland was chiefly the petty bourgeoisie.

Traditionally, the sentiments of the Polish petty bourgeoisie were anti-semitic, Russophobic and anti-German. The new communist middle stratum has taken over these old prejudices and hatreds. The genesis and traditions of these phobias obviously differ. Their common trait in post-war Poland has been that the communist middle stratum, under directions from above, has had to suppress these feelings. The psychological effect of this was often to hinder individual advancement in the administrative apparatus and in the Party. The road to this kind of advancement, theoretically easy since it requires no effort to acquire a really expert knowledge, was in practice blocked, especially during the years 1948 to 1956, by the older cadres, some of whom were of Jewish origin.

THERE was yet another special reason for the frustration of the middle cadres. People under 40, who in 1967–68 comprised the bulk of those who were most impatient and persistent in demanding advancement in this stratum, had constituted between 1949 and 1951 those elements of youth whom the Party had recruited into its ranks with the idea of creating and educating its own socialist power apparatus. This recruitment during the height of Stalin's rule was governed exclusively by the criteria of social origin and absolute devotion and obedience to Stalin and the Party. These criteria were at that time taken to absurd lengths. Blind obedience and vigilance towards the class enemy was only one quality which counted at that time. In the effort to select the most trustworthy cadres, capable elements who, it was thought, might sometimes think independently, were successfully weeded out.

The success of political systems and of many human undertakings often depends on capable and ambitious careerists. Idealists are not necessarily the salt of the earth. However, in Poland and other East

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European countries, the criteria of selection used were such that they effectively blocked the advancement of able careerists in public life and promoted dullards instead. In their later service the latter made up for their intellectual and educational deficiencies by acquiring other skills in the school of Party life. These included servility towards superiors and brutality towards subordinates, as well as following faithfully any Party order and any Party dogma. In particular they were free from any inquisitiveness—it was a trait identifying the enemy.

The thaw of the middle 1950s, the ferment of 1956 and the upheavals which Poland suffered, led the cadres of the still young *apparatchiki* to the opinion that they had been betrayed. Gomulka, released from prison, was supported by the Polish radical intelligentsia in his bid for leadership and appointed to it by the Party. They suspected that the new leadership was going to base itself on the people, which in effect would signify that they would be relegated to the scrap heap. This explains the initial opposition and distrust of a large part of the apparatus towards Gomulka. However, they were soon relieved to learn that they had been mistaken. Gomulka and his closest associates based themselves on a solid and lasting foundation: the Party bureaucracy. The cadres of *apparatchiki* recruited in 1949–51 have survived. Their status has been restored and complete confidence placed in them, but their obedience and blind devotion were shaken. They learned nothing, but gradually they began to doubt the catechism. They developed a hatred of clever politicians and Jewish Party intellectuals who, in their opinion, were skilful enough to extricate themselves from any situation. The old and still uneradicated habits and prejudices brought from the small towns and villages, from the peasant and artisan milieux rarely influenced by lofty nineteenth-century ideas about progress and equality, left them essentially as they had always been, i.e. full of petty bourgeois hatreds and prejudices. The world of the communist bureaucracy taught them one other thing: noble slogans are here to be constantly repeated, but the law of the jungle is here to be practised. Until 1955 some of them were naïve fanatics. After 1956 there was no room for fanaticism. They became cynics, but cynics of the worst kind: obtuse and narrow-minded men. On this fertile ground, the sentiments of hatred towards Jews and intellectuals, who were seen as seeking to damage the foundation of the established state order, could not fail to develop rapidly.

At the same time, the growing conflicts among the factions struggling for power in the upper echelons of the Party and government hierarchy left the latent stage and entered the stage of open warfare. The political repercussions of the war in the Middle East merely provided the spark. They led to the first phase of the internal Polish political crisis in the summer of 1967, which was temporarily smoothed over and subdued. It was said at the time that the unforeseen events in the Middle East

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caught the Moczar faction unprepared to take over the reins of government. The so-called 'Partisans' did not yet have a 'shadow cabinet'. But the student disturbances of March 1969 found the Moczar group much better prepared for a showdown.

The 'Partisan' faction then undertook a frontal assault. Its tactics were only too simple. Ambitious activists of this group employed anti-semitic slogans, knowing perfectly well what response they would evoke among the *apparatchiki*. That which for many years had been strictly forbidden was now able to flourish freely, provided that the euphemistic designation of 'anti-zionism' was used. Neither Moczar's nor Gomulka's supporters cared what reaction the anti-semitic campaign would arouse among the people. They knew perfectly well that the struggle for power in the Party would take place neither in the Party nor among the people, but only among the so-called Party activists.

After years of waiting and suppressed hatred for the humiliation suffered during the period of the so-called Polish October, prospects of revenge and advancement were opened up for the *apparatchiki*. Revenge meant attacking members of the radical Polish intelligentsia who 12 years before had attempted to destroy the Party bureaucracy, believing that ways and means existed of improving the situation and escaping from the blind alley of degradation and absurdities in which the communist movement found itself. Advancement meant filling the positions of revisionists after their removal, a large percentage of whom were of Jewish origin. This was to be used as proof that the vast majority of the enemies of the Party and the Polish People's Republic were aliens. In this way the middle stratum was able to relieve itself of its long-suppressed emotions.

IN essence, however, the struggle between the Party factions after the student disturbances was neither a campaign against zionism nor a campaign against revisionism. These slogans were cryptonyms for another drive, aimed against the humanistic intelligentsia, the circles of the most enlightened people in Poland and the student youth. These elements, brought to despair by the brutality of the apparatus and the shameless lies of the press and radio, inaugurated in February and March 1968 a hopeless confrontation with the authorities. They were undoubtedly influenced by events in Czechoslovakia. It is certain that the students counted on the support of workers in some of the larger industrial plants, above all in Warsaw. This support was not forthcoming and the spontaneous movement ended in defeat.

The old leader, Gomulka, was certainly not a particularly enthusiastic advocate of the anti-zionist campaign, realizing that this was the speciality of his competitors. However, he saw no other alternative than that of taking the wind from his opponents' sails into his own. He himself took the lead in the campaign initiated by Moczar and Strzelecki.

Thus something akin to auction bidding began in the anti-zionist

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and anti-revisionist campaign. At the Party meetings, the assembled mass of bewildered petty officials who were mainly concerned with their own financial problems, were confronted with a witch-hunt. It was safe to predict that the anti-zionist campaign would win the most supporters. Anyone could be accused of revisionism, but only Jews could be suspected of zionism, and they were few in number. The vast majority of the lower-ranking government or Party officials, with no ethnic blot on their origin, would be beyond the reach of the gloomy farce. The methods of blackmail used, the absurdity of the charges, the moral turpitude of the most active accusers and their low intellectual level recalled the years from 1948 to 1954. The character of Party meetings was comparable to Stalinist times. In actual fact, however, the analogy is misleading. Stalinist terror was not reimposed in Poland, and no one intended to reimpose it. Propaganda lies, purges of officials, and the whole arsenal of measures of intimidation are usual weapons of the post-Stalin totalitarian system facing a power crisis.

Although Gomulka in trumping his opponents' propaganda ace did the only thing which seemed to him possible in the situation, he would not have succeeded in eliminating the Moczar faction and in the end would probably have been defeated. Antipathy in the ranks of the middle stratum of the apparatus towards the leader of October had been near the surface for a long time. Gomulka would not have remained in the saddle even if he had sacrificed some of the old guard, the removal of which was being demanded more and more insistently by Moczar's people. However, as we know, at the critical moment, when the fate of the First Secretary of the Central Committee and his group hung in the balance, the decisive vote of the CPSU was cast; its support of Gomulka after the invasion of Czechoslovakia sealed the fate of the 'Partisans' to all intents and purposes. They had to content themselves with the modest successes they had achieved before the Party Congress. The main battle was over. Since that time the 'Partisans' have merely been waging guerrilla warfare. The middle Party cadres, who were successfully running a race in which the first prize was the leadership of Poland, were frustrated by the decision of the CPSU. They were strong enough to force Gomulka's group out of the positions it occupied. However, when it came to the balance of forces within the Soviet bloc, their power was shown to be virtually nil.

The attitude of the Soviet Union and its support of Gomulka underlined once again the caution and conservatism of the current collective leadership of the CPSU. Gomulka's known and tested loyalty, shown again during the Czechoslovak intervention, was far more dependable than that of Moczar and of his ambitious and career-hungry supporters.

There was yet another factor which influenced the rejection of Moczar's candidacy for the Party leadership. Despite the declarations of loyalty to Moscow made by Moczar, and courtesy articles printed

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in *Pravda* extolling the merits of the leader of the 'Partisans', Soviet leaders rightly felt that the Russophobia of the Polish communist bureaucracy matched the chauvinism of the Soviet *apparatchiki*. For this reason Moscow's interests were better served by a Polish leader who, to maintain his position, was ready to keep these nationalistic sentiments in check than by one who could unleash them to gain popularity among the middle strata. If anti-Russian sentiments had been fostered in Poland, the matter would not, as in the anti-Jewish campaign, have been restricted to the mass of Party and government bureaucrats, but would have involved larger sections of the population.

For this reason it was also necessary to check the anti-semitic campaign. It had served its purpose during the power struggle. It yielded certain gains for the Moczar faction, which was able to secure for its supporters a certain number of positions. But at this point a halt was put to further ambitions and hopes. Under these conditions the normal reaction among the more committed activists, who had failed to understand the mechanism of the changes and motive forces of the factional struggle and expected a permanent purge of both zionists (i.e. Jews) and revisionists (i.e. intellectuals showing signs of despair), was one of disenchantment.

Unfortunately for the initiators of the campaign, the soil in which anti-semitism was to grow became more barren with each expulsion of a Jew from his position. The Jews left; but the Polish intelligentsia remained. It is dejected and broken, yet it still represents a potential danger, and the torch of rebellion is still not extinguished, threatening the comunist bureaucracy with its Nemesis.

THE attempted rebellion of the Polish *apparatchiki* has ended. It was bloodless. Its weapons were blackmail, lies, demagoguery and slander. Gen. Moczar certainly did not represent the aspirations of the middle cadre and its ambitions to participate in ruling the country. He simply utilized the ranks of *apparatchiki* in his attempt to take over the Central Committee. Had he won, he would not have shared power with his low-ranking supporters, but would have replaced 'the old guard' by himself and his close collaborators. After the imposed decision of Moscow he could do little for the moment but accept his defeat. He realized how small was the weight of the Polish middle cadres when confronted by the USSR.

Another kind of confrontation was taking place on Poland's southern border, in Czechoslovakia. The confrontation was in this case between the whole Czechoslovak nation and Moscow. It began earlier and died out more than six months later than the confrontation in Poland. The two events had little in common except for the epilogue. Different forms of intervention were used by the Soviet Union. In the case of Czechoslovakia, 'Big Brother' intervened brutally, demonstrating his military strength, in Poland a single speech by Brezhnev was enough.

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One thing is clear: whether it is a question of rescuing the *apparatchiki* (as in Czechoslovakia) or of curbing their aspirations (as in Poland), their destinies are significantly different in a communist country which is free from the tutelage of a super-power than in a country which lives in the shadow of a powerful state like the Soviet Union. In the Soviet case the rise of the middle cadres is closely related to the imperial *raison d'état*. If there were in the offing some disintegrative processes in the Soviet Union which could effectively shake the pyramid of power there, this would certainly have a crucial significance for the future of the East European countries. But the increasing influence of the middle bureaucratic strata in the USSR would not bring any significant changes there, let alone upheavals. On the contrary, the Soviet middle cadres are the mainstay and the guardians of the communist status quo. The events in Poland (and in Czechoslovakia too) clearly demonstrated that everywhere they are the most ardent adversaries of the intelligentsia on which all hopes of rebellion against totalitarian rule rest.

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THE CONCEPT OF TOTALITARIANISM

*Leonard Schapiro**

A CONCEPT, in the words or Sir William Hamilton, is the result, rendered permanent, of a previous process of comparison. A new concept, therefore, will usually require a new word, when once the result of the comparison has taken shape in our minds. But the emergence of a new word is no proof of the emergence of a new concept. Writers to whom we owe the new word may for reasons of their own be applying a new name to something that has long existed as a concept: did 'totalitarianism', for example, when it first reached the English language from the Italian in 1928, really mean something quite different to us from the older 'tyranny', or 'despotism', or even 'dictatorship'? Or did the new word only seem more acceptable because the older words seemed too archaic? Or too abusive to apply to countries like Italy or later nazi Germany and the Russia of Stalin, with whom our governments kept on assuring us we were on the best of terms, in spite of their somewhat eccentric internal regimes? The object of this article is in fact to explore the concept: what do we mean when we use the word 'totalitarianism'? And do we mean by the word something that is essentially new and contemporary in the vocabulary of political discourse? Or is it merely the case that a new word is doing duty for older words which have been applied to the same concept for centuries? And, if so, has the term a legitimate right to exist? Or does the use of it merely help to obfuscate our discernment of the true nature of polities which are described as 'totalitarian'? In the pages that follow I propose first to look briefly at the history of the term; to search thereafter, in brief outline, for the genealogy of the concept over the centuries in men's thoughts about politics; and finally to consider what value, if any, there is in retaining 'totalitarian' as a separate term, purporting to describe polities of a novel kind, and distinct from those known in the past.

THE adjective '*totalitario*' was, it seems, current in Italian by 1925 at the latest. The first use of the word by Mussolini was in a speech of 22 June 1925, attacking the remnants of the opposition parties. But it had been used six months earlier by the liberal paper *Rinascita Liberale* on 5 January. The word was used on both occasions in a

* This is an expanded version of a paper read at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on 2 June 1969. It is intended to form the basis of a volume in a series entitled *Key Concepts in Politics*, now in active preparation by the Pall Mall Press, of which I am editor. I have benefited by comments and criticisms made in Jerusalem, for which I am most grateful.

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general sense, in contrast to 'liberal': Mussolini spoke of '*La nostra feroce voluntá totalitaria*', while the article referred to the April 1924 elections as '*totalitarie e liberticide*'. (The etymological dictionaries do not help us on the origin of the word: the Italian derives it from the French, while the French, in turn, derives it from the Italian.) In subsequent years Mussolini used the word habitually as a political term, '*lo stato totalitario*', and it passed into the language of Italian fascism: it appears in the *Enciclopedia Italiana* article on 'Fascism' in 1932, both in the section written by Mussolini and in the section written by Gentile. In German usage, the word '*totalitär*', or more frequently in the domesticated form '*total*' ('*der totale Staat*'), was often used in the early years of nazi power. It became less frequent and fell into disuse thereafter: Hitler preferred the word '*autoritär*'—possibly in order to avoid any suspicion of imitation by Germany of Italy.[1] In Russian the word was not used before 1940, and then as identical to 'fascist': it is, however, of interest that in the new Soviet literature of the underground 'totalitarian' is sometimes used as a critical descriptive term for the Soviet regime.

According to the OED the word was first used in English in 1928. *The Times* in 1929 referred to the '"totalitarian", or unitary, state, whether fascist or communist', and G. H. Sabine in his article on the 'State' in the edition of the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, published in 1934, applies the word equally to the fascist and communist 'one-party states'. The suggestion is sometimes made that the use of the word 'totalitarian' indifferently for the fascist and communist dictatorships is a product of the 'Cold War'; evidently this suggestion is untrue. However, it is true that until 1945 in American usage (on the evidence of successive editions of Webster's *International Dictionary*) the word was applied primarily to fascist Italy and nazi Germany; and that the actual frequency of use of the word, both in academic and in popular writing, has increased enormously since the end of the Second World War—as reference to successive editions of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and of Webster's *International Dictionary* shows. It may be, as H. J. Spiro suggests,[2] that the concept of 'totalitarianism' has been exploited in the USA as a 'counter-ideology' in order to justify a policy of hostility to the USSR—though the arguments that he adduces are far from convincing. I am not concerned with this question. What I am concerned to investigate is whether those who helped to put the term into circulation were in fact justified in doing so because they were seeking to describe something that appeared to be a new phenomenon—whatever the motives of any of them may have been.

[1] I am indebted for much of this information to Dr M. Michaelis.

[2] In his article 'Totalitarianism' in the 1968 edition of the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, and in a paper presented to the American Political Science Association at Chicago in 1967.

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I HAVE no intention of offering a definition or a model of the 'totalitarian' polity—the purpose of a definition is to put limits to the use of a particular term, and it thus necessarily involves the assumption that the term validly exists and means something different from other terms. A valid definition will be applicable to all polities, old or new, which come within its ambit: conversely, some polities popularly called 'totalitarian' will be squeezed out by many definitions—there are few definitions of 'totalitarianism' of which I am aware which will cover fascist Italy, to which the word was in fact first applied by Mussolini. I propose instead to look at the main features or contours of the three polities to which the description 'totalitarian' was first applied: Fascist Italy, National Socialist Germany and Soviet Russia under the rule of Stalin. What did writers in the English language have in mind as the main contours of these three polities, or, perhaps more accurately, what could they legitimately have had in mind, when they asserted, say, in 1936, that Italy, Germany and Russia were 'totalitarian'? I am not concerned primarily with other polities to which the term has been applied, whether older or more recent, since the use of the term 'totalitarian' as applied either to past societies or to polities which emerged after the basic three must necessarily have been by way of analogy.

These contours seem to me to be mainly five in number. First and pre-eminent among them is the Leader—Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin. This is true historically, in the sense that each polity owed its origin to the determination and ambition of an individual. Of course, to assert this is not to minimize the importance in the emergence of these systems of historical, economic and social factors, without which the success of the individual in rising to power would have been impossible—had Hitler been born in 1889 in a village in Buckinghamshire instead of in a village in Austria he would in all probability have ended in a lunatic asylum or on the gallows. Nevertheless, the imagination of a normal human being refuses to accept Stalinism without Stalin, or nazism without Hitler. However, the pre-eminence of the Leader as a contour is no mere matter of history. It is also true that an examination of the three polities shows that the Leader in practice proved a more important factor in the system than doctrine, and indeed more important and influential than any other factor.

This can be seen from two aspects: his relation to the official doctrine of the movement on which his legitimacy claimed to rest; and his relation to all other sources of authority within the polity. Thus, in all three instances, it was the Leader who in the last resort determined the contents and the application of the official doctrine. This was particularly striking in the cases of Mussolini and Stalin. For Mussolini, so far from rising to power in 1922 on the basis of a doctrine, in fact began by disclaiming all need for a doctrine and only set about inventing one after the murder of Matteotti in 1924, as a device for creating legitimacy for what had been a manifest usurpation of power on his part. Stalin,

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who inherited an already established doctrine from Lenin, not only modified it to suit his own ambitions, but succeeded in grafting the notion of the supreme authority of a Leader on to a doctrine, Marxism, to which this notion was completely alien.[3] Again, in each instance, a marked feature of the system was the preoccupation of the Leader with the risk that an institution might emerge within the polity which would have sufficient independence and authority to rival his own authority. This was particularly evident in the conflicts in which each of the three Leaders engaged with his own party, out of which he himself had emerged and on which his legitimacy rested. Unless such a party were subjugated to the will and control of the Leader, the danger always remained (as countless parallels from history show) that the movement might in time dispense with its founder in favour of a more pliable new Leader. Hence, Mussolini—the least successful of the three—fought a continuous battle against the party. Hitler, the most successful, effectively subjugated his party once and for all in June 1934—reportedly to the envy of Stalin. Stalin battled continuously against his party—between 1934 and 1939 principally—and may well have been on the eve of another battle when he died. The object of this subjugation of the party as an institution was to ensure that however extensive the authority exercised by an individual party member might be, and for however long a period this authority might be exercised, it should at all times be evident to all that the authority of that individual derived neither from the party nor from the law, but solely from the pleasure of the Leader; and that such authority, however exalted, could at any moment be determined by the Leader. It may be observed that this aspect of Stalin's rule, which Stalin brought to a fine art, makes it inaccurate to describe the Soviet Union, at any rate between 1936 and 1953, as a 'one-party', or 'monopolistic party', state. It will be necessary to return to this aspect of Soviet government. But it should be noted at the outset that we are concerned only with the Soviet Union in the Stalin era as a model for the origin of the concept 'totalitarianism': different considerations arise both in respect of the period of Lenin's rule, and as regards the years since Stalin's death. So far as Lenin was concerned, for all his personal ascendancy, the communist party while he was in control still retained its character as an institution—and this is one reason why it is very doubtful if the term 'totalitarian' can properly be applied to the Lenin era.

The second contour clearly discernible in each of the three countries is the subjugation of the legal order to the arbitrary will of the Leader, or of those acting in his name. Since no legal system readily lends itself to arbitrary manipulation, if only because certainty and predictability are of the essence of all law, while uncertainty and unpredictability were of the essence of the rule of each of the three Leaders with whom

[3] His ideologists even discovered that the notion of the Leader was a central feature of Marxism: see e.g. K. Popov, 'Partiya i rol vozhdya', *Partiinoe Stroitelstvo*, no. 1, 1930, pp. 3–9.

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we are concerned, the general effect of the subjugation was to suspend the operation of the law in any real sense of the word 'law' in certain areas—while at the same time, in other areas, ostensible legal rules and principles continued to be applied. This strange situation has given rise to the illusion to which some writers (such as E. Frankel or J. H. Hazard) have at times been subject, that 'law' and 'illegality' somehow coexisted side by side in Germany and in the Soviet Union. Since no one could ever be certain that an area of seeming legal order would not at any moment be invaded by the arbitrary principle, it seems somewhat illusory to describe as 'legal', with its meaning of fixed and certain, even part of an order which was both shifting and uncertain. In other words, each Leader sought to destroy or subjugate the legal order. As in other respects, Mussolini was the least successful, though attempts were also made in Italy to remodel both the criminal law and the civil law in ways which would fit with the Leader's purposes—by ensuring that anyone whom it was considered necessary to put out of the way could be destroyed with a semblance of legal process; and by circumventing the safeguards of property and contract wherever the purposes of the Leader's policy required it. The operation was completely successful both in Germany and in the Soviet Union under Stalin. The double standards which the German criminal courts had applied in political cases under the Weimar Republic made it easy to graft on to German criminal law a system of what was at times virtually arbitrary terror, disguised as law by the theorists of National Socialism. Nazi theory in this respect was probably aided by the strong tradition of positivism in legal theory in Germany, which laid stress solely on the formal source of the legal norm, with no regard either for the legitimate authority of the source or for the content of the norm. This view of law provided a background particularly well adapted to the purpose of grafting an arbitrary system of rule on to the law, since judges and lawyers were easily persuaded that the bare will of the Führer had the full force of law. Indeed, respect for the bare forms of the law was as characteristic of National Socialism as it was of communism under Stalin—provided that the forms were flexible enough not to present any obstacle to any policy. In the case of Stalin, less refinement of theory was in fact required for the subjugation of the law. In contrast to what happened in Germany, in Russia the legal order—the law, the Bench and the Bar—had been demolished by the Bolsheviks almost immediately after they had seized power, and legal tradition was very weak. Moreover, even where it survived—for example, in the universities—the tradition of respect for law was undermined by the prevalence of the doctrine, based on Marx and Engels, that law, along with the state, was soon destined to 'wither away', and to be replaced by a system of simple administration.

THE third discernible contour of each of the three systems of rule we are considering is the assertion of control over the area of

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private morality. No area of private conscience is, at all events in theory, immune from control by the Leader or by those acting on his behalf. As Gentile put it, quite accurately, 'it is impossible to be fascists in politics and non-fascists . . . in school, non-fascists in our families, non-fascists in our daily occupations. . .'.[4] Thus the Leader seeks, with varying degrees of success, to eliminate, or at any rate neutralize by subjugation, every authority over the human conscience which might rival his own—the Church and other religious bodies, the family, and sub-societies like the professions, the trade unions, the universities or cultural groups. It was in Italy, where Mussolini manifestly failed in his avowed aim, that the question of this aspect of 'totalitarian' control was most discussed in theory. Gentile sought to justify fascism by his doctrine of the 'interiorization' of the state within the individual. The fascist system, he wrote at the end of his life (in his apologia composed after the fall of Mussolini),

> appears to make the state swallow the individual and to absorb into authority completely the liberty that should be set against every authority that limits it. . . . But one might say just the opposite: for in this conception the state is the will of the individual himself in its universal and absolute aspect, and thus the individual swallows the state, and since legitimate authority cannot extend beyond the actual will of the individual, authority is resolved completely in liberty. Lo and behold, absolutism is overturned and appears to have changed into its opposite, and the true absolute democracy is not that which seeks a limited state but that which sets no limit to the state that develops in the inmost heart of the individual, conferring on his will the absolute universal force of law.[5]

It will be necessary to return later to this use of the word 'state' in 'totalitarian' theory, which is to some extent paralleled in Germany in the writings of Carl Schmitt. But it may be noted here that the theoretical difficulty of using the term 'state' to embrace the kind of totality of power which sets no limits at all to its competence that Mussolini was trying to assert, was pointed out by Pope Pius XI in 1931.

> A state was entitled, he said, if it so wished, to claim for itself a 'subjective totalitarianism', 'in the sense that the totality of the citizen shall be obedient to and dependent on the state for all things which are within the competence of the state, having regard to its special end'. On the other hand, 'objective totalitarianism' which subordinates the citizen's whole life, 'individual, domestic, spiritual and supernatural', to the state 'is a manifest absurdity in the theoretical order and would be a monstrosity were its realization to be attempted in practice'.[6]

[4] In a speech in May 1925. Quoted in H. S. Harris, *The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile* (University of Illinois Press, 1960), p. 172.

[5] G. Gentile, *Genesis and Structure of Society*, translated by H. S. Harris (University of Illinois Press, 1960), p. 179.

[6] D. A. Binchy, *Church and State in Fascist Italy* (London, Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 330–31.

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As will be suggested later, the instrument by means of which the Leader seeks to displace both law and morality is ideology. Thus, the autonomy and independence of the law are forced to yield to the higher policy of the community as embodied in the official doctrine, with the result that law virtually ceases to exist and can whenever desired be replaced by the requirements of a doctrine which the Leader can manipulate at will. Stalin's use of the notion of 'enemy of the people' in the courts as a method of political struggle is a good example of this replacement of law by ideology. In the same way, the autonomy of private morality is made to yield to the arbitrary and variable demands of the official doctrine of the moment, which neither conscience nor religion is allowed to rival.

The fourth of the main contours of the three polities with which we are concerned is that each of them, differences in doctrine notwithstanding, is based on a democratic formula or fiction. In other words, in each case the Leader seeks to legitimize his rule by an appeal to mass support. In some instances, at some periods no doubt the mass support was genuine enough; the question is, however, immaterial for present purposes. The significant fact is that, genuinely or fraudulently, even a Leader like Hitler, whose right to rule the Germans was constantly enunciated as a sacred truth, still found it necessary to demonstrate the mass support on which his rule claimed to rest.

There were, it would seem, two reasons for this very significant contour of the three Leader polities. In the first place, it is doubtful if in the world that emerged after the First World War any legitimacy other than a democratic (or pseudo-democratic) legitimacy could have been successfully asserted in the 'climate of opinion' then prevailing. However reactionary in fact the rule of a Hitler or a Stalin may have been, it had to be conducted in the name of 'the people'. Moreover, each of the three Leaders (Stalin more cautiously and indirectly than the other two) claimed to be endowed with some special 'charisma'. '*Mussolini a sempre raggione!*' was a phrase coined by Mussolini himself. Hitler's *Table Talk* is even less reticent. Now, in circumstances in which the priests or the oracles can no longer be invoked with hope of success to sanctify the 'charisma', the repeated acclaim of the populace (the Antaeus-like contact with Mother Earth, to which Stalin once referred) becomes an unavoidable necessity.

There was an even more important reason. In the great body of literature which has tried to analyse the social origins of 'totalitarian' society, the most illuminating of the works with which I am acquainted is that of W. Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*. 'Mass society' in this context means a society in which the intermediate societies, which stand between the ruling élite and the population, have for various social and historical reasons broken down: 'atomized' man (as others have described him) stands alone in the crowd without the intermediate buffer of trade union, club or church, facing his rulers. In this mass, or mob, he is the victim of mass hysteria and the target for skilful manipulation by the Leader's persuasion experts. Not all mass societies

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are, or will necessarily become, 'totalitarian', but no society which is *not* a mass society is likely to become 'totalitarian'. If this view is right, then a second function of the democratic formula adopted by our Leaders is to assist in the preservation and extension of the 'mass society' in which, ideally, each individual is linked to and wholly dependent upon the Leader, without lateral links to 'intermediate societies'—other than the fake and manipulated shams which the Leader creates in order to delude his subjects.

Whatever the reasons, there is no doubt that the democratic formula is as much a part of fascism and National Socialism as it is of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, in spite of the very different origins and contexts of the three doctrines. This raises the difficult and controversial question whether there is a distinction between 'left' and 'right' 'totalitarianism'—the question is at the root of the charge that 'totalitarianism' is no more than an instrument in the 'Cold War'. There are certain strong arguments that can be adduced in favour of making a clear division between the two kinds of systems—fascist and communist. There is the historical fact that fascism, both Italian and German, was backed by the industrialists, whereas communism, at least in its early stages, was supported by the Russian working class. It is possibly true, even, that the workers and peasants of Russia benefited more from the new regime than the workers and peasants of Italy or Germany from theirs—though it is perhaps difficult to measure benefits when they have to be set off against the many millions of workers and peasants who were destroyed by Stalin's policies. It is also true that the theory of a Leader with almost divine rights, which is central to fascism, is totally alien to the theories of Marx, to which Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism is partly related. However, in the context of reality, as distinct from theory, these differences are not necessarily so striking. Thus, the democratic façade was in each polity used by the Leader to bolster his legitimacy. Again, it was the case that considerable support for fascism came from the poor and the dispossessed, who were outside the structure of the organized working class,[7] and that considerable support for the Bolsheviks in Russia before 1917 came from the bourgeoisie. On these grounds alone it would be difficult to justify the 'left-right' distinction.

It is of course true that the intellectual paternity of fascism and Stalinism is in many respects different. Communism (even in its debased form of Stalinism) retains some of the traces of the notions of reason, equality, internationalism and democratic order from which it sprang. Fascism drew its immediate inspiration from extreme nationalism, from romanticism, from doctrines exalting violence, from theories of racial inequality and from crude perversions of certain Italian and German national historical traditions. But again, what

[7] However, the work of sociologists like Shils and Lipset has shown the existence of significant working-class fascism.

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we are concerned with are the realities of rule by Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin. Even if Stalin's official doctrine may have derived, at many removes through Marx, from the Enlightenment, in what kind of sense can one attribute to Stalin a belief in reason, or equality, or in the ultimate goodness and perfectibility of man? (Note again that the case of Lenin is in this respect too quite different.) The language of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism is at times the language of the Enlightenment, and that of fascism is not: but the principles on which each Leader based his actions were very similar in practice. It can also be argued that communism is a doctrine of universal application for all mankind, where fascism is nationalist and racial. But the argument cannot be pushed too far, if practice is considered. Did not Hitler's order envisage positions of rule by the superior races throughout the world (like the honorary Aryans in Japan), with the inferior races either exterminated or dutifully accepting their inferior status? And was this kind of gibberish, with which plans for world conquest were thinly disguised, so very different from Stalin's nationalistic policy of Soviet expansion, thinly annointed with the jargon of communist internationalism?

Thus, the 'left-right' division of these doctrines must be treated with some caution. This is not to deny the importance of recognizing the entirely different intellectual origins of the several doctrines. For one thing, communism, in all its forms, may contain within it a potentiality for evolution towards liberal democracy which fascism does not. The theory of the Leader as supreme authority can at best lead to another Leader[8]: the democratic theory, the Enlightenment terminology of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, can, at any rate potentially, lead to a demand that the theoretical façade be observed in practice.[9]

The fifth contour of each of the three polities is a fever of constant mobilization. Everyone is at all times being galvanized, dragooned, persuaded, exhorted, shamed or compelled to act for some end or other. It is essentially a form of life where no one is ever left alone for long—'we recognize nothing private', as Lenin had said. The ostensible ends of all this activity of mobilization differ: Stalin effected a virtual economic and social revolution, Mussolini did nothing of the kind, for all the talk; Hitler changed social relations and undermined the hitherto accepted moral code, but did not last long enough to effect a serious economic revolution. But the purpose of all the mobilization activity was clear enough in each case: to bolster the legitimacy of a usurper Leader, and to create the constant illusion that without the Leader all would be lost.

[8] A possibility which, in private, Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin all, incidentally, ridiculed, each seeing himself as unique and final.

[9] As is happening to some extent in the Soviet Union today. I am indebted for this aspect of the importance of the 'left-right' difference in doctrine to Dr S. Avineri of The Hebrew University.

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THUS, the five main contours which a look at the three polities concerned would have revealed in 1936 are a Leader, the subjugation of the legal order, the control over private morality, a democratic formula and constant mobilization. It is now necessary to look briefly at the three institutional pillars on which the three polities rested: interrelation of state and society, ideology and the party.

B. N. Chicherin, in his analysis of state and society, has pointed out that the idea of totality can only apply to the abstraction known as the state, which embodies both continuity in time and supreme authority in space. Society always remains a conglomeration of individuals and of groups of individuals. If the matter rested there, it would be possible to describe a polity known as 'totalitarian' as one in which the state progressively asserts itself over individuals and groups of individuals, in other words as one in which the state progressively absorbs society. Some such line of reasoning underlies the argument of Gentile to which reference has been made above, and indeed is at the root of Mussolini's '*Lo stato totalitario*'. But such an argument is only valid if the notion of the state is what Jellinek calls the *Machtstaat*—a notion which describes no more than the actual power (*potentia*) which rules, whatever its nature and whatever its legitimacy, divorced from all idea of authority (*potestas*), or legal order. Such a view of the state was held, for example, by von Haller (whom Hegel attacked so savagely in the *Philosophy of Right*) and by Kelsen, the extreme theorist of legal positivism, according to whom the idea of the *Rechtsstaat* is meaningless, since every state is always necessarily a *Rechtsstaat*. But the position is quite different if the state is seen as originating in force, it is true, but acquiring legitimacy and authority by regularity, by acceptance of the rules of the political game, and by legal rules which circumscribe and define the area of its authority. This is indeed the notion of the state which belongs to the tradition of European political thought much more than any view which adopts a position of complete neutrality, or indifference, towards the source of authority or legitimacy of the powers that be. It was to this tradition that Pope Pius was referring when he spoke of the 'manifest absurdity in the theoretical order' of '*Lo stato totalitario*'.

But, theory apart, each of the three polities offers manifold examples of the constant war conducted by the Leader and his ruling élite specifically against the framework of the state and the law quite as much as against society and the individual. Dr Hans Buchheim has recently demonstrated, for example, with what persistence the SS strove over a period of years to absorb the police, precisely because the powers of the police rested on *Staatsrecht* which circumscribed them, whereas the power of the SS was 'ideological', and

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therefore subject to no limits whatever other than the Führer's will.[10] The entire history of Stalin's rule can be seen in terms of Stalin's struggle to ensure and retain the dominance of his party and police confidants over the organs of the state in order to use these organs for his own ends in ways inconsistent with the constitutional and legal foundation on which they were based. Numerous instances, less successful in practice, could be adduced from the history of fascist Italy. If this view of the state is accepted, it follows that 'totalitarian state' is a contradiction in terms; and that so far from the absorption of society by the state, the 'totalitarian' polity presents a picture of continuous assault by the ruling apparat both upon the state and upon society. This 'ruling apparat', which is a feature common to our three polities, is not the state: the state, in each case, which the Leader inherited upon seizing power, was not dismantled. The Weimar Constitution remained legally in force throughout, the Soviet Constitution of 1918 in substance until 1936, and was even then replaced by a very similar kind of legal façade. The ruling apparat is best described as a cancer which spreads itself throughout the state: if excised, the original state will revive—as did the original Italian state after the fall of Mussolini. It consists, this apparat, of the Leader and of such individuals or groups or temporary structures (for he will not tolerate any independent institutions) whom from time to time he uses for his purpose.[11]

The second institutional pillar to be considered is ideology, which I suggested earlier is used by the Leader as a means of replacing both law and morality. Ideology in the polities with which we are concerned is much more than a system of beliefs which motivate political action, or a doctrine which is generally accepted by rulers and ruled. It is also much more than ideology in the sense in which Marx used it—a false picture of reality, designed to bolster the rule of the dominant class. In our three polities ideology represents the closest approximation, *mutatis mutandis,* to the fusion of Church and state known to history. The Leader derives his legitimacy from the ideology, which he himself both interprets and reshapes; he disposes without any challenge from the law over the secular arm in the persecution of heretics; and he need fear no interference from the Church in his determination of questions of morality and conscience. The incessant indoctrination of the ruled in the tenets of the ideology serves many more purposes than merely to justify the Leader's authority, though certainly the pursuit of legitimacy for power which

[10] Helmut Krausnich, Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, *Anatomy of the S.S. State* (London, 1968), pp. 127–248. Cf. also Hans Buchheim, *Totalitäre Herrschaft* (München, Wesen und Merkmale, 1962), pp. 117–23.

[11] I have borrowed the term 'apparat' from G. Ionescu's *The Politics of the European Communist States* (London, 1967). But, as is evident, I cannot accept his terminology 'apparat state': the apparat, in my interpretation, is not one *kind* of state, but something different from, and inimical to, the state.

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originates in usurpation is one of the important functions of ideology. But ideology does much more than that. It mobilizes enthusiasm, and enures to hardships. It anaesthetizes the ruled against over-sensitivity to the enormities of the Leader's violation of accepted morality. It helps to isolate the individual by denying him the privacy, the comfort and the protection offered by a personal code of conscience and morality, or by a Church.

This far-from-exhaustive list shows that 'totalitarian' ideology is much more than a doctrine—it is an instrument of rule, of manipulation. This is not the place to engage in a discussion of the meaning to be attached to 'ideology'—a subject on which a large literature already exists. It is, however, necessary to make one observation on ideology in the 'totalitarian' polities. There are some who take the view that, since the manipulation of others by means of an accepted doctrine or tradition is not peculiar to the so-called 'totalitarian' states, there is therefore no difference in kind, though possibly of degree, between ideology, say, in the USA and ideology in Stalin's Russia. It is, of course, true that certain accepted doctrines fulfil in most polities a role which in some respects appears to correspond to the role of ideology in the 'totalitarian' polities—such as the mobilization of enthusiasm, the bolstering of legitimacy, inducing acceptance of social and economic differentiation, and the like. But it seems to me that a clear line has to be drawn between circumstances in which the 'accepted' doctrine is in fact in free competition with other doctrines, and circumstances in which those who lay down the doctrine also have the power to ensure that no other views will be tolerated, or even uttered. At this point ideology becomes an instrument of rule, different in function and in kind from anything that can exist where the rulers lack this power to ensure a monopoly for the official doctrine. Ideology is for one thing as often as not totally unconnected with belief: there was no need under Stalin's rule to believe in the official lies, but it was necessary to repeat them incessantly; and nothing else could be put in their place outside the privacy of one's own thoughts. In contrast, the 'myths', the 'derivations', the 'false consciousness' and the like which have been discerned in polities where expression of more than one view is possible, depend very much for their efficacy on belief. In short, to apply the term 'ideology' to official doctrine in the Soviet Union in 1936, to the programme of the British Labour Party and to effusions about the 'American way of life' renders the term totally useless. If parallels are to be sought for the 'ideology' of the 'totalitarian' polity, they are perhaps more likely to be found in Spain in the reign of Philip II or in Geneva during the ascendancy of Calvin. For in these polities too, as in our three cases under review, we find something like the fusion of the secular and spiritual powers which gives ideology, fascist or communist, its distinctive character.

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THE third institutional pillar with which we are concerned is the party. The party, or the party which emerged from the movement, is certainly a characteristic feature of the three polities. It is an instrument of rule, the source of the Leader's legitimacy and in each case raised by ideological manipulation to a level of quite extraordinary and unchallengeable authority and dignity—whether it be as a militia at the personal orders of the Duce, or as the bearer of the historic mission of the German race, or as the vanguard of the proletariat. From a more practical point of view, it provides a disciplined force, in every case with its armed element, to fight the Leader's battles in the rise to power, and to terrorize his enemies when once power has been achieved. But it is also the force which, by virtue of its superior knowledge of the secrets of history, or the science of social development—in other words, by virtue of ideology—can be used to capture and control the institutions of the state. The party is a priesthood, as well as a force of myrmidons; it overpowers by doctrine as well as by castor oil and the bullet in the back of the neck.

Can it then be said that the single party, tolerating no rival parties, is a necessary and distinctive characteristic of the 'totalitarian' polity? The question is of some theoretical importance in determining the novelty and utility of the term 'totalitarian'. For it would seem to be the case that the modern ruling party of the fascist or communist type, with the Book in the one hand and the *manganello* in the other, is unique in the history of mankind. If this is indeed so, then it would be reasonable to infer that polities which are based on parties of this type are also new and unique in history. And while one can certainly find instances of a tyrant's personal following which reveal many characteristics of the modern fascist or communist party, there would seem to be no case which combines both the ideological and the combatant elements. It is also true that the party is a distinctive element of our three polities in the sense that in each case the party grew out of the movement in which the Leader emerged, or which the Leader created, and effectively brought the Leader to power. (The case of Stalin, it is true, is somewhat different: he inherited the machine ready made. But it was nonetheless by means of the party that he created his particular type of polity.)

However, to include the party as a necessary and distinctive ingredient of these polities does not mean that the party enjoys anything like monopoly of power, or even necessarily at all times predominant influence. For Stalin, for example, the party was only one source upon which to draw in building up his ruling apparat—both the police and the bureaucracy were equally important sources. It has already been stressed earlier in this article that each Leader found it necessary, each in his own style, to subdue his party: to leave an institution of so great prestige and authority, and armed as well, free to pursue its own policy, restrained only by veneration

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for the Leader or for the tenets of the doctrine would have been naïve stupidity not to be expected of any serious tyrant. And so, the history of the three polities is in fact one of erosion of the parties as independent institutions in their own right, of the predominance within the party of a network of personal agents of the Leader, or of the reiterated and constant assertion by the Leader of his own authority over against the authority of the party hierarchy. The object is plain: to ensure that, as far as possible, the authority which the party member enjoys and the privileges which he claims are at all times seen to be emanations of the authority of the Leader. For the same reason, this authority of the party member must be seen to endure for only so long as the Leader's favour lasts, and no one, under the Leader, however exalted, is immune. The rule of Stalin was the clearest illustration of these principles in practice: in this respect it provided a striking contrast to the period of Lenin's supremacy, and in some measure to the position which has arisen since Stalin's death.[12] In sum, the party is probably a distinctive feature of the three polities under discussion: but in no case does it enjoy a monopoly of power, and the description 'one-party state', as applied to any of the three polities, is in some respects misleading.

UP till now, the object has been to look at the concept 'totalitarianism' in terms of its content: to inquire what could reasonably have been subsumed in the use of this word in the English language, say, in the mid-thirties. The answer has been sought in an examination of the contours and institutional pillars of the three relevant polities. The pursuit of the concept must now take a different direction. Granted that we can now achieve an approximation to the meaning attached to the word 'totalitarian' when it first came into use, were the political ideas expressed by the word 'new'? Or had they formed a part of human speculation about politics in the past, even though the words used had been different? Any answer to so vast a question in intellectual history would require many hundreds of pages. All that can be attempted here is to suggest a few pointers to the lines of investigation; and to raise some of the specific problems to which an answer would have to be found.

It may be well to start by making it plain what an investigation of this kind is *not* concerned with. It is possible to discern, on the basis of good evidence, the direct influence on the Leaders with whom we have been engaged of certain contemporary or earlier political thinkers. Thus, in the case of Mussolini, Sorel, Marx and Nietzsche can be identified as influences with fair certainty, Plato and Pareto with fair probability. In the case of Lenin, who begat Stalin, there

[12] John W. Lewis and the present author have tried to develop this analysis of what Robert L. Tucker has called the 'führerist' type party (as contrasted with the 'Bolshevik' type) in 'totalitarian' polities, including China, in *The China Quarterly*, October–December 1969.

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is the definite identification of the influence of Marx, Chernyshevski and Clausewitz, and the probable influence of Tkachev. Even Hitler, apart from the effects of the hotch-potch of anti-semitic and racial literature which he absorbed during his Austrian youth, was probably influenced by Hofhauser, Spengler and Nietzsche. But the influences of one mind upon another are matters of mystery: in no conceivable sense can the inference be drawn that because, say, Nietzsche influenced Mussolini or Hitler, therefore Nietzsche is the father of 'totalitarianism'. The history of influences has its place in biography: it is of little assistance in tracing the intellectual origins of a concept.

The historian of a concept is thus not concerned with the fact that the mind of this man was immediately and directly influenced by the thoughts of that man. His duty is to search for the continuity of ideas, to search for the similarities of cast of thought over the ages, which show man, when speculating about politics, engaged in thinking about what are essentially the same problems, though the times and the circumstances change. In this context one naturally turns first, after Aristotle, to the architects of the idea of the modern, powerful absolutist state—Bodin, Calvin, Hobbes. It is always a humbling experience to return to Aristotle's *Politics*: there are few modern notions that are not already to be found there. Among the traditional methods of tyrants, he tells us,[18] are 'the removal of men of spirit', but also additional measures like the 'forbidding of common meals, clubs, education and anything of a like character . . . likely to produce the two qualities of mutual confidence and a high spirit . . .'; as well as 'the adoption of every means for making every subject as much a stranger as possible to every other'. There follow prescriptions for secret police, spying, informers, the sowing of mutual distrust and discord, which have a ring of sempiternal human depravity about them. The skilful tyrant, adds Aristotle, will also impoverish his subjects, since they will then be so busy scratching a living that they will have no time for plotting; and engage in military adventures so as similarly to keep them out of mischief and 'continually in need of a leader'.

Clearly Aristotle shows us the method of rule pursued by our three Leaders: but his notion of tyranny lacks the mobilization element that characterizes their three polities, as well as the mass democratic façade. When we turn to the theorists of absolutism, we are confronted with the contrast between the notion of a *state*, however powerful—limited, determined on certain fixed legal lines, and firmly rooted in legitimate authority; and the usurper Leader and his apparat of our three polities—unlimited, uncircumscribed, constantly at war with the state as much as with society, renewing the 'charisma' of the Leader with a succession of outbursts of mass hysteria. Bodin, for example, for all his insistence on the absolute and indivisible nature of sovereignty,

[13] In Book V, xi, §§ 4–10. I have used Sir Ernest Barker's translation.

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beyond question for the subject, quite clearly distinguishes legitimate authority, bound by the limits of natural law, from tyranny—where 'the monarch tramples underfoot the law of nature, in that he abuses the natural liberty of his subjects by making them his slaves, and invades the property of others by treating it as his own'. He is a strong advocate of 'estates and colleges', since nothing contributes more to 'the ruin of tyrannies'.[14] Calvin, the most eloquent advocate of obedience to the powers that be, nevertheless recognizes the duty of the magistrates to do their utmost to prevent liberty from being impaired, 'far less violated'; and they are to be regarded as 'perfidious traitors to their office and their country' if they fail to do so.[15] Again, no one defended the powerful sovereign more ardently than Hobbes. But the sovereign for Hobbes, however powerful, acts within limits of law and nature, he is neither arbitrary nor unpredictable: he has the character of a state, not of a ruling apparat as described earlier. The *Leviathan,* in which the range of the sovereign's power is least restricted, permits liberty 'in those things which in regulating their action the sovereign hath praetermitted'—in what sense is this true of our three polities, where absence of a legal enactment is never a guarantee that no offence has been committed? And Hobbes goes on to list those liberties: 'the liberty to buy and sell and otherwise contract with one another, to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own mode of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit, and the like'.[16] In his earlier work on government *de Cive* Hobbes goes even further; and his tract on the history of the Civil War, *Behemoth,* is virtually a diatribe against power without authority. This is a different world from that of our three polities: it is sufficient to reread these old handbooks on the modern state to be confirmed in the view that 'totalitarian state' is a contradiction in terms, a marriage of incompatibles.

The intellectual paternity of the concept of 'totalitarianism' seems to be found much more in what can be described as the manipulative tradition of politics—among the devisers of blueprints for man's perfect bliss, who paid more regard to the aim which they wished to achieve than to the methods by which this aim was to be achieved. These thinkers stretch in a long line throughout our history, from Plato to Beatrice Webb. For the most part they appear to be, as Plato in the *Republic,* or as virtually all the writers of utopias, unconscious of the liberty of the individual, indeed of the individual at all: at most there is a benevolent optimism (as in Morelly's *Code de la Nature*) that liberty will follow automatically if once all life is redesigned on the right lines. It is, moreover, characteristic of the utopian writer that he views his problem as a totality: he recognizes no obstacles, be it of

[14] Quoted from the (abridged) translation of the *Six Books of the Republic* by M. J. Tooley, Oxford n.d. (1955), Book II, chap. 4, and Book III, chap. 7.
[15] *Institutes of the Christian Religion,* Book IV, chap. xx, § 8.
[16] Book II, chap. 21.

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law or sentimentality or traditional morality, to the achievement of the great ideal for mankind which he has conceived in his mind. So, the civilized, if somewhat monkish, Campanella was quite prepared to send to the gallows ladies who used make-up, because such artifacts interfered with his plan for perfect human breeding: without make-up every woman would be equally attractive to every man. Again, the kindly Saint-Simon, whose aim was primarily the elimination of poverty, in his zeal to advocate (and, had fate been kinder to him, to impose) his scientific chimera on mankind, was quite prepared to jettison both parliament and law courts in the interests of efficiency; to judge men solely in terms of their potential value in developing '*le régime industriel*'; and to laugh to scorn any fears that a despotism might result from a system of rule based on 'science'. Saint-Simon was to an even greater extent than his forerunners like Mably or Morelly an example of that determined application of principles borrowed from engineering or stockbreeding or business management to a sphere where they do not and cannot belong—politics. Indeed, it is this view of government as consisting essentially in the management of an enterprise that lies at the basis of the long line of utopian thinkers—and, in my view, in the direct line of the paternity of theories of 'totalitarianism'.

AN especially difficult question is raised by the cases of Rousseau, Hegel and Marx. There can be no doubt at all of their direct influence on much of the philosophy of 'totalitarianism'—on Gentile, or on Carl Schmitt or on Lenin, for example. But in what historically true sense can they be placed in a direct line of intellectual development which led on to Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin? The cases of Rousseau and Marx are particularly perplexing: is one to father the theoretical framework of tyranny, as constructed in the present century, on these two men whose motive force was a passionate love of liberty, and whose main aim was to free man from the subjection to which each author, in his different way, saw man doomed? This is not a question that can be resolved here. But I suggest that we must have in mind, before accepting the direct paternity of Rousseau and Marx for Stalin and Beria, another possibility. Is it perhaps nearer the truth that neither Rousseau nor Marx ever propagated, or at all events, intended to propagate, the concept of 'totalitarianism', but rather that they propagated utopias without much guidance on how to attain them, and which were in any case unattainable; and that their utopias were only converted into the inferno of the 'totalitarian' polity when someone (in this case Lenin, followed by Stalin) tried to implement them in practice?

The 'totalitarian' elements in the *Social Contract* are evident enough: the prohibition of 'partial societies', the ill-defined but all-justifying General Will, the compulsory liberation of man, the civil religion, the rejection of representative institutions, the assertion (in

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Book IV, chap. 8) that legislation gives birth to morality—all this is of the essence of 'totalitarian' theory, and has no doubt contributed much to the thought and writings of those who have developed it. Much could also be written about the dangerous influence of the belief that man is intrinsically good and is only made wicked by society—though this would bring us close to the borders of theology. And yet, what true advocate of the 'total' polity could ever have written this—or a hundred other passages for which there is no space? 'A people is free, whatever the form of its government, when it sees in him that rules over him not the man, but the instrument of the law.'[17] It may well be that one of the earliest critics of Rousseau, Benjamin Constant, was right in criticizing Rousseau for his lack of precision in the use of language, not for his hostility to individual liberty.[18] Or, to put it another way: the main vice in the *Social Contract* seems to lie in its failure to realize that the problem of liberty can never be solved by Rousseau's recipe—the state which is, as it were, 'one's own' (not a notionally representative one, since representation is for Rousseau a delusion) in which (since no man is likely to oppress himself) one need never fear oppression. 'One's own' state is a fiction: it remains the same conglomeration of officials and policemen as any other, and does not remotely become 'one's own' because its actions are proclaimed to be taken in the name of the People. The individual continues to need protection, which is both effective and independent, against 'his own' state as much as against any other—perhaps even more. Neither Rousseau nor Lenin (who in this respect was Rousseau's direct heir) ever recognized this simple fact of political experience.

Marx is an equally difficult case. In some respects 'totalitarian' theories seem closely related to the views of Marx: there is the historicism (in the sense in which Popper uses this word), there is the emphasis on classes rather than on individuals, and, above all, there is the depersonalization of politics. In the writings of Marx, as so characteristically in all communist writings, politics ceases to be a relation between men, between rulers and ruled, but becomes an abstraction, an interplay of anonymous, invisible, and, no doubt, at times imaginary, forces. On the other hand, it is a complete travesty of Marx's views to use them in order to justify support of government by commissars in the name of some abstract socialist principles: in his criticism of the Jacobins, in his correspondence, in his polemics with Bakunin and elsewhere Marx was throughout his life a most vigorous critic of a form of ostensible socialism which he regarded as a dangerous delusion. What Marx envisaged, and it was no doubt an unattainable utopia, was the disappearance, or transcendence (*Aufhebung*), of the state as a result of the social revolution, with a consequent end to the

[17] *Lettres Écrites de la Montagne*, no. VIII.

[18] In *De L'Ésprit de Conquête et de l'Usurpation dans leurs Rapports avec la Civilisation Européenne*. (Pleiade edition of the works of Constant, p. 1049 note.)

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alienation to which man is subject. One class by coming to power abolishes all classes for ever. Again, as with Rousseau, this is an imprecise, ill-defined utopia. How does 'a class' (if there is such a thing) take power, except through commissars? And, even if the state should disappear, this does not entail the disappearance of all forms of rule, and certainly does not do away with the alienation of man. It may be the case that Marx's utopia of the disappearance of the state was the most dangerous utopia of all times. For the end of the state means the end of legal order—but it does not mean the end of rule. What survives when the state goes is therefore naked rule, unrestrained by law, constitution or convention, the absolute, personal rule of an apparat. Now Lenin, a more pragmatic man than Marx and a more skilful revolutionary, endeavoured to put the utopia into practice. (*State and Revolution*, Lenin's most utopian work, suggests that in September 1917 he still believed in the attainment of the utopia.) The inevitable result was the system of commissar rule, out of which grew the polity which under Stalin we described as 'totalitarian'. But in what way was this Marx's own concept of the society of the future?

Hegel is in a different category. His historicism (in Popper's sense again), which he bequeathed to Marx, is the inspiration and justification of all 'totalitarian' thought: and it is in 'History' as an abstract entity that all the Leaders of our generation have sought their legitimacy. His extravagant language on the subject of the state, his defence of *Machtpolitik*—there is a whole host of ill-defined notions in the writings of Hegel which has found its way into the apologetics of 'totalitarianism'. And yet, there is one element in the thought of Hegel which seems to remove him from the direct line of evolution of the 'totalitarians'. This element is his notion of the state. The state for Hegel, however extravagantly it may at times be described, consists quite clearly of both power and authority: power alone is not a state for Hegel, as his attack on von Haller shows.[19] The *Philosophy of Right* differentiates state from society, recognizes the autonomy of the individual and the right to free moral judgment by the individual—and all this is quite incompatible with both the theory and the practice of the three polities which gave birth to the description 'totalitarian'. Whatever Hegel's influence on the development of this kind of thought in the present century, it cannot be accurately determined without first showing the world of difference that divides Hegel from the apologists of the so-called 'total state'.

THERE remains the last question: how new is the concept of 'totalitarianism', and how useful is the retention of this word as a separate and distinct term in the language of politics? Even a cursory examination of the contours of the three polities in respect of which the new term was coined strongly suggests that the predominant one, from

[19] See the *Philosophy of Right*, § 219 and the long footnote to § 258.

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which the others derive, is the overwhelming importance of the Leader. They derive their existence from the will, imagination, and appetite of the Leader, and their institutions are wrenched into the shape most likely to promote the Leader's survival with the greatest success. Ideology is a device to give him legitimacy; the law and private morality, which might otherwise set limits to his power over men, are flouted and frustrated on the basis of theoretical propositions of greater or lesser intellectual depravity. All this is not so very much unlike the tyrannical polities of the past, of which there have been many. Endless parallels to our three polities can be (and have been) found in the ancient and classical worlds, and in more modern Europe—the Italian City States, Ivan IV of Russia, and our own Tudors have all been invoked. It can be objected that these suggested parallels fall short because they lack the element of mobilization which characterizes our three modern polities—the fact that the entire population is at all times dragooned and exhorted to effort in the interest of some war for the greater glory of the Race, or for the Millennium of Communism, or for whatever particular variant of enthusiasm the Leader propagates. But tyrannies with a high element of mobilization of this nature built into them have been known in the past. There have been, for example, the hydraulic societies of the oriental world (which Professor Wittfogel has used so strikingly as a parallel to the three modern polities) in which mobilization of the population for ambitious work projects was an integral part of the despotic system of rule. Even more important perhaps is the case of the Empire of the Incas, which, as it happened, exercised a considerable influence on the thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Garcilaso de la Vega's work on the political system of the Incas was published in Madrid in 1608 and in French translation in 1633. Its influence on Morelly is evident,[20] and directly, or through Morelly, its very modern ideas of 'total' mobilization and control for definite ideological ends spread to many others.

Tyranny, then, is not new: neither is the concept of tyranny. Even a cursory glance at political analysis of government in the past discloses an awareness of the principal devices by which the tyrant endeavours to preserve himself in power which begins (as so much else in political thought) with Aristotle. It is said (without much evidence to support it) that Stalin read the *Prince*: had he read the *Discourses* on Livy he would have discovered that Machiavelli was quite well aware of the differences between tyrannical and constitutional government, even if he had good advice to offer to the tyrant. Most striking among the early studies of tyranny is one which is plainly aware of almost all the features which seem to characterize our three 'totalitarian' polities—even the party is to be found there in embryo. This is the work of a young contemporary and friend of Montaigne, Etienne de la Boétie,

[20] See the introduction by Gilbert Chinard to his edition of the *Code de la Nature* (Paris, 1950).

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whose tract on tyranny, *Contr'un ou Discours de la Servitude Volontaire*, was published in 1578. Almost—but not quite. The missing element, to which it will be necessary to return, is the mass or democratic legitimacy of our three polities.

The parallels of the past, both institutional and conceptual, have led to a search for some distinctive feature of the modern polity to which the term 'totalitarian' is applied. Among the most convincing of these suggested distinctions are two. The first is the change introduced by modern technology, especially modern communications and modern weapons—the radio telephone and the machine gun. It is, of course, plain that the extent of interference which the three Leaders were able to inflict depended on modern technological means. But more and beastlier does not mean different. The particular techniques of Hitler or Stalin were dependent on modern technology. But as one searches for parallels in the tyrannies of the past, one finds them in increasing numbers, and, in the end, one is left in doubt about the validity of the emphasis which is often laid on technology: is it really a factor which causes a difference in kind, or only in degree? Again some [21] have stressed the dynamic nature of the 'totalitarian' polity as a distinctive feature. The 'totalitarian' Leader is not content, say these scholars, as the tyrant of old, to leave things much as they are, provided that he is obeyed and sufficiently supplied: the modern Leader wishes to transform everything, not only on the physical plane, but to replace the existing system of values by another system. Martin Drath, in particular, regards this last feature as the distinctive 'totalitarian' feature, in contrast to 'authoritarian' rule (of which modern Spain can be taken as an example). This seems in many ways the most convincing of all the criteria for distinction which have been suggested.[22] And yet, the fact remains that there have been rulers who have wished to transform everything, and to replace old values by new, whose rule has nonetheless not qualified for the description 'totalitarian'—in the sense in which the word was used when it first appeared. Julius Caesar is one example—read Chapter XI of Book Five of Mommsen's *History* in order to discern what changes could be attempted by a ruler without anything approximating to the 'total' polity resulting from the attempt. Napoleon is another example: no man changed more, yet, for all Constant's strictures, his despotism fell very far short of that of Mussolini, Hitler or Stalin.

Thus, in face of this difficulty some have proposed to reject the word 'totalitarian' as little more than a term of abuse; or as a term

[21] For example Martin Drath. See his Preface to Ernst Richert, *Macht ohne Mandat. Der Staatsapparat in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutchlands* (Köln und Opladen, 1958), pp. ix-xxiv. (A somewhat similar basis of distinction was used by Benjamin Constant in order to urge the novelty of Napoleon's despotism: former despots were content to put down criticism, this one actually requires positive praise.)

[22] Subject to the criticism that 'authoritarian' is a meaningless term, since all rulers enjoy, or claim, or seek to acquire, authority, if only by fraudulent means.

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used to justify hostility to the Soviet Union; or to conceal the fact that the United States is in no way different in its tyrannical methods from the Soviet Union. I have tried to show that it was not in origin a Cold War term: and I am totally indifferent to the polemics of the New Left. The only criteria that scholars should apply is utility and accuracy: does the term 'totalitarian' express more accurately and more clearly than other terms, like tyranny, despotism or autocracy, a specific political concept? When all parallels have been drawn and comparisons made, there seem to me to remain two aspects of the notion 'totalitarianism' which are distinctive to our contemporary predicament, and which suggest a difference of kind from all older examples.

The first aspect is that 'totalitarianism' is a post-democratic phenomenon. It belongs to the age of the rise of nationalism and of nation-states, to the age of legitimation of power by a democratic formula, to the age of the emergence of mass society. Of course, in this context, one's mind turns immediately to Tocqueville's prophetic words, so remarkably prescient in one respect. He foresaw, it will be recalled, an entirely new form of oppression which threatened democratic nations, for which the old names 'tyranny' and 'despotism' were quite inappropriate, and which therefore had to be described. The society of the future would be a society of equals, and of strangers one to another. Over them all would arise a tutelary power, 'absolute, detailed, regular, foreseeing and mild', which would provide security, satisfy wants, 'make their pleasures easy to pursue, conduct their principal business for them, direct their industry . . . and divide up their inheritances'. The sole independent act of the masses will be to choose their master, and after that they will return once again to their condition of dependence.[23]

What Tocqueville foresaw was that the despotism of the future would barter security for personal responsibility—somewhat like Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor. But Tocqueville's prediction related to a society where the traditions of democracy and personal freedom still prevailed, and the new benevolent despotism could rule mildly over an indifferent people, softened by a high standard of living. (The danger that he foresaw is incidentally real enough—but that is another topic!) What he could not foresee was that the tyrannies of the future would first emerge in the aftermath of a great and destructive war, in militarily defeated and economically depressed countries. Moreover, these tyrannies were to arise in the wake of the shattering of traditional moral and hierarchical values. In the vacuum that would arise there would be no barriers to the ambitions of the Leaders waiting to usurp power, and no moral restraint on a kind of human wickedness that Tocqueville could perhaps have never even imagined.

Thus the conclusion of it all may be that 'totalitarian'— a word as

[23] *Democratie en Amérique*, vol. II, iv, chap. 6.

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ugly as the architecture of the dictator who gave it currency—deserves to survive as a political term; and that the instincts of those who popularized a new term in our language were right. It is not the best term possible: the element of 'totality' which it contains echoes Mussolini's propaganda, and is misleading as to the real essence of its meaning. For totalitarianism is in truth tyranny or despotism [24]—but it is the tyranny or despotism of the age of mass democracy.

[24] I am aware that these terms have quite different meanings. But the distinctions are not any more relevant in this context to me than they were to Tocqueville.

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INTEREST ARTICULATION: A TOTALITARIAN PARADOX

Francis G. Castles

IN recent years the discipline of political science has seen a reawakening of interest in problems of comparative analysis. Theorists, particularly those with a structural-functionalist leaning, have attempted to find a valid basis for comparison by delineating the various structures and styles of institutions carrying out political processes.

There would appear to be two basic flaws on the part of the practitioners of the comparative method in dealing with the problems of totalitarianism. One of these stems from their overwhelming interest in those political processes which contribute to the making of political decisions, rather than to those by which the decisions are implemented.[1] This emphasis on 'inputs' rather than 'outputs' is very difficult to emulate in studying totalitarian polities, since such systems by their very nature attempt to restrict influence on the decision-making process to a single body, the Party, and to conceal from public scrutiny those other channels of influence that may be occasionally used. The other difficulty in applying comparative analysis to totalitarian polities lies in the insistence by many writers on the subject that a totalitarian society 'is historically unique and *sui generis*'.[2] Although there is much to recommend this view, it has tended to make for an approach which stresses the unique characteristics of totalitarianism to the exclusion of all research into possible similarities between totalitarian and other polities.

Obviously the definitions offered for the totalitarian phenomenon have a comparative status. They point to those characteristics of the Soviet and nazi systems that differ markedly from all other political systems.[3] However, having stressed the dissimilarities, the analyst often proceeds to study the totalitarian society without reference to the insights provided by a more general comparative analysis. This is nowhere clearer than in looking at the functions, or rather non-functions, of group politics in the totalitarian system. That intermediate groups of a pluralistic Western nature do not exist in totalitarian polities is one of the very few features of this type of political system that seems to be universally agreed upon by commentators.[4] Indeed, in arguing

[1] Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 13 ff.

[2] Carl J. Friedrich, 'The Unique Character of Totalitarian Society', in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism* (Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 47.

[3] See, for instance, C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, eds., *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 3–13.

[4] See, for instance, C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 211–24 and 239–89; Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Allen & Unwin, 1958), pp. 319–23; and J. N. Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government* (Chicago University Press, 1964), pp. 49–65.

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that the Soviet Union, despite the relaxation of terror since 1953, remains in essence totalitarian, Allen Kassof points precisely to the fact that its rulers have been unable to accept any lessening of the enormous degree of control they wield over social and political groupings.[5]

Despite this focus on the non-existence of an independent group structure in both nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, scant attention has been paid to the likely consequence of such a situation and the advantages and disadvantages accruing to the regime thereby. The importance of these issues can, however, be brought into the open if we consciously adopt a structural-functionalist approach. By focusing our attention on certain processes, which it is assumed all political systems must to some extent perform, a basis is provided for a comparison which can illuminate some of the less obvious aspects of the workings of totalitarian polities.

IN order to assess the consequences of the non-existence of pluralistic groupings in such polities it is necessary to understand the functions such groups perform in Western political systems, and to see whether they may not be at least partly carried out by alternative mechanisms in the totalitarian context. Almond contends that the function of independent groups is to articulate interests, that is to convert the interests of individuals into demands made upon the political authorities.[6] From this perspective a rather different picture of the totalitarian regime emerges. On the one side, it is reasonable to suppose that in systems of a highly coercive nature, such as the totalitarian ones, interest articulation will to a considerable degree be suppressed, and that pluralistic groupings are proscribed is itself an indication that this is the case. On the other side, it is by no means apparent that such political systems are able, or even desire, to suppress the articulation of interests altogether. Indeed, it can be argued, on completely theoretical grounds, that political systems, irrespective of the apparatus of coercion they possess, are unable to prevent the existence of interests of a latent variety, or to suppress completely the articulation of some of those interests as demands made upon the decision-making process. The basic rationale of this argument is that whereas it may be possible for 'all forms of organisation and communication [to] become saturated with a coercive flavour', it is not possible for every aspect of social relationship to become imbued with a coercive content.[7] For a situation of this kind to exist, a society would have to devote its total human resources to the task of coercion. Since, as a consequence, none would exist for vital economic, administrative and other tasks, we may dismiss this

[5] Allen Kassof, 'The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror', *World Politics*, vol. 16, July 1964, pp. 558–75.

[6] G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, eds., op. cit., p. 16.

[7] G. A. Almond, 'Comparative Political Systems' *Journal of Politics*, vol. 18, 1956, p. 405.

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ideal typical possibility as a utopian dream only to be realized when all these tasks are carried out by non-human, automated, agencies. It follows from this that, since coercion is merely another term for the suppression of interests, these will exist and be articulated to the extent that the coercive content of the regime is not total. The practical difficulties of exercising total coercion are demonstrated under the extreme conditions of concentration camp life. Although there is considerable evidence that life in the camps was mentally and morally destructive for most of the inmates, it could not prevent acts of individual courage and the expression of views regarded as heretical by the regime.[8] Moreover, the vast resources devoted to control purposes in the camps make them relatively isolated experimental situations, and certainly ones which it would be impossible to duplicate on a nation-wide scale.

This argument can be stated in less abstract terms by relating the existence and articulation of interests to the economic process and the implications that process has for the political sphere. All societies, irrespective of their degree of complexity, require some division of labour. Furthermore, all hitherto existing societies have allocated rewards differentially to individuals according to their role in the economic sphere. This quasi-Marxist view is not used to suggest that there must of necessity be two irreconcilable classes in society, but rather that the economic division of labour presupposes sets of individuals with interests in increasing or maintaining their role in the system of economic allocation of rewards. This assumption has, of course, been widely utilized in the study of totalitarian polities. The continuing existence of sectional interests and the suppression of their expression is in a sense the hallmark of such studies, since it provides a convenient indicator of the degree of coercion in these political systems. Moreover, in so far as the post-Stalin period has brought an awareness that the Soviet Union is not monolithic and that tensions exist within it, these tensions have been largely attributed to the demands of sectional interests, whether these be those of the army, the peasants or the managers.[9] There is even some evidence that when the leadership is relatively insecure it may make tacit gestures to these sectional interests. Brzezinski and Huntington argue, for instance, that 'Khrushchev not only rallied certain policy groups to his side but through his agricultural and (after 1957) his housing policies he was acknowledging broader social pressures'.[10] It might equally be suggested that the murder of Röhm in 1934 was less an act of personal vengeance on Hitler's part

[8] See Terence Prittie, *Germans Against Hitler* (Hutchinson, 1964).

[9] The tensions generated by the Soviet army's professional interests are, for example, illustrated in disputes over the level of military manpower. M. P. Gallagher, 'Military Manpower: A Case Study', *Problems of Communism*, May–June 1964.

[10] Z. K. Brzezinski and S. P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (Chatto and Windus, 1964), p. 198.

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than a tacit attempt to assuage the army's fears of the growing dominance of the SA.[11]

Both the above illustrations bring us to the borderline between the existence of interests and their articulation. The view that at least some interests must be articulated in totalitarian polities is somewhat more controversial than the argument that interests exist in such systems. It may, however, be suggested as a general theorem that *interests will be articulated to the degree that the totalitarian regime pursues rational purposes.* The expression of interests may be likened to the process of feedback in a homeostatic system. Such a system is one in which functioning is automatically maintained at a constant level through a process by which the flow of information about the altering environment triggers responses of a type restoring the system to equilibrium. Successful policy implementation requires a similar flow of information in order that policy proposals can be adapted to particular conditions, and the expression of interests by all those in any way affected by the policy provides precisely the necessary information. Consequently, it is perfectly possible to suppress interest articulation in so far as one is uninterested in whether individuals carry out the tasks assigned to them. But if one desires the successful completion of these tasks, one must listen to the individual's demands to the degree that they are relevant to the attainment of these purposes. It is, of course, true that totalitarian regimes tend to be mobilized on the basis of millenarian ideologies not susceptible to rational proof and this may be taken to explain the relatively low degree of interest articulation permitted.[12] But it is not true that totalitarian regimes have no rational purposes. Rapid economic development of the kind initiated by Stalin must of necessity, if it is to be successful, involve, on the part of those who direct the process, an awareness of and sensitivity to the interests of those who participate in it. The 1930s saw not only the elimination of the kulak and the mass terror, but also the rewarding of those interests essential to a rapid economic development—the managers and the stakhanovite labour aristocracy. Khrushchev was quite explicit on this issue of utilizing rational means to achieve economic purposes, even if it meant giving up long established organizational dogmas. He constantly reiterated the irrationalities that stemmed from the type of departmentalism that existed under Stalin. For instance, he complained:

> Some departments carry various articles and building materials for their enterprises over thousands of kilometres, while other departments are bringing back from these places similar materials and

[11] It has been argued that the removal of Röhm was intended to appease the power interests of the SS, but even if this is the case, the point remains equally valid. See E. K. Bramstedt, *Dictatorship and Political Police* (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1945), pp. 72–73.

[12] This distinction between purposive rationality and the whole-hearted pursuit of a millenarian ideal parallels Weber's distinction between social action oriented in '*Zweckrational*' or '*Wertrational*' terms. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation* (Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 115 ff.

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> articles. Here is an example. Last year the Ministry of the Construction of Metallurgical and Chemical Enterprises sent 20,000 sq. metres of prefabricated houses from Karelia to Krasnoyarsk Krai. . . . At the same time, the Ministry of the Timber Industry and the Ministry of the Construction of Petroleum Industry Enterprises sent some 170,000 sq. metres of prefabricated houses from the Krasnoyarsk Krai to other parts of the country. . . . This is all due to departmental chaos.[13]

It was in response to muddles of this kind that Khrushchev implemented his policy of decentralization of industry. Although not particularly successful, this policy is a clear example of an attempt to realize ends by rational means. An even more adventurous experiment in resolving economic muddle of this kind is to be seen in the limited adoption of Professor Liberman's proposals to resurrect profitability as a major indicator of plant performance and as a major determinant of managerial bonuses. Here managers are being quite explicitly rewarded for avoiding the kind of waste of resources at which Khrushchev directed his most virulent strictures. Nor, of course, is economic expansion the only end to which a rational choice of means is appropriate. Very similar considerations apply to victory in war, and Hitler's continued receptivity to the professional interests of the army and the economic interests of the armaments manufacturers may be explained in this way.

THE argument so far brings us to the crux of the paradox of interest articulation in totalitarian systems. *Whereas interests exist and are to some extent articulated, this is not a function of organized pluralistic groupings.* In this respect the totalitarian regime may indeed be said to be markedly different from all other modern political systems. But in saying it is different, we do not thereby absolve ourselves from the responsibility of attempting to distinguish those mechanisms which do, in fact, articulate interests, nor from delineating the possible consequences the use of such mechanisms will have for the working of the political system. Although, as has already been suggested, totalitarian regimes attempt to cloak the process by which interests are articulated, both because they are unwilling to publicize evidence of a lack of unity or to advertise means of procuring change, some surmises are possible on this topic.

One mechanism by which sectional interests may be afforded some weight is the already mentioned fact that the rational pursuit of policy requires some attention to the interests of those individuals actively participating in the realization of policy. Such a sensitivity to interests may come from the unorganized protest of the individuals concerned. This, for instance, appears to have been the case with the somewhat decreased tempo of collectivization after the initial brunt of that policy had led to the massive destruction of livestock and machinery by the

[13] *Pravda*, 8 May 1957.

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peasants. Stalin's letter 'Dizziness from Successes', published in *Pravda* on 2 March 1930, appears to have been related to a concern that his goal of rapid economic growth might be hampered by the rapidly deteriorating situation in regard to the production of foodstuffs. A sensitivity to interests of this kind may also be manifested by designing policies so that they are not conducive to protest. The totalitarian leadership is hardly likely to arouse protest for protest's sake, rather it is likely to avoid doing so to the degree that such a policy is compatible with its ideological aims. In the early stages after a revolutionary dictatorship has been instituted this will be difficult to accomplish, since the *sine qua non* of the regime will be total change in the society's values, a task that cannot be accomplished without arousing the protest of established groups. Consequently, to the extent that interest articulation and protest are not conducive to the total regeneration of values, terror must be utilized for their suppression. Terror, by this argument, becomes a device which is dependent on the regime's need to ignore interest articulation entirely. It is, moreover, a device which becomes progressively less important as the regime succeeds in its aim of changing the values of the general population. Psychologists have argued that such a change in values is already observable in the Soviet Union.

> The consensus of observers is that character changes have taken place in the Soviet citizenry since the Revolution . . . [they] are more overtly disciplined and less spontaneous. They are more practical and less contemplative; more concerned with results and less with the means whereby they are gained. . . . Regardless of their origin these are traits that enable man to live and operate more effectively in a modern industrialized society and particularly in a tightly controlled system such as the Soviet one.[14]

Under such circumstances of changed values it is easier for the modern Soviet leadership to accede to interests before they become articulated as discontent, since leaders and led operate within a common framework of values, and consequently the demands voiced would not for the most part be disruptive of ideological goals. This argument appears at least in part to be borne out by the recent tendency of Soviet commentators not merely to admit that differing interests exist, but to suggest that those who formulate policy might do well to give these interests at least some weight in their deliberations.[15]

Another factor built into the totalitarian structure gives the leadership an interest in recognizing and acting upon demands before they are ever voiced. Brzezinski argues that in contrast to the situation prevailing under constitutional government, the totalitarian leadership is completely isolated from public opinion, since it has itself forced such opinion into a surface appearance of total unanimity. This being the

[14] R. A. Bauer, *The New Man in Soviet Psychology* (Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 182–83.

[15] See, for instance, the editorial in *Pravda*, 16 June 1965.

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case, the shrewd leader may look around for those interests which in virtue of their position might oppose him, and then eliminate them.[16] While this appears to be an accurate appraisal of the motivation lying behind both Soviet and nazi purges, it can equally provide a motivation, on at least some occasions, for framing proposals in such a way as not to arouse undue discontent. Such a practice must have some appeal for a leadership which is aware that under the surface of a forced unanimity discontent may reach considerable dimensions before it is nipped in the bud.

THIS observation points to another means by which interests may be articulated within the totalitarian system. The isolation of the leadership is not accepted with equanimity; they attempt to circumvent it by a 'signalling' system, which is used to gauge those points at which discontent is likely to come to the surface.[17] The elements in this system may be divided into those where the interests articulated are assessed by agents of the regime, and those where interests are encouraged to be expressed more openly. The agents who are used for this passive listening-in process are many and various. In particular, as Albert Boiter has pointed out, the Soviet system utilizes a vast network of worker-correspondents who are attached to local and provincial newspapers, and the agents of the State Security Committee that are to be found in every place of work throughout the country, as a means of assessing the reception of policies.[18] A similar function was carried out by the SD in nazi Germany. The agents of this organization were used as a means of obtaining reports on the public's moods, and even though their reports could hardly be said to have changed basic policy, there were occasions when they led Goebbels to change the emphasis put out by the propaganda machine.[19]

Party and trade union meetings and the correspondence columns of the press all provide some opportunity for a more active articulation of interests, and a further set of signals by which the leadership may gauge discontent. In the Soviet Union of the Stalin era criticism of all types tended to be proscribed, since, before the establishment of the legitimacy of the regime, all protest, however minor in character, tended to be regarded as an implicit challenge to the principles on which a communist society was founded. However, once some degree of legitimacy is attributed to the regime, this situation changes, and an avenue for some limited criticism becomes a safety-valve which prevents discontent building up beneath the placid surface and erupting as a threat to the regime.

16 Z. K. Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge* (Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 16 ff.
17 See M. Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* (Macmillan, 1959), pp. 306 ff.
18 Albert Boiter, 'When the Kettle Boils Over . . .', *Problems of Communism*, vol. XIII, Jan.–Feb. 1964, p. 35.
19 E. K. Bramsted, 'Aspects of Totalitarian Systems', in Adam Roberts, ed., *The Strategy of Civilian Defence* (Faber, 1967), p. 53.

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Although it has been argued that there is some scope for a limited articulation of interests through the Party and state apparatus in so far as they have roles as 'signalling' mechanisms, it can hardly be said that such an expression of interests is actively encouraged. This makes it all the more strange that it is only recently that any Western commentator has noted one area in which the expression of criticism and suggestions for reform are positively fostered. The attitude of the Soviet regime to citizens' demands expressed in letters to the press, Party committees and soviets at all levels is, according to a recent article, quite the reverse of discouraging.[20] Moreover, the official praise accorded to the virtues of letter-writing as a means of obviating red tape and other bureaucratic phenomena is apparently taken to heart by the Soviet citizen. Quite apart from the local press, the most widely read newspapers such as *Pravda, Izvestia, Trud* and *Komsomolskaya Pravda* between them receive something like a million letters from readers per annum. Apparently the sheer volume of complaints and queries prevents either the journals involved or the central organs of the Party fully investigating the issues raised and many of them are referred to the Party apparatus at the republican level. As Cleary notes: 'The Party obviously prefers to receive input demands from the masses in a non-aggregated form, presumably because the aggregation function is commonly associated with autonomous interest groups.'[21] Once more it is apparent that the totalitarian regime prefers to emphasize those channels for the expression of interests which avoid the coalescence of individuals into an actively organized group. Letter-writing perhaps obviates this tendency to a greater degree than any other form of interest articulation. It is *par excellence* an individual pursuit and it is consequently hardly surprising that the regime affords it a greater indulgence than any other form of literary enterprise. After all, letters to the *apparat* need not be acted upon, and the sensitive editor will be careful not to print those which impinge on matters of political delicacy. Most important, demand inputs in the form of letters have the unparalleled advantage of encouraging the active expression of discontent (as other 'signalling' devices do not), without at the same time producing any appreciable degree of activism. They provide the totalitarian regime that has for the most part abandoned the most obvious instruments of terror (for one does not write critical letters to the secret police or to those who might refer them to the secret police) with perhaps its most delicate gauge of the state of public opinion.

THIS brief survey of the range of 'signalling' devices of which the regime can avail itself says very little about how efficient such mechanisms are likely to be. The curtailment of criticism on major

[20] J. W. Cleary, 'Demand Inputs in the Soviet Political System', *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, May 1969.

[21] Ibid.

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aspects of policy once they have been adopted by the hierarchy, and a natural desire on the part of individuals to avoid awakening the dormant powers of the apparatus of terror, certainly provide two major constraints on free criticism. This being the case, one must look elsewhere for major examples of interest articulation within the totalitarian system. One must, in fact, look to what T. H. Rigby has described as 'crypto-politics'. He argues that, 'On the analogy of other non-liberal-democratic states, we might reasonably hypothesise that conflicts of interest and aspiration in the Soviet Union, denied a special political sphere of operation, tend to give a political coloration to processes ostensibly executive and administrative in character . . .'.[22] In other words, some degree of articulation of interests takes place as a result of the activities of corporate groups within the institutional structure. There is considerable evidence that such a process took place in nazi Germany and that it still does take place in the Soviet Union. One very serious proviso must, however, be noted in dealing with the pressures exerted by these groupings within the institutional framework, and that is that they can in no way be evaluated as equivalents to the autonomous interest groupings of the Western nations. It may be reasonable to define 'those influential bodies of men within and without the Presidium and the Central Committee whose composite power makes them a force to be reckoned with in Soviet politics' as 'interest groups', as does Roger Pethybridge, or to see conflicts between managers and planners as manifestations of 'interest group' activity, as does Alfred Meyer, but only if we understand the term 'interest group' in a way very different from that usually denoted by its use in Western systems.[23] Interest groups in Western nations are able, because of the independent basis of their support, to press their grievances against the hostility of the government. There are many reasons why this is not the case in a totalitarian system. Groups like managers and planners have no formal organization to provide a basis for cohesive protest. While they have interests which they will attempt to realize, they are in the sort of position that Marx described as typical of the French peasant: 'There is merely a local interconnection among [them] . . ., and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political organization, they do not form a class.'[24] More cohesive groupings, like the army, would appear to be better situated to extract favours from the totalitarian regime, but while it is certainly true that they can forward their interests to a limited extent on such matters as manpower and other professional concerns, they are impeded from independent action against the regime by a number of factors. One lies in the fact

[22] T. H. Rigby, 'Crypto-Politics', *World Politics*, vol. 50, January 1964, p. 183.

[23] Roger Pethybridge, *A Key to Soviet Politics* (George Allen & Unwin, 1962); Alfred G. Meyer, *The Soviet Political System* (Random House, 1965), pp. 233–34. It should be noted that Meyer acknowledges the differences between Soviet and Western interest groups.

[24] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire* (International Publishers Edition, 1935), p. 109.

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that the regime may attempt to circumvent their influence by infiltrating political officers into the military hierarchy. Another is that, except in times of severe disruption of the system, the Party and its radiating civilian agencies are likely to possess a higher degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the civilian populace than has the High Command.[25] This being the case, the civilian leadership is able to curtail any excessive articulation by the removal of its most ardent advocates. This is as true of the removal of Zhukov as of the removal of Blomberg and Fritsch. Apart from such specific devices preventing the army from acting as an independent group, totalitarian regimes have tended to multiply and duplicate offices in such a way as to prevent individuals from becoming too closely identified with any particular interest.[26] As Rigby has suggested, perhaps the most important types of grouping are those which comprise a leader's career connexions, but precisely because these are unorganized and relatively easy to identify they are also easy to remove if they appear a danger.[27] 'Guilt by association' is one of the more important principles by which the purges operated. That career connexions can constitute groupings of major relevance in the policy-making field is illustrated by Khrushchev's elevation to the highest posts in the Ministry of Defence of those men 'who had distinguished themselves during the war in the south, and whom he knew personally'.[28] On the other hand, that those men were not purged in 1964 on Khrushchev's fall, and that their stranglehold on the Ministry has only gradually been diluted by new blood, points to the fact that they did not carry their loyalty to their erstwhile patron to the extent of identifying themselves too closely with his policies.

THIS list of mechanisms by which interest articulation may take place is by no means definitive even for the period of Stalinist rule in the Soviet Union or for that of Hitler in Germany. For instance, in so far as market forces still determine the types of goods presented for sale, it may be argued that the consumer is to some extent exercising a successful articulation of interests. However, rather than delve into the more obscure methods by which demands may be minimally satisfied, it is, perhaps, more interesting to note briefly those types of interest articulation which seem to have appeared in the Soviet Union since the demise of Stalin. One of these is an elaboration of the passive type of satisfaction of interests through the market mechanism. In its most developed form of the Liberman proposals, and in its much less ambitious form of actual economic reform, there have been a series of deliberate decisions to give the consumer a greater choice in the type

[25] S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp. 100–101.
[26] See Hannah Arendt, op. cit., pp. 399 ff., and T. H. Rigby, op. cit., pp. 190–91.
[27] Ibid. p. 192.
[28] G. Jukes, 'Development in Soviet Military Policy and Party-Military Relations since the Overthrow of Krushchev', paper presented to the Australian Political Studies Association Conference, August 1968.

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of commodities he can purchase. Although the changes involved may not seem unduly impressive to the Western observer, they may be quite significant to groupings, like the peasantry, which were formerly almost completely inarticulate. Thus Scott suggests:

> In so far as the voice of the rural population has been effective it has been outside the formally political channels and as part of the wider and more potent army of consumer-producers. While the production of capital goods retains its primacy in the thinking of the top management, it has evidently been accepted that some regard to what the public wants (even if at times it shows signs of frivolity repugnant to more austere natures) is in order as a means of securing co-operation in public purposes (even if this means seeking to simulate some of the workings of non-communist economics).[29]

It is also the case that the post-Stalinist period has seen a greater degree of freedom of expression on the part of individuals through the medium of the press. As Barghoorn notes, it is not unusual to find military leaders, educators, industrial leaders and so on expressing opinions and advancing proposals which although overtly in accord with Party goals also reflect bureaucratic and professional interests.[30]

Despite this tendency, two important caveats must be entered into any argument which sees in this development some sort of move toward a pluralistic situation in which group views are freely expressed. The first relates to the fact that while the views expressed by individuals may reflect group interests, they are not in fact the result of organized group action. Educators in the provinces may be fully in accord with the ideas expressed by one of their fellows in the press, but they are not yet willing to stand up and be counted. This brings us to the second point, that the topics on which views may be expressed are restricted and subject to very rapid alteration. The increased freedom of expression in the press is still maintained within the bounds that we have noted as typical of the totalitarian regime; it must be an individual statement of views and consequently unimpeachable on the grounds of partisanship, and it must be instantly suppressed if policy changes should make it desirable.

Perhaps the most significant extension of interest articulation has been a product of the post-Khrushchev collective leadership. As Wolfgang Leonhard has pointed out, the factionalism pertaining to this extended period without personal rule has made it impossible to reach clear-cut decisions on many issues, and in consequence there have been many compromises or delays in policy formulation. This situation has, in his words, ' served to encourage the open airing of disagreements and to enlarge the opportunity for forces outside the Party apparatus

[29] D. J. R. Scott, ' Resistance and Opposition ', *Survey*, July 1967.
[30] F. C. Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR* (Little, Brown & Co., 1966), pp. 154–55.

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to present reform proposals and new ideas for discussion'.[31] It seems reasonable to suppose that the greater facility with which individuals can express their viewpoints is a resultant of the policy vacuum emerging from this factional clash among the top leadership. Obviously, however, and this fits in with what has been said about the rapid alteration of issues on which discussion is possible, the issues on which new ideas may be presented change as the leadership finally decides its policy. At present the issues which are open appear to be those of agricultural policy, Party-state relations and the level of military preparedness. The degree of liberalization the regime was willing to permit seems to have been restricted by the need to avoid undue political risks.

ONE definite conclusion arises in regard to our discussion of the interest articulation process in totalitarian polities as a whole, and more explicitly in relation to modern developments in the Soviet Union. It appears that totalitarian regimes are not so much antipathetic to the articulation of interests, as to the formation of groups. Where it is possible the expression of demands is forestalled by the avoidance of policies which would arouse major discontent. At a local level, and more recently at a not so local level, criticism may not be discouraged, but it is restricted to the arena of individual dissent. To join with others to voice one's disagreement is factionalism (*grupovshchina*), and is regarded as subversive. Where groups must of necessity exist, either for functional reasons, as in the case of the army, or for control purposes, as in the case of the trade unions, considerable efforts are made to prevent even the most minor indications of an emerging independent group existence.

This raises the question of why the totalitarian regime finds group activity so abhorrent, when it does not necessarily object to the interests such groups might articulate if they had an independent existence. The answer to this enigma seems to lie in precisely that independence. A group's current interests may not be objectionable, but its possession of an independent organizational structure and leadership implies a potential for opposition of a more serious kind that might challenge the totalitarian leadership. In so far as one interprets that leadership's interests to lie in power for its own sake, and to the degree that power is a zero-sum concept, then it is apparent that the existence of any group with an independent power-base involves a diminution of the leadership's power. If, rather than attribute sheer power-hunger to the totalitarian leaders, one argues that their interest lies in the fulfilment of their ideological, millenarian beliefs, a similar argument is applicable. The potential for serious opposition is a potential for disrupting the

[31] Wolfgang Leonhard, 'Politics and Ideology in the Post-Krushchev Era', in A. Dallin and T. B. Larson, eds., *Soviet Politics since Krushchev* (Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 68.

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achievement of the communist or '*Volk*' society, and, in consequence, cannot be tolerated.

Such an interpretation of the status of interest articulation and group activity in totalitarian polities has important implications for all those theories of such systems which impute their continuance to the existence of a bureaucratic ruling class.[32] While much evidence has been collected by individuals such as Djilas, suggesting that the higher Party functionaries in the Soviet Union and in the satellite countries enjoy an enormously higher standard of living than the general population, there is considerably less evidence that this section forms a cohesive grouping.[33] The usual procedure adopted in the type of theories we have mentioned is to deduce the cohesiveness of the section from the evidence of its material well-being. But since, as we have seen, the totalitarian regime attempts, largely successfully, to separate the function of interest articulation, on which the degree of material well-being is dependent, and the formation of independent groupings, such deductions would appear to be inadequate.

THE totalitarian leadership reaps a number of considerable advantages from the way in which the interest articulation process is structured. The most important is probably that demands on the decision-making process tend to be formulated through informal and rather precarious channels. The regime is able to prevent open criticism at will and to remove career connexions by administrative or physical purge. Another important aspect of the lack of independent group structures is the fact that the regime can prevent the contagion implicit in many instances of interest articulation manifested in countries with a pluralistic structure. Pressure groups in such countries attempt to publicize their opposition to the government as widely as possible in order to activate those latent interests or 'potential groups' they feel might sympathize with their position.[34] By utilizing a 'signalling' system that is for a large part passive in character, and by insisting that criticism be individually expressed, the totalitarian regime is able to minimize the danger of awakening unnecessary protest.

Despite such advantages, however, the paradoxical situation described presents one considerable danger to the leadership that does not exist in Western systems. This is the danger of a 'more or less spontaneous break-through into the political system from society, such as riots and demonstrations'.[35] Into this category of what Almond calls 'anomic interest group' activity, one might also put possible military intervention in the political sphere. There are two basic reasons why

[32] See, for instance, James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution* (Penguin, 1962), and T. Cliff, *Russia: A Marxist Analysis* (International Socialism Press).
[33] M. Djilas, *The New Class* (Thames & Hudson, 1957), pp. 56–58.
[34] On the role of 'potential groups' see David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), pp. 23 ff.
[35] G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, eds., op. cit., p. 34.

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such activities should be manifested in totalitarian polities. Both of these relate to the fact that in the process of articulating interests independent groupings create what may be regarded as 'safety-valve' mechanisms for the channelling of discontent into areas which are not conducive to violence or revolutionary activity. Intermediate groups provide a set of highly visible and institutionalized channels through which discontent may be voiced. By relying upon the independent strength of the group, the individual may hope to wrest an amelioration of his conditions from the government. Should he fail in this attempt, he will probably be able to rationalize his defeat by arguing that equally visible and institutionalized group interests opposed him. This is merely to restate the principle that the individual has the right to promote his interests subject to the will of the majority. But in totalitarian systems the mechanisms of interest articulation are neither institutionalized, nor highly visible. As we have argued, this process is largely conducted by individual expressions of interest or through the medium of unstable and informal groupings. It is also to a large extent carried out by the anticipation of interests and the observation of interests. Since both involve a high degree of passivity on the part of the discontented individual, it is reasonable to suppose that he will be unaware of the channels he might utilize to further that discontent. This is the crux of the problem. There are no obvious means at the disposal of the individual in the totalitarian society to press his claims to the limit. The most he can do is to be ever more discontented, and if the 'signalling' devices are for some reason inoperative, or the leadership's anticipation is defective, then the most likely result will be spontaneous outbursts of hostility and violence.[36] Where the 'signalling' devices are ineffective, and alternative means for channelling discontent unavailable, relatively minor causes can produce major explosions. This appears to have been the case in the major strikes and riots in the city of Novocherkassk in June 1962, which were apparently caused by increases in the prices of meat and dairy products. Albert Boiter's documentation of this outburst shows clearly how pent-up grumblings can rapidly turn into a violent attack on the symbols of the regime, including the plundering of Party and government offices. According to eye-witness reports the number of dead in this particular outburst numbered several hundred.[37]

The above-noted fact that such outbursts may take on a distinctly anti-system flavour is the other feature of the lack of independent groupings that has severe dangers for the totalitarian regime. The very existence of such groupings will tend to exercise some degree of moderation on extreme demands, since to continue functioning they require the maintenance of stable channels of access to the powers-that-be. Groups

[36] It should be noted that totalitarian leaders are well aware of the need to anticipate possible causes of discontent. One of Khrushchev's major criticisms of Stalin was that the latter was unaware of the true state of things in the countryside.
[37] Albert Boiter, op. cit., pp. 33–43.

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tend to exert a moderating influence on their members in order to get a better hearing for their basic demands. In this way the existence of group values tends to protect the political system from extremist impulses. As Kornhauser argues:

> Intermediate groups, even though they are independent of top élites, operate to protect these élites from arbitrary and excessive pressures by themselves being responsive to the needs and demands of the people. In the absence of intermediate groups to act as representatives and guides for popular participation, people must act *directly* in the critical centers of society, and therefore in a manner unrestrained by the values and interests of a variety of social groups.[38]

In a situation where no visible channels of alleviating discontent are available, and where there are no group interests to moderate extremism, extremism may come to the fore by focusing its venom on the one highly visible target, the regime itself. This tendency is reinforced precisely by the fact that in using passive channels of interest articulation, and in attempting to anticipate discontent, the regime has attempted to make for itself a reputation of benevolent omniscience. While this attitude may be a highly desirable one to instil into one's subjects, it has considerable dangers when individuals are discontented, since they are more than likely to attribute their problems to a decline in the leadership's benevolence or omniscience, or both.

In other words, where there are no differentiated, independent channels for the expression of grievances, the only possible way to effect the change one desires is to overturn the system. The German generals were totally unable to impress on Hitler the disastrous nature of the course he was pursuing, and in consequence their only alternative was his physical destruction. In the communist context, Djilas points out that even a strike by a small number of individuals can bubble over into a general insurrection:

> While individual strikes are almost impossible, and hopeless as far as potential results are concerned, there are no proper political conditions for general strikes and they can occur only in exceptional circumstances. Whenever individual strikes have taken place, they have usually turned into general strikes and taken on a distinctly political character.[39]

The East German uprising of 1953 is an example of how rapidly such dissidence may spread and take on a political, anti-system character. As Baring points out, a strike of 300 building workers in Block 40 of Stalinallee became a general strike cum non-violent uprising of 300,000 in 272 towns throughout the country in a matter of 36 hours.[40] This indicates that while it may be true that the totalitarian regime can

[38] W. Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Routledge, 1959), p. 33.
[39] M. Djilas, op. cit., p. 110.
[40] Arnulf Baring, *Der 17 Juni 1953* (Cologne, Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1965), p. 66.

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prevent the contagion of interests in the normal course of events, once an anomic breakthrough occurs only the use of military force can prevent the total disruption of the system. This latter point is quite clearly illustrated by the need for Russian troops to stem the swelling tide of liberalization in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In both instances the Soviet authorities estimated, probably quite correctly, that the anti-system, anti-Soviet slogans of the reformers implied the existence of only two viable alternatives: either the nations involved would in effect leave the Soviet sphere of influence, as had Yugoslavia earlier, or coercion must be used to prevent that result.

THE Czechoslovak case in effect provides a type-case of the processes of interest articulation in the totalitarian context. The original impetus to liberalization lay not in the expression of demands by cohesive groupings, but in the gradual emergence within the higher echelons of the Party hierarchy of individuals of a more liberal persuasion. Where the Novotny regime would have immediately suppressed the growth of a mass-based democratic reform movement, it did not attempt to prevent, until it was too late, some expression of diverse individual views within the Party itself. The emergence of Dubcek in this manner provided a signal for the voicing of grievances of every kind and the creation of groups to promote those grievances. The very fact that reform was in the air and, moreover, sanctioned by the regime, provided that which had previously been missing, visible and institutionalized channels through which long-standing discontent could be expressed. The Soviet intervention, however, restored the old situation, but with the important difference that the discontent had been brought into the open. Under these circumstances, the expression of interests has taken an increasingly anomic form. An incident as intrinsically trivial as the Czechoslovak ice-hockey team's 4:3 victory over the Soviet team was enough to spark off mass demonstrations against the occupying power throughout Czechoslovakia. Such activism is strangely in contrast with the relative passivity shown in the immediate weeks following Dubcek's replacement by Mr Husak as First Secretary of the Party. This seems to suggest that the six-month period in which pressure groups had time to develop was insufficient for the creation of entrenched loyalties among the population either to the groups themselves or the political leaders who had made them possible. The slogans daubed on walls and public buildings appear to be negatively oriented against the occupying force rather than positively supporting the ousted leaders. Once again it would appear that unorganized discontent will take an anti-system flavour, rather than positively fighting for particular leaders and aspirations. Certainly, those who formulate the policies of the Soviet occupation strategy seem not greatly concerned with the temporary re-emergence of group life. It is suppressed almost incidentally in the process of reasserting censorship and the previously existing norms of Party life. Such evidence of Soviet scorn

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for the type of group life and vitality which emerged in Czechoslovakia cannot be taken to indicate the intrinsic weakness of pluralistic groupings when ranged against totalitarian attempts at control.[41] It is rather to point to the need for a period considerably longer than six months to develop group loyalties and consciousness. Whether a totalitarian regime will ever give its population sufficient time for such a development is a question only the future can answer.

This analysis, although it has dealt with no aspects of totalitarianism other than the way in which interests are articulated, does seem to lead to the conclusion that in respect of this aspect at least, such systems are unique. In neither modern Western nor traditional systems is there an attempt to separate the function of interest articulation from the group structures which normally perform that function. The groups that articulate interests vary in kind from functionally specific interest groups, like trade unions and business associations, to religious, kinship and lineage groups, but in all systems other than the totalitarian it is groups which voice the individual's demands of the political system. It has been argued that totalitarian leaders reap considerable benefits from the lack of independent groupings, which can challenge their authority and impede their societies' progress to the millennium. But with these benefits they may also reap the whirlwind of anomic discontent, which because of its unorganized and violent character can only be controlled by the use of massive force. It is strange that in devising means whereby the totalitarian population is allowed some expression of its views, a paradoxical situation is created in which the instruments of suppression once more come into their own.

[41] For evidence of the ability of a political system with a firmly entrenched system of pluralistic groupings to resist totalitarian aggression, see Maque Skodvin, 'Norwegian Non-Violent Resistance during the German Occupation', in Adam Roberts, ed., op. cit.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A POST-MORTEM

Pavel Tigrid

[*This description of Soviet-Czechoslovak events between 1967 and the fall of Dubcek is based on the extensive testimony of several officials of the Czechoslovak Communist Party who had a close view of the various negotiations, as well as on documents and personal records both published and confidential. They were put at our disposal by public figures in Czechoslovakia anxious to see them published in the West.*]

THE Czechoslovak crisis that was to entail the fall of Antonin Novotny, the 'Czechoslovak spring', the invasion of summer 1968 and the replacement of Alexander Dubcek, started in effect at the session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Committee on 30–31 October 1967. There was nothing to indicate that this plenum would differ from its dozens of predecessors; the procedure and routine were the same. 'Theses' were presented on the 'Position and Role of the Party in the Present Stage of Development of our Socialist Society'. This dogmatic and long-winded 22-page document asserted amongst other things that 'the state must exercise an indispensable repressive function towards all internal and external anti-socialist forces and negative manifestations in society'. Jiri Hendrych made the opening speech, members pulled out of their pockets ready-made 'contributions to the discussion' and the Presidium and Secretariat expected everything to be agreed unanimously in the usual way, including the previously prepared resolution drafts.

Everything was spoilt by a single, small technical hitch, however. One member of the Presidium, Alexander Dubcek, raised an objection in the direction of Antonin Novotny. The documents and resolutions put before the meeting, he complained, differed in a number of respects from those approved and agreed by the Presidium. This was very strange behaviour, though only to be expected, he added, from the First Secretary. Dubcek went on to produce statistics suggesting that Slovakia was being continuously cheated in economic matters, particularly investment policy, and Novotny, he said, had presided over these malpractices.

Comrade Novotny became very angry, as he usually did on the infrequent occasions when he was criticized. His answer amounted to this: that if comrade Dubcek felt Slovakia was getting a raw deal from Prague, very well, let us set up a separate Czech National Council, create a federal state and the two economies could go their own way with the Slovaks finding their own capital to invest; he, Novotny, was not in favour of this solution and wondered whether it was not inspired by some relic of 'bourgeois nationalism'.

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At this, pandemonium broke out and for the first time in 20 years a plenary session of the Central Committee was to witness an uncontrolled and uncontrollable discussion. A member for Brno, Josef Spacek (later one of the most liberal figures in the Presidium), quoted the results of a survey of members of the Party in Southern Moravia, showing that the organization there was pretty well disintegrating. Volenik, Secretary of the North Moravian Region, made a critical speech, and another came from Vodslon; comrades Smrkovsky and Slavik deplored the official theses as 'optimistic and unrealistic'. Finally, the ominous phrase was heard: 'cumulation of offices'.

Novotny could scarcely believe his ears. At about the same time he heard that late in the afternoon of 31 October Prague University students had come out on to the streets and that a procession (quite unpolitical at the start, it is clear) was even then marching towards the Castle and hence, by a further coincidence, in the direction of the Central Committee session. It was getting on for eight o'clock. Celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution was about to start and a Party delegation under Novotny's leadership was due to leave for Moscow. The dogmatist group had what struck them as a brilliant idea: the plenum would be interrupted for technical reasons and discussions therefore terminated. Novotny tried to secure unanimous approval for the theses, but for the first time in the history of these meetings it was refused, 13 members voting against the submission of the document to the Party organizations. Only eight votes were cast against a proposal to defer the plenum until December, many supporting it only to ensure that a firm date was set for the resumption of discussion —12 December.

Novotny and his friends had gained what they most badly needed: time to manoeuvre and intrigue. A period of feverish activity ensued for the two warring factions, who realized that this time it would be a fight to the finish. It was clear that, as in such situations in the past, a scapegoat would be sought; no one was anxious to fulfil this role. Still, it does not seem as if Novotny yet had any serious fears for his future. He expected great things of the trip to Moscow, notably the opportunity first to neutralize and then to liquidate his opponents. When he arrived, however, Novotny found the leaders in Moscow far less favourably disposed than he had hoped. Indeed the situation was quite embarrassing for him. Brezhnev and his colleagues kept postponing political talks with him on a variety of pretexts. For the Soviet Embassy in Prague had simply not had time yet to report on the unexpected course of the October plenum. The Moscow leaders, with many other problems to worry about, had no great desire to get involved in the internal disputes of a traditionally faithful communist party, and finally sent Novotny home with a non-committal expression of confidence in his person and his further measures.

On his return from Moscow Novotny fell ill, and Jiri Hendrych had an attack of heart trouble, so that the internal argument in the Party

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came to a halt. But only outwardly. Presidium groups of varying composition met daily at the bedside of one or other of the leaders, and the prevailing mood favoured a quiet compromise. It was no longer possible, of course, to skirt round the issue of separating the offices of Head of State and First Secretary, but this was commonly referred to as an unspecified 'principle' that 'required consideration'. Meanwhile the Soviet Embassy, by contrast, had sent an urgent telegram to Moscow painting a picture of chaos and uncertainty in the Czechoslovak Communist Party (Ambassador Chervonenko is quoted as having remarked in a private conversation that it was all because 'so few people had been hanged' during the fifties). Then at the beginning of December the Embassy passed on an invitation from Novotny to Brezhnev, asking the Soviet Party leader to come to Prague as soon as possible. He arrived on 8 December. The official statement that he had come at the request of the whole Central Committee was of course untrue; not even the Presidium members knew about the invitation.

Brezhnev refused to take part in a Presidium meeting, but he did speak to individual members and argued forcibly in favour of Novotny retaining both his jobs. In private conversations Hendrych later said that the Soviets had no particular personal interest in Novotny's future; but the Soviet leaders, he pointed out, were 'weak and fearful of any change, scenting danger in every concession'. The same source gave the opinion that Brezhnev, 'none too intelligent a man', was then fully in charge of ideological affairs in which chaos prevailed, whereas in economic matters, for which Kosygin was responsible, the outlook was indeed improving.

However, not even Brezhnev's intervention could silence those voices in the Czechoslovak Presidium favouring separation of the two supreme posts, especially since the mood in the Central Committee at large was well known. The deadline for the deferred plenum was approaching, and still the Presidium had reached no decision. It was not till the last moment that a further week's postponement was agreed, up to 19 December.

THE session was finally opened by Lastovicka, who proposed on behalf of the Presidium a two-point agenda: 1. Economic development problems. 2. Rearrangement of the leadership and relations between the central functions. Novotny opened the discussion of point 2 as follows:

> To begin with I should like to exercise self-criticism in regard to my remarks at the October plenum. . . .
>
> That plenum featured a number of issues which left an unpleasant taste behind and which unfortunately, due to various distorted interpretations, have had repercussions inside the Party and in public life.
>
> In this connexion I feel I must say something about my own contribution. . . . I have thought a lot about it and taken note of

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the views of other comrades. I see now that my address was inept and ill-considered and was rightly criticized by a number of comrades. . . .

Comrades, I should finally like to inform the Central Committee about the recent visit by the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The initiative came from a telephone conversation with Comrade Brezhnev, who had rung me up. As usual in such conversations we discussed various international questions and the current work and problems of our two Parties. I asked him if I could have a personal discussion with him, for which I would be happy to go to Moscow. I should like to stress that I had been charged by the Presidium to discuss a number of questions—particularly those concerning specialized production—during my previous stay in Moscow, for which there had then been no time. We had met at the October Revolution anniversary celebrations, but there had been no opportunity for a quiet and informal chat. In our second conversation comrade Brezhnev said he would be pleased to come here on a short friendly visit and talk to members of the Presidium. . . .

Twice recently there has been discussion at plenums of the Soviet Central Committee of international questions, including defence, to which the Soviet Union devotes large sums.

The Soviet comrades appreciate that priority must always be given to the defence of the Soviet Union and of the whole socialist camp. The public supports this policy, because it does not wish for another war and the sufferings of the last war have not yet abated. . . . The international situation is a complex one. . . . The imperialists will not lightly quit the arena of the world. . . . The future belongs to socialism; it is only a matter of time before we gain the upper hand and . . . finally overtake capitalism in the economic field. The imperialists understand this . . . Czechoslovakia faces a powerful attempt at ideological subversion; the West is pressing hard upon our country, as upon the German Democratic Republic and the other socialist states. The West seeks to thrust wedges between us and weaken our unity. . . .

For these reasons, comrades, we shall continue to weigh carefully every step we take; it is a great responsibility which the Central Committee carries.

It was at this point that comrade Vodslon suddenly stood up and asked in a loud voice:

I beg of you comrades, what do you take us for? We have heard speeches from comrades Lenart and Novotny. I do not know if they represented the agreed view of the Presidium, but in any case I must ask why we should have to learn about the disagreements within the Presidium from sources other than the Presidium. Anyone at all familiar with the situation knows that such disagreements exist. The foreign press has written about it, foreign radio summaries talk about it, only we are denied truthful information. Where is it laid down that the Presidium should appear before the

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> Central Committee with a unanimous opinion, when we know that it is not unanimous? That was made quite clear at the last Committee session. . . . I think that when they address the Central Committee comrades should state their own views. They ought to say what really went on in the Presidium. I read in the papers one day that the Central Committee had invited comrade Brezhnev, and the next day that it was the Presidium. I am a member of the Central Committee but I had been away ill for two weeks so I do not know. But these are basic questions, comrades. Even the public talks about them. . . . We have got to express an opinion about these things for once, comrades. If we act like this we merely lose people's confidence.

With this, the cat was out of the bag. After a vain attempt by Lastovicka to put it back in again, the debate developed in dramatic terms. The economist Ota Sik contributed a crushing review showing that without thoroughgoing changes in the political system it would be impossible to improve the economic situation, which was already catastrophic. Sik attacked not only Novotny, but the Party system itself. He proposed that it should be permitted in future to form factions within the Central Committee and to set up expert commissions with a decisive say in the management of affairs, so that even Secretaries of the Central Committee would be subordinate to them.

> Comrades [he began], I wish to speak today not about economic matters but about certain political problems which I regard as paramount at this moment.
>
> We have to admit that popular discontent with the present trend of society is growing. The last session of this Committee showed that a large section of the Party appreciates the critical nature of the situation and sees the need for change. This is a time of decisive solutions, if we are not to be held responsible one day for inexcusable neglect of serious symptoms, for lack of courage to speak up at the moment of crisis. Most honest working people are baffled that we have failed for so long to deal with self-evident shortcomings. They are disoriented by lack of specific information . . . and display increasing disinterest, hopelessness and an embarrassing withdrawal into their private shells. The intelligentsia is registering its disapproval ever more publicly and vociferously. That part of society which reacts most sensitively of all, the young, is highly sceptical towards all political and economic measures. The aversion that grows amongst them already, I am afraid, has a partly anti-socialist character. It is no use washing our hands of them, comrades; these are the future pillars of the social order. With the general decline of interest and activity among Party members, which has to an increasing extent to be made up for by the apparat, there is a haphazard search for causes and solutions on the part of both communists and non-communists, and a distrust in the effectiveness of Party resolutions. . . . Conflicts of opinion cannot be ignored any longer, unless the Party is to forfeit its leading role altogether. Voices are raised suggesting that things

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were better before, that the Party used to have a firm grip on everything, that there were no discussions, that we have now had enough of democracy and need a firm guiding hand again. . . .

We have condemned the personality cult and the glorification of Stalin's person, the mass violence and illegality and the violation of collective leadership. But we have failed to carry out any deeper clarification of the need for basic changes, of the role and working methods of Party and state, such as would prevent such elevation of personal power and a personal machine above the rights of other communists from ever occurring again. . . .

If the Party is not to lose its authority entirely, if the economy is not to grow steadily worse and social conflicts are not to turn into a serious threat to socialist prospects, we must really knuckle down to a number of crucial measures. . . .

The most important thing for us to carry out without delay, comrades, and in my view at this very session, is as follows:

We must eliminate the extreme accumulation of power in the hands of certain comrades, notably comrade Novotny, in which I see the greatest obstacle to a rapid recovery by the Party. The Presidium has already decided in principle on the need . . . to separate the functions of President and First Secretary, but continues to postpone its actual implementation. I think it is wrong to tarry over this problem, for its solution is a precondition for other important changes and for the restitution of a healthy atmosphere in the Party. . . .

I accordingly propose, as our first act, to request comrade Novotny to resign the position of First Secretary and to call upon the Central Committee to release him from this post.

As a second act I propose the immediate election of a commission of comrades enjoying the confidence of the majority, people of long Party experience and whom we most respect for their bold and candid speeches on various occasions, or for their general good character in moments of stress, and whose behaviour has not contributed to the strengthening of personal power on the part of this or that comrade. I have in mind such comrades—pray take note of my specific proposals, I may be wrong—as Bilak, Boruvka, Hrdinova, Indra, Fierlinger, Kriegel, Krosnar, Lorincz, Machacova, Piller, Rigo, Sedlakova, Slavik, Smrkovsky, Spacek, Vodslon, Volenik and Mikova. . . . This commission should immediately set to and draft proposals for two candidates for the post of First Secretary, and for several new Presidium members. . . .

Thirdly, immediately after the election of these officials the Presidium should be charged with drafting basic measures for the democratization of our Party, subject, however, to further discussion of several main points. I would personally suggest in particular these guidelines:

First, a specific set of rules needs to be elaborated for the activities of the Central Committee, its Presidium, Secretariat and commissions. The Central Committee itself must become genuinely, and not just formally, the supreme Party organ between congresses;

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the plenum must cease to be an assembly for unanimously approving cut-and-dried proposals by the Presidium.

Second, the responsibility for special spheres of Party activity must lie not with individual officials, but with Central Committee commissions . . . responsible to the Presidium and the plenum of the Central Committee; the function of Secretaries should be the running of their departments on behalf of the respective commissions. The activity of communists in the armed services and security forces should be governed by two independent commissions responsible to the Presidium and to the plenum of the Central Committee, and no member of one of these two commissions should be a member of the other.

Third, the post of Central Committee Secretary is incompatible with the highest state functions—President of the Republic, Chairman of the National Assembly or any government minister. A Central Committee Secretary cannot serve for more than two periods of office, unless in exceptional cases the Central Committee gives its assent by secret vote to a third.

Fourth, all elections are secret. . . .

Fifth, the Central Committee's code of procedure should also cover cadre policy, which must not be employed to strengthen the position of particular individuals. . . .

Furthermore, the Presidium should be adjourned to draft a short-term Political and Economic Action Programme, to enable the Party to deal as quickly as possible with the accumulation of urgent problems concerning the organization and working methods of the state, the management of the economy, culture and other important social fields.

Sik's speech had a cold reception, as was only to be expected in a Central Committee still consisting largely of dogmatist officials. However, such members as Smrkovsky, Spacek, Boruvka, Volenik and even some conservatives (Fierlinger and Dolansky) added their specific criticisms of Antonin Novotny, pointed out his personal responsibility for the crisis of state and Party and demanded his resignation as First Secretary. Comrade Vodslon stressed that . . . 'the Party has developed into the paramount institution of power, and is even entrenched as such in the Constitution and laws of the country. . . . I am not sure that we need this under socialism. . . .'

Some speakers such as Oldrich Rakosnik, on the other hand, opposed Sik's suggestions on the grounds that they would . . . 'confuse' the workers, and in addition 'play into the enemy's hands'.

WHEN the second day's session opened (20 December) Lenart tried on behalf of the Presidium to patch things up. He deplored the 'fantastic rumours circulating abroad and among certain circles at home, tending to dramatize the Presidium's dealings'. As for Sik's proposals these 'go beyond our statutes' and the plenum was not competent to decide on such matters, still less to 'vote on them on the spot, which

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would violate the scientific character of Party work'. Sik had 'expressed many opinions without support of facts or arguments' and 'employed a method which ought not to be customary in comradely relations'.

Lenart's efforts failed. Vaclav Slavik immediately challenged him to say in what point Sik had 'gone beyond the statutes' and Lenart was unable to answer. Libuse Hrdinova protested at the Presidium's failure to inform the Central Committee of Brezhnev's visit. Piller stated that the blame for the sad state of the country and for the 'evident decline of sympathy for the USSR', lay with the whole Presidium and not with Novotny alone, who 'despite certain faults had devoted his whole life to the Party'.

Another speaker was Vasil Bilak, a member of the Presidium who was later to play a highly ambiguous role in the Party's dealings with Soviet representatives. In December, however, he criticized Novotny very openly, and complained that the press had not mentioned many of the subjects Novotny had touched on at the September plenum. (These included allegations that the Fourth Congress of Czechoslovak Writers in the summer of 1967 had been prepared in Paris as well as in Prague.) 'The Party's rank and file are adult and want clear answers', said Bilak. And then, turning to Czech-Slovak relations, he added:

> Those comrades who have studied the Party archives at the Barnabite Monastery have been amazed to read that only four months after the proclamation of the 'Magna Carta of the Slovak nation' at the joint meeting of the two Parties on 17–18 July 1945 one of the authors of that Magna Carta, comrade Kopecky, proposed the dissolution of the Slovak national institutions. . . . As evidence of a wave of anti-Czech feeling in Slovakia Kopecky at the same joint meeting had adduced the 'argument' that at the Panslav Day celebration at Devin the comrades from Prague had been given smaller portions of meat than the Slovaks. . . . Such was the kind of 'evidence' upon which was gradually built the fictitious charge of nationalism and distrust and, in the end, the quest for enemies in our own ranks.

THE third day's session opened with a defensive address by Novotny.

> . . . I should like to stress again that I received both the post of First Secretary, and that of President of the Republic, at the hands of the Central Committee of our Party. In 1957 the Central Committee was considering how to ensure fulfilment of the Party's will in the situation prevailing after the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party. . . . Even then I resisted the combination of the two functions, pointing out the difficulties and problems it would impose on me. . . . Then again when I was re-elected President in 1964 . . . I asked (comrades in the Presidium) that if ever they should find me unable to perform both functions adequately . . . they should tell me so quite frankly. I repeat what I said at the Presidium meeting, that I put my office as First Secretary at the disposal of the plenum of the Central Committee. . . . I shall accept

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> any decision that the Central Committee makes. . . . I have always done what the appropriate organs of the Party decided and carried out the work assigned to me. The Party's interest has always been paramount for me, and that is how I intend to go on. There will no doubt be a place and a time for me to say something myself about questions of Party work, for I cannot forgo the right to reply to certain remarks made in the discussion about my own activities.

It was Dubcek who now notified the plenum that the Presidium on the previous day had 'accepted comrade Novotny's proposal to place the function of First Secretary *à disposition*' but proposed postponement of the discussion about filling this post until 3 January. Comrade Smrkovsky strongly disagreed. He said:

> I have the feeling that we are experiencing one of those critical moments in the history of our Party which will decide for a long time to come whether it will progress or petrify. So we should consider carefully . . . what the essence of the crisis is. Is it the result of unfettered personal ambitions, or inter-group fighting, or irresponsible actions by Secretaries, or of national hyper-sensitiveness among Slovak communists, as some people are saying? Or is our argument a manifestation of objective processes whose understanding and solution is of vital concern to the Party and to the whole of Czech and Slovak society? I am not so naïve as to ignore the role of personal and other factors, but I do think that our disagreements are primarily a reflection of objective processes and social needs. . . .
>
> The Slovak problem is one of the chief factors in this argument, a factor which came to the surface at the moment when comrade Dubcek's speech at the October plenum was stigmatized as nationalistic. This description was greatly objected to, not merely by the Slovak members of the Central Committee, but by many Czech ones too. . . .
>
> Another serious topic is our relationship to the Soviet Union. . . . Friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party, based on complete equality, mutual respect and independence, is and will remain one of the basic planks of our Party and state policy. I was therefore very disturbed by comrade Chudik's suggestion that Soviet comrades should be consulted in connexion with our decision. Does this mean we are to involve Soviet comrades in our own quarrels? Are we to make them arbitrators in favour of one particular solution, and so in fact saddle them with some of the responsibility? Would that be good for our Party and our country? Would that add to the Soviet Union's prestige in our country or promote Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship? . . . We cannot in our Party permit that any individual or group should arrogate the right to stand as a kind of guarantee of our relationship to the Soviet Union. . . .
>
> The same applies, I think, to another question that has been raised here, the question of who represents the interests of our working class. . . . No single individual or group of Party members can claim a monopoly right to defend the interests of the

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workers and to incorporate the working-class traditions of our Party. . . . Nor is it right to describe our arguments as a conflict between workers and intellectuals among the Party leaders. . . . Any tendency to set workers against intellectuals is highly harmful and alien to the whole tradition of our revolutionary Party. . . .

The Party must create the conditions for a renewal, if I may so put it, of that enthusiastic spirit of 1948 and pre-1948 which we remember so well. This naturally requires changes, including changes at the top. That is the objective basis for our arguments, which have become centred on the demand for personnel changes in the Presidium. I should like to say something about these. Though I do not regard them as the kernel of all our problems, I do think that these changes are indispensable, things being as they are. It is a question in the first place of enlarging the Presidium, and in the second of dividing the functions of First Secretary and President. The need to enlarge the Presidium is clear from its own members' statements; it is in such a condition that it is very doubtful whether it can perform the tasks assigned to it. It also follows from its co-responsibility for the Party's present plight, and from the incorrect way it has behaved vis-à-vis the plenum of the Central Committee. The Presidium requires, in my opinion, new blood. I am thinking of four or five additional members. If some members of the Presidium have put their places *à disposition* . . . they should be filled in accordance with the statutes.

Far more complicated . . . is the personal separation of the posts of President and of First Secretary. . . . I have come to the conclusion that this separation should be accomplished without delay, for reasons that are quite objective. In the first place comrade Novotny . . . as the highest official with the greatest concentration of power, bears the greatest responsibility for the present state of affairs. . . . Secondly, it is unsatisfactory that an excessive number of duties should be piled upon one pair of shoulders. . . . Surely we are not so short of people that one comrade should have to perform two tasks, and for such a long period. On the other hand, we are not blessed with such outstanding personalities as, for example, Lenin, who could perform all the practical work involved in both jobs as well as a certain amount of theoretical work such as ought to some extent, at least, to go along with each of them. . . .

There are also some topical reasons. Some comrades feel uncertain about what would happen if no changes were made after all the criticisms that have been expressed. . . . Many are afraid, not without reason when one considers certain past experiences, that there might be a certain relapse into the methods of the fifties, with strong measures being taken against opponents inside the Party. . . . That would involve a most serious danger for the whole Republic. . . .

All these reasons have led me to conclude that the decision about the First Secretary's post should be made now, *at this plenum*. I have not reached this view hurriedly; I have considered whether the whole thing could not be left until the Party's Fourteenth Congress. . . . Even before December I discussed my feelings with

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comrade Novotny when he invited me to talk with him. I urged him at the time to make the proposal himself to the Central Committee for splitting the two functions. . . . He did not do so, and I much regret this. To put your office at the Committee's disposal, comrade Novotny, is one thing. To lay it down and say, 'For various good reasons I will not hold it any more and I want the Central Committee to appoint a successor'—that would be quite different. . . . I would put a resolution, comrade Novotny, if you would only accept it, for you to have two hours to consider the matter. All of us, I think, would give you two hours, or as long as you wanted—I would anyway, and vote for it with both hands! Come and tell us that you appreciate the need to solve the situation and split the functions. I am sure you would find full understanding among us here in the Central Committee. But if things go on the way they have been going, I am much afraid of the consequences. . . .

But what we want above all is a positive programme for renewing people's confidence in the leadership of state and Party. It is up to us all whether we succeed in this. On the fiftieth anniversary of our Republic we should try to switch to the offensive, so that this year sees a restoration of unity within the Party, and of unity between the Party and the people. . . . As an industrial country with democratic traditions and a traditionally strong communist movement, we must finally prove that we are capable of striking up new paths, little known and explored, and capable of solving democratically, and in the spirit of the Party's teaching, the serious economic and political changes which can no longer be deferred.

SMRKOVSKY'S speech set off a long and excited debate such as the Central Committee had not witnessed for 20 years. A few members—Nemec, Indra, Leflerova, Mestek, Trojan and others—proposed an adjournment, for which they no doubt had their own good reasons. Others were more subtle; Ladislava Besserova, for example, pleaded on behalf of the women present who had Christmas cooking on their minds and suggested that 'we can perfectly well continue the discussion on 3 January'. Dubcek on the contrary pointed out that only 22 of the 62 members who had put their names down to speak had so far had the floor. Chudik came to the defence of Novotny, who was (he put it) 'to be sacrificed for the benefit of a few dissatisfied philosophers, a handful of writers and sundry elements'. 'I am scared', he added, 'at some of the tones and undertones we have heard, which would give our Party a quite different character from what it has enjoyed throughout its whole magnificent 50 years' history'. Dubcek then announced from the chair that Novotny had asked for the floor as a matter of privilege.

Novotny now urged that members attend first to the backlog of urgent practical decisions concerning the Slovak National Council, the National Assembly, various ministerial arrangements etc., whose further postponement would cause public dismay, and deal with the Party personnel questions at the plenums scheduled for February and March. Meanwhile he had a complaint to make.

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> I do not accept, comrades—I shall be quite frank about this, and return to the matter later—I cannot accept lessons about personal character and Leninist norms from people, even from members of the Central Committee, whose past activity does not entitle them to it, as the Party Control Commission could testify. Mark my words, comrades.

Kolder, in contrast, proposed at this point that the plenum's wish should be met and that all members of the Presidium and Secretariat should individually 'close their accounts'. This was accepted. Kolder then summed up the situation inside the Party as chaotic, blaming this on 'the methods used for securing implementation of the official line' and on 'the intolerable atmosphere in the Secretariat', where certain Secretaries enjoyed privileged positions and intrigue and suspicion were rife. He complained that work on the first revision of the 1949-1954 trials, which Kolder had himself taken over in 1962, had been sabotaged, and official secretiveness had led to the publication in the West of a short version of the report produced after several months' work in the Barnabite Monastery archives by a 25-man Party commission. (The full version, a far longer document, had so far been kept restricted in the Central Committee archives, he assured members.)

Kolder went on to retail various baneful results of the practice of 'cumulation of functions'.

> On the Saturday before Brezhnev's arrival a meeting of the Presidium was called to discuss the general question of Party unity. In the afternoon Trnavsky informed us that Brezhnev was due to arrive at Novotny's invitation and that the whole Presidium was to meet him. No such meeting took place at first. There was a two-hour delay while Brezhnev negotiated and chatted with Novotny, Lenart, Dubcek, Dolansky and Hendrych. Then in the evening we had a brief session together, as Novotny has described; Brezhnev declared that he did not wish, so to speak, to interfere in our internal affairs. My own main concern was that if a confrontation had taken place and then we had discussed Party unity, it would look as if Brezhnev had come to straighten us out. But the procedure actually adopted was a reasonable one.

Comrade Hendrych gave the opinion that the healthy development of the Party had been interrupted by 'a small group of writers, mostly communists I am afraid, who proffered opinions directly opposed to Party policy'. This in turn 'stimulated the enemies of socialism', witness the writers' manifesto, Mnacko's campaign, the 'links with émigrés' and so forth. Unfortunately, Hendrych noted, 'comrade Novotny's nervousness had also become more acute'; he criticized the First Secretary's speeches of August and September 1967 for their 'lack of subtlety'. His decision to vote against Novotny in the Presidium, he said, had 'not been sudden, but matured slowly'. The Party should draft a new Action Programme by the end of October.

The session resumed after lunch with a self-critical speech from

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Martin Vaculik, while Stefan Sadovsky by contrast said there was no crisis in the Party at all. This appeal to ethics and sensibility then came from Antonin Kapek.

> I should like to ask comrade Novotny, by his statements here, by his exemplary courage and loyal communist attitude, to prevent further discussion and pouring out of filth which nobody can justify. . . . I can promise the Central Committee that I shall never in my whole life speak about any negative traits in the First Secretary, for I have no wish to speak against the Party and against unity. I shall always speak about comrade Novotny's successes and his efforts and I feel convinced it rests purely with him whether we all behave like that. . . .

The Presidium's scope for action was now 'minimal', Oldrich Cernik assured the plenum. Following the October plenum 'too many things had leaked out of the Presidium meetings—not by anyone's intention, perhaps, but people do talk too much'. The combination of the two supreme functions had been justified in its time, he thought, and one should not fall for any 'one-sided estimate of comrade Novotny. . . . I am sure for my own part, comrades, that as time goes on comrade Novotny will see who really meant well and acted sincerely both towards him and towards the Party.'

Dubcek stated that he was exhausted and unwell. He insisted that the important thing to remember about the Slovaks was that they were 'living together with the Czechs of their own free will', and that they would only get what they fought for.

The debate dragged on and time grew short—suiting the dogmatists, who wanted the decision postponed. Vilem Novy proposed that the session be adjourned till January, and that the Presidium together with representatives of the regions be charged with drafting a solution for the cumulation-of-posts question and a reform of Party working methods, as well as with putting forward a new candidate for the post of First Secretary. After several rather confused interventions from the floor Dubcek put the proposal for the adjournment to the vote; it was accepted with five abstentions. The proposal for a consultative group was passed unanimously.

NOVOTNY now had practically a week to take some firm action; he used it to make his most serious mistakes. He overdid everything: both his preparations for liquidating opponents and his efforts to threaten or bribe potential allies (army officers received a thousand crowns' bonus just before the crisis). A great campaign to buy souls was started everywhere while Novotny took more and more control into his own hands. Comrades Leflerova and Besserova, it turned out, instead of worrying about Christmas cakes had jumped into their official cars and, together with other comrades, started a tour of the provinces to win local officials over. They warned everybody that socialism and the Party would be in jeopardy unless Novotny retained all his functions.

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Obscure plans were also being hatched by the Eighth (Security) Department of the Central Committee and by circles close to the Party organization in the Defence Ministry. During December a number of reservists had been called up without warning and in several parts of Bohemia manoeuvres had been held which might or might not have been purely military exercises. Certain militia units were put on the alert for a period of several months and an exercise was scheduled for 12 December in Prague. The result was quite amusing, for at this point the Main Political Administration of the armed forces under General Prchlik intervened and diverted the militia units to the Military Academy in Dejvice and to the Party High School building in Vokovice, on the grounds that they would be instantly available for action. There they ate and drank day after day, waiting for the moment that never came. When everything was over they returned home and only then realized that they had virtually been Prchlik's prisoners the whole time.

Meanwhile uncertainty reigned at the Defence Ministry. The Party organization there had a meeting on 19 December, the first day of the Central Committee plenum. Sensational rumours circulated and a certain General Sejna was foremost in promoting them. He claimed that a 'hostile faction' had been uncovered in the leadership, consisting of Dubcek, Kolder, Cernik, Dolansky and Hendrych, and that Novotny had avowed he would 'smash' it. The army must not stand idly by, Sejna proclaimed, arguing that the defence forces had always been expected in complex domestic situations to play 'a certain role'.

It became apparent later that these rumours were both exaggerated and premature. On the same day, 19 December, the present Defence Minister General Martin Dzur rang General Pepich (who was to succeed Prchlik), who in turn warned his friends, the 'reliable' officers on the General Staff. These effectively frustrated the conspiracy in the nick of time. On 2 January General Janko, who was later announced to have committed suicide, summoned a number of commanding officers to Prague. The plan was apparently for a tank brigade to move on Prague at a predetermined moment; this was to be the signal for a counterblow by Novotny's people and a nocturnal police razzia against their opponents. For this purpose Mamula, head of the Central Committee's Security Department, drew up a list of people to be arrested. This list, drafted with assistance from officials in the army and security forces, was approved by Novotny. Exactly 1,032 arrest warrants were issued, signed by Kudrna as Minister of the Interior and by State Prosecutor Bartuska; Mamula was merely to fill in the dates when needed. (Questioned later before the Central Committee, he insisted that this was normal practice and that open-dated arrest warrants were held ready in every country for dealing with people suspected of anti-state machinations.) The intended victims included Central Committee members Dubcek, Cernik, Smrkovsky, Sik, Vodslon, Sedlakova, Spacek and many others; Generals Dzur, Prchlik and their associates; certain officials of the Party's central organs and of the non-communist 'social organization'; many communist

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writers, artists, journalists, students and so on. (When Novotny fell in January, Mamula's men destroyed a great deal of compromising material in the Party headquarters, Defence Ministry and President's Chancellory. Photostat copies of the arrest warrants, however, were preserved.)

The pro-Novotny forces were to strike at the beginning of January. When Novotny delayed convocation of the plenum, however, his opponents scented trouble. Finally Kolder rang Novotny with a form of ultimatum: if Novotny did not convene the Central Committee immediately he, Kolder, would do so on a crisis footing. Accordingly Novotny summoned the Committee for 3 January.

On 5 January, while it was sitting, a meeting started at 7.30 in the morning on the third floor of the Defence Ministry of the main Party committee in that organization, with a number of senior officers from the Ministry also attending. The main point on the agenda was a letter addressed to the Committee stating that 'communists in the armed forces do not approve of the division of the functions of President and First Secretary', on the grounds that the international situation 'does not permit such changes'. Generals Sejna and Janko showed signs of nervousness as the debate went on, but when a vote was taken almost the whole meeting favoured the dispatching of the letter. (The generals who subsequently took the letter to the Castle arrived to find that Dubcek had already been elected First Secretary. Nothing daunted, they left the letter in its briefcase and were in fact the first group of visitors to congratulate Dubcek on his appointment!)

AT the Central Committee plenum, meanwhile, Novotny had started off with a mild exercise in self-criticism and renewed his offer to hand over his Party post if anyone had doubts about his performance. Comrade Sedlakova from Bratislava shouted out that it was the Central Committee which conferred functions and the Central Committee which decided when to take them away again. The atmosphere rapidly became heated and some of the hesitators joined those who were already known to be critical. (It is alleged that comrades such as the former Minister of Information, Hofmann, had two or three versions of their 'contributions to the discussion' ready, one favouring Novotny, one against him, and one non-committal.)

As the argument raged an increasing number of members favoured separation of the supreme offices; but not all. Defence Minister Lomsky, for example, pointed to the international dangers surrounding the Republic, such as German revanchism, and concluded the moment was not ripe for such grave changes. The chief of the general staff, General Rytir, spoke even more dramatically; he claimed to have just received intelligence reports of an 'increased threat' to the country from abroad. General Prchlik, on the other hand, argued sarcastically that the last speech showed how incapable some comrades were of using the information entrusted to them, and how they oversimplified it or exaggerated it

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to suit their purposes. It was embarrassing, he said, to hear such nonsense from the mouth of the head of Czechoslovak intelligence, and he hinted that the army was aware of strange preparations going on suggesting the possibility of the defence forces being misused in an internal Party conflict.

The clumsiest move—and it cost him the second half of his political career—came from Lenart, who asked what other socialist countries would think if Novotny resigned. He even read out passages from a threatening memorandum by Ulbricht, which provoked cries of disgust and mirth. To crown everything Vaclav David, the Foreign Minister, none too intelligent but at least undisguised as a Moscow agent, tried to demonstrate with quotations from the foreign press that any criticism within the Party was welcome fuel to the Western imperialists, adding that 'imperialism has high hopes of the economic reform proposals'. David was promptly hooted down by the economists in the Central Committee.

Opening the second day's session (4 January), Oldrich Cernik announced that the Presidium had come to a decision overnight: the question of separating the supreme functions must be decided that day. Accordingly the Presidium had called upon comrade Novotny 'to draft appropriate conclusions in co-operation with the consultative group in readiness for the evening session'. The Presidium would then 'make recommendations for further action' the following day.

All through the night of 4–5 January the consultative group argued and negotiated, above all with Novotny himself who obstinately rejected almost every candidate that was suggested, Smrkovsky and Sik most vehemently of all. His own proposals for the succession—Lastovicka, Lenart, Martin Vaculik—were in turn unacceptable to the consultative group. And so it went on. When Cernik's name cropped up, the candidate was himself disinterested—he was more keen to be premier, and a combination of both jobs was after all no longer possible. So Cernik put forward a name that had not been considered till then: Dubcek.

After a little hesitation Novotny decided to back this suggestion. For that he had two reasons. First, Dubcek was a Slovak so that the choice might seem too radical and 'inappropriate' to the Czech members of the Central Committee; then there would be no agreement and the dispute would drag on, giving Novotny's party time for further manoeuvring. Second, Dubcek was known to be a hesitant and somewhat timid personality, a man of compromise whom they could hope to manipulate. ('An honest man, but indecisive', was Hendrych's verdict.) To Novotny's way of thinking this was another point in Dubcek's favour.

Dubcek himself, however, was at first reluctant. He realized the enormity of his task and the size of the responsibility he would have to assume. He insisted from the outset that he did not want it to appear as if his original fracas with Novotny in October had been due to personal motives. He urged that collective leadership and collective decision-making be upheld.

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All the foregoing developments transpired during the night of 4–5 January. At 9.12 a.m. Kolder told the plenum from the chair that the Presidium and the consultative group together had reached ' unanimous conclusions ', the nature of which would now be explained by Novotny.

> Right from the start of our talks in the Presidium I made clear that in order to make things easier both for the Presidium and the whole Committee I would stand up in the plenum and put the office of First Secretary at the Party's disposal. I did this to ensure that discussion was not restricted by any feeling that my own person was an obstacle to free decision-making, any idea that the First Secretary's post was tied to me personally. At the same time I declared that I was in favour of separating the functions of First Secretary and President of the Republic. And I stress, comrades, that I am still of this opinion. . . . I ask, in line with our discussions in the Presidium and with my own conviction, that I should be relieved of the office of First Secretary, and I say quite frankly that I do so in the interest of Party unity and I hope my decision will be understood in this spirit.
>
> I also wish to put forward in the Presidium's name and in accordance with the view of the consultative group and with my own preference the unanimous proposal that comrade Dubcek should be chosen as First Secretary. . . . My own feeling, comrades—and I know a good deal of thought was given to these appointments—is that a good and happy choice has been made, that in comrade Dubcek's person we have a guarantee that . . . his work will lead to a reinforcement of unity. . . .

Kolder now assured the meeting from the chair that Novotny would remain the ' Workers' President ', continue to hold high office and lend every assistance to the new First Secretary. Asked by Kozelka whether any thought had been given to Novotny remaining First Secretary and relinquishing the presidential office, he replied that the original proposal had been unanimous. Jiraskova urged acceptance of the Presidium's proposal so that the session could end with everyone in agreement.

Another 51 Committee members were down to speak, but to hasten the vote a number withdrew their names—Kriegel, Machacova, Havlin, Havlicek, Kuba, Spacek, Prchlik, Novy (the last-named asking that ' Novotny's achievements ' should be accorded due recognition). Pavlovsky and Salgovic, who were to emerge as traitors eight months later, protested against the decision. Pavlovsky warned against the ' international repercussions ' of Novotny's resignation and asked that other communist parties, particularly the Soviet, should be immediately informed ' by internal channels ', since there was clearly going to be a change of policy in the Czechoslovak Party. Salgovic complained that he had been trying to speak ever since the plenum started on 19 December and had never been given the floor. Was this an example of the ' Leninist norms ' everyone talked so much about?

Other members also withdrew their names, yet the debate still went on. Some, like Nepomucky and Stoll, felt it necessary to recall the ' early

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revolutionary years' of the Party, others agreed with the proposal but wanted to make various supplementary points. The hesitators, however, were coming round in favour of Dubcek for they could now see clearly how things were going to end up. Finally he was voted in unanimously as First Secretary. We quote some characteristic passages from his speech of thanks. He began:

> I shall try to be brief. I should like to say, comrades, what I have said in the Presidium and to the consultative group when I was proposed as a candidate, and I should like to repeat it at least in part to you: anyone who knows me will realize this is one of the hardest decisions I have ever had to make. I do not have to explain this; you will understand it yourselves and in any case I would find it hard to put it before this plenum. This is something that so affects one's state of mind; as I have already said, I do not know how I shall feel after the lapse of time. . . .
>
> As for our Czech comrades here and all Czech working men, I should like to say—as it were through the mouth of the Czech man-in-the-street, my brother-in-law Vasek and my uncle in Slany—well, that I shall continue to do everything I can to strengthen our unity, the unity of our indivisible Czechoslovak state, and to do everything for what has always been the keynote of our Party's policy—all-round reinforcement of relations with the Soviet Communist Party and the parties of the other countries in the socialist camp; to put it simply, I shall exert every possible effort to work towards the aims which the Central Committee has always had under the leadership of comrade Novotny. . . .
>
> I realize, comrades, that everything depends on the collective. . . . We talked about this in the Presidium . . . as the most important thing a man can rely on in his work: the collective. And that includes, last but not least, the assistance of comrade Novotny which he has promised me—and that of course is something I value. . . .
>
> I should like to thank comrade Novotny for the work he has done . . . all these years; there is no doubt he has tried to the best of his conscience to make his contribution to the fulfilment of our Party's policy.
>
> Comrades, thank you for your expression of confidence.

In the afternoon, four new Presidium members were elected to strengthen Dubcek's position—Josef Spacek, Josef Boruvka, Emil Rigo and Jan Piller. Finally, the exhausted plenum approved the text of a resolution later described by Ota Sik as 'extremely toothless. . . . We were trying mainly to avoid making a sensation, to get a political grip on things and avoid chaos, to inform the public by gradual steps. That was probably a mistake; we should have provided more accurate and worthwhile information from the start.'

The session was wound up by Kolder who, having asserted that its proceedings, 'despite their complexity, confirmed the unity of the Central Committee in fulfilling the general line approved at the Thirteenth (1966) Congress and reinforcing the application of Leninist norms in the Party's

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life', called upon everyone to sing the Internationale. Which they did, ending at 3.57 p.m. on 5 January 1968.

SIK'S criticism of the final resolution was an understatement. It no longer contained the provision in the original draft that the Central Committee should in future exercise 'a decisive control function over all other Party organs', i.e. including the Presidium. Instead, the Presidium was now to play a responsible part in 'elaborating and fulfilling Central Committee resolutions'; it was to 'formulate new ideas, keep the Central Committee regularly informed, to call upon the Central Committee plenum to state its view on all its activities and in the case of internal disagreement to inform the plenum of the viewpoints of the individual members of the Presidium'.

The information which was handed down to Party officials about the December and January sessions of the Central Committee was itself not merely inaccurate but completely distorted. This was of course the intention of circles close to Novotny, and of others too, who did not see themselves as completely vanquished. Local and district organizations of the Party at first knew nothing of what had transpired except that Dubcek had replaced Novotny. This was especially true in the countryside, where the impression was that a few personnel changes had occurred 'up there' and everything would continue as before. But in Prague too there was plenty of indignation at the lack of official candour. Vilem Novy, who gave a report to a meeting of the Party organization at the Central Committee's Political College, was shouted down and promised to hold another meeting to which he would come 'better prepared'. The meeting demanded, however, that they should be told about developments by a Presidium member, Jiri Hendrych himself, who had after all been responsible for two purges at the school of which Milan Hubl, the former Vice-Rector, had been the most prominent victim. (Hendrych complied on 8 February.) Again Jiri Hajek, the future Foreign Minister, met with a stormy reception from the meeting of Party representatives of the Prague University faculties because of his over-cautious presentation. The meeting, at which the chief spokesman was the lecturer Frantisek Samalik, proceeded very democratically to elect a 12-member commission which drafted a strong resolution calling among other things for the resignation of Novotny from his presidential post too.

The wave of protests from 'below' against the distorted picture of the Central Committee debates greatly increased as a result of instigation from leading figures like Smrkovsky, who realized, rather late in the day, that their own fate was menaced by the ignorance of junior officials and the pretence of 'continuity' in Party policy. Moreover, there was considerable uncertainty in the top ranks. Dubcek himself was hesitant and postponed till February any basic statement of his programme, meanwhile devoting 16 or more hours a day at the Secretariat reading and listening to reports. In view of this, and of the promise Dubcek had made to Brezhnev just after his appointment that there would be no

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more ' radical ' personnel changes, it is hardly surprising that dogmatists like David, Lomsky, Pastyrik or Lastovicka felt quite safe in their ministerial or Party seats. Men with discouraging records like Erban, Duris, Auersperg and others began to speak up and offer their dubious talents to the new leader. As the phrase ran in Secretariat circles throughout January, ' the situation was obscure '.

ONE thing Dubcek did insist on was that a programme for the new leadership should be drafted before the settlement of cadre questions in the Party and government. With this everyone agreed, though not all for the same reason. Some hoped that the outline of an Action Programme would at least permit a somewhat realistic analysis of Czechoslovakia's political and economic situation and allow proposals for implementing and improving the reforms which the previous leaders had frustrated. Others, on the contrary, trusted that protracted work on drafting such a programme would lead to a cooling of enthusiasm and above all to the suppression of demands for convening a special congress or conference of the Party.

Initially, the efforts to draft a programme were nervous and disorganized. Around 20 January Kolder summoned an *aktif* of Party specialists from various fields—Secretaries, economists, historians, lawyers, sociologists. It was a strange assortment ranging from dogmatists like Fojtik to progressives like Mlynar. Sik was not even included among the economists. On the other hand, right next to Kolder in the chair sat none other than Pavel Auersperg, the notorious former head of the Central Committee's ideological department. [Note: he became head of its international department in May 1969. Tr.] There were no Slovaks at all. Kolder explained that the initial purpose of the gathering was to draw up a list of the most burning issues, ' the things ', as he put it, ' which hurt us most and make people discontented '.

The meeting proceeded in a ramshackle way like some slow-motion Party happening. Everyone was given a five-page memorandum described later by one of the participants as an ' unseasoned goulash of ideas '. Kolder then invited everybody to put on paper whatever idea occurred to him; then they could help put it all together. It was a frightening spectacle to see these high Party functionaries, who for decades had orated confidently about their ideological ' armour ', struggling to put life into empty phrases which had long since lost any public magic. (' Stop the excess of unfinished projects! ' was one stirring slogan.)

Thus there emerged the first version of what was amplified and amended by some hundred individual consultants (but not a single working-class representative) and commented upon by the various commissions of the Central Committee, till it emerged as the Party's ' Action Programme ' and was discussed and approved at the April plenum.

A number of proposals were omitted from the first version, not because it was not intended to put them into effect but because it was

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thought unwise to publish them at the time. There was for example a passage discussing the possibility, or even necessity, of devaluating the crown. Recommendations for reducing defence expenditure and for eliminating the useless production ministries were omitted. Paragraphs dealing with the relation between the Party as the 'leading power' in the country, and its government, were repeatedly rewritten and left the subject no clearer than before. The chapter on foreign relations was short and deliberately vague in parts; here, as elsewhere in the Programme, there were formulations which clearly contradicted one another.

The general reaction to the Programme was that vast effort had been expended to little avail. Young people, and especially university students, who had expected radical changes in the Party's policies, were deeply disappointed. Workers, who perhaps studied at most the passages about the economy or the proposed increases in family allowances, were chiefly anxious to see whether there was not some concealed attack on their wage packets. Novotny took the opportunity to address a workers' meeting at one of the great CKD factories, where he hinted that the new trend in the Party was against their interests and that if the new epithet 'conservative' meant someone who stood up for the workers then he, Novotny, was proud to be counted among the conservatives. Dubcek and other members of the Presidium tried to frustrate these attacks of Novotny's by talking to shopfloor meetings themselves, and apparently succeeded.

AFTER a while the widespread whispering campaign and atmosphere of uncertainty in the Party ranks began to militate against the dogmatists; the floodgates of criticism were opened even in branches where for years no one had dared to raise their voice against the official line. Functionaries who had at first claimed that no change was envisaged started to resign in fear of exposure. Anniversary meetings at district and regional headquarters became a free-for-all in which the winners were not always more capable or honest than the losers, but at least the most intolerable of the old gang were purged.

A second factor was the new freedom of comment exercised by journalists in the press, radio, television and news films. The Party leaders, far from trying to hinder them, gave them some backing, even agreeing to provide quite detailed accounts of Presidium and Central Committee meetings. The result was a regular explosion of information and open opinion, which found an enthusiastic echo throughout the country among people whom the Party had vainly tried to stir up into political activity during the previous two decades. People found themselves 'socially involved' almost overnight—which led them of course to take a close and interested look at those who had taken the new initiative.

The new Party leaders, however, soon became uncertain. As the

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'Prague spring' burst around them, they found themselves unable to catch up with the stream of questions put to them by the public, and particularly by TV and radio journalists. One issue led to another as the political onion was unpeeled, layer by layer; people watched the television screens spellbound and fought to buy newspapers. They even began to send signed letters to the press and to telephone their views to the radio. Commentators and announcers suddenly acquired the popularity hitherto reserved for hockey champions; one of the best-loved, Milan Weiner, found a notice 'Weiner for President!' pinned to his office door.

The new freedom of expression, so skilfully exploited by Party journalists, naturally had other consequences—attacks from abroad, especially from Pankow and Moscow. By mid-May a regular anti-Czechoslovak campaign of threats and blackmail was under way, and soon there followed an outcry from the Czechoslovak Communist Party itself against unspecified 'anti-socialist forces'—an outcry that nobody took very seriously at the time.

One outstanding result of the period was the exposure of further violations of justice dating from the Novotny period and the rapid increase in and legal rehabilitations of the victims, communist and non-communist alike. The journalists and the new leaders joined forces in furthering this process, which was aimed against those who had carried out the barbarities of the fifties even if they were not those ultimately responsible.

By early March it was already clear that the Czechoslovak 'rebirth' was going to be a far more profound affair than had seemed possible when the process began with the palace revolution in the Party leadership. The leaders themselves had never imagined that the nation-wide response to their invitation to 'discuss the state of the nation' would threaten their own position. When the waves of criticism began to lash against Novotny's second, presidential, office the popular interest coincided with that of the new team at the top. Novotny pretended to be deaf to the clamour; for a long time he was assisted in his reluctance to abandon the post by the 1960 Constitution, which contained no provision for removing the President. The public therefore had to wait until Novotny resigned—which he only did under extreme pressure. The Party put its weight behind a growing press and radio campaign which castigated 'men of the past' still occupying 'the highest places', yet never mentioned Novotny by name. It is after all a tricky matter to criticize an irremovable head of state, let alone to accuse him of crimes against humanity.

In the midst of this quandary came the Sejna affair. General Jan Sejna, a farmer by trade, had belonged to the Party since 1945, joined the army five years later, become a member of parliament and candidate member of the Central Committee in 1954 and risen to be the most powerful 'Party general' in the Defence Ministry, where he acted as the mainstay of Mamula and his dreaded Eighth Department of the Central

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Committee. On 27 February 1968 Prague Radio suddenly announced that he had been deprived of his parliamentary immunity for embezzling some 300,000 crowns, but had not been arrested because he had meanwhile fled the country.

However, the matter was not as simple as that. It was made quite clear in the press, and later at Central Committee sessions, that Sejna, Janko and a few other generals had plotted an intervention by the army into the Party's internal affairs, and done so in conjunction with Mamula and with the knowledge of Lomsky, Rytir and the President of the Republic.

The Sejna affair quickly blew up into a major scandal. Press, radio and television vied in exposing details of the life of this playboy officer, personal friend of the Novotnys, father and son, boon companion of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact generals, who had been able calmly to leave the country in an official vehicle together with his son and his son's fiancée and proceed via Hungary and Yugoslavia to Italy and thence to Washington. This was a most welcome development. It was even rumoured in Prague that Prchlik's friends had known of Sejna's intended flight, informed 'appropriate Party quarters' (but not Dubcek) and allowed him to go unscathed. (If true, this argues considerable foresight. On the debit side, however, Sejna's flight brought an investigating commission post haste from the Warsaw Pact high command, which diagnosed 'serious shortcomings' in the Defence Ministry and increased the watchfulness of the Soviet military.)

However this may be, the first Prague Radio criticism of Novotny by name was on 3 March, the day after the announcement of Sejna's flight. From that moment requests for Novotny's resignation began to pour in from Party branches. Yet it was not till 22 March that the radio was able to announce the acceptance by the Presidium on the previous day of Novotny's resignation 'for reasons of health'. The operation was a tricky one. The presidium of the National Assembly had first to request the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party to coerce Novotny into resigning, and to threaten a vote of no confidence by the National Assembly if he did not, before the dictator realized that his days were numbered.

A week later Novotny had to relinquish his positions in the Party Presidium and Secretariat too. This happened at a Central Committee plenum at which he had arrived in his official car complete with bodyguard. His evident bad temper was not improved when he noticed a group of reporters and cameramen on the steps of the Central Committee building, itching to record his appearance. 'Take their names and have them arrested!' he shouted to his bodyguard, but even they had ceased to obey him. The same plenum approved the candidature of General Svoboda as the next President.

Following Novotny's resignation from the Presidency, and more especially after 28 March, there was a regular epidemic of resignations and dismissals of people closely associated with his nefarious rule; there

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were also several suicides in circumstances never properly cleared up of people from Sejna's circle, and of former employees of the courts, the Public Prosecutor's office and the Ministry of the Interior.

Thus, in an atmosphere of almost daily disclosures of murders and tortures inflicted on political prisoners in the fifties, as well as of new suicides and mutual charges of responsibility for these horrors, there ended the darkest period in the history of this land.

The second phase of the 'rebirth' was ushered in by Novotny's fall, the proclamation of the Action Programme, another reorganization of the Presidium (the dogmatists scored by getting Boruvka dropped and the Stalinist Svestka elected to this still crucial body), changes in the Secretariat (the appointment of Indra as a Secretary was another dogmatist victory) and finally the establishment of a new government under Cernik, with its own programme.

This phase was marked by two obvious factors: a fundamental public debate on the scope and meaning of democratization, and an increase in Soviet pressure on Prague. The two were clearly connected. Men like Brezhnev, Gomulka, Ulbricht and no doubt even Professor Kurt Hager—the East German Politbureau member who openly criticized Smrkovsky, and by implication the whole new Czechoslovak leadership, on 26 March, so infuriating communists and non-communists alike and accelerating the liberal trend—would have gladly accepted the changes in Prague provided they had been limited to a few top Party personalities, without affecting the power structure or ideological doctrine and without aggravating polycentric tendencies in the Warsaw Pact. But the dogmatists had been disappointed in all these respects, thanks to the irresistible political pressure 'from below' which had built up, and to the efforts of Party and non-Party intellectuals in canalizing this pressure and sometimes even giving it organizational forms. This was inevitable. For as soon as it became permissible to say aloud what everyone knew, viz. that the 20 years of communist rule had led to failure, and often catastrophic failure, in every sphere, people were bound to put the logical question: Why? The answer to that was no doubt a complex one, but it boiled down to a simple conclusion: the source of all errors lay in the ideological and power-political structure of the *entire system*. How could the rot be stopped, and a repetition of the blunders and crimes of the Stalin era be forestalled, if not by making possible the creation of a realistic *alternative* system to the one that had failed?

The debate about the possibility of such alternatives continued right on until 20 August, when it was rudely halted by foreign intervention. In the long view, however, it is this debate which constitutes the most important political event of the Prague spring. Czechoslovak journalists earned well-merited laurels, as the great bulk of the population, communists and non-communists, tried by discussion to find a feasible way out from the collapse of the totalitarian system.

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WHEN Soviet nerves snap, Soviet tanks usually start moving—in strict secrecy. On 9 May 1968, however, the whole world was privy to the advance of Soviet armour westward from Cracow to the Czechoslovak border. Lest the international agencies by any chance overlook the movement, the Polish police on the same day sent back to Warsaw a number of British and American car-drivers making their way south to Czechoslovakia. Several Western foreign ministries were thus alerted. Where were the Soviet tanks going? Nowhere, it seemed. Then why were they on the road? Training manoeuvres, presumably. But in that case, why had the general staff in Czechoslovakia, as a Warsaw Pact power, not been informed? They were in fact informed *subsequently*, but that again was a military secret.

There were delegations on the move at this time too between Prague and Moscow—Party, government, army, Warsaw Pact, trade union and writers' delegations. On 24 May Kosygin unexpectedly turned up in Prague, where Marshal Grechko, Epishev and other senior Red Army officers were already installed. The news that Kosygin was going to take the waters in Karlovy Vary was only imparted to Dubcek a few hours before his arrival; the cure was then shortened without explanation from 10 to six days. What was agreed at Karlovy Vary was roughly this: the Communist Party would retain its monopoly of power in the country; the economic reforms would continue; Czechoslovakia's links with the Warsaw Pact and Comecon would be reinforced; staff exercises (without ground troops) would be held immediately on Czechoslovak territory; an Extraordinary Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party could be held without objection; and Novotny's membership in the Party could be suspended.

During the days before the Central Committee's May plenum a number of Soviet security experts arrived in Prague. Under the terms of certain agreements between the security forces of the Warsaw Pact countries these specialists were invited directly by the heads of the individual security departments in Prague without the cognizance of the Minister of the Interior, Pavel. The first Soviet units started arriving in western Bohemia from East German territory on the very day when the plenum started, and 10 huge Antonov transport aircraft landed at the Milovice airfield during the following night. No one had been informed in Prague; the first news came from provincial Party organizations, asking what line they should take. This was how the Ministry of Defence itself found out what was going on. No statements were made at the plenum, nor even at the Presidium meetings behind the scenes. Only later did Dubcek admit that he had promised Kosygin to keep quiet.

Shortly after the beginning of the plenum Czechoslovak counter-intelligence, and thereby Dubcek himself, learnt (through monitoring a conference of Soviet generals with Marshal Yakubovski) the highly important fact that the Marshal had told them Soviet forces would

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remain in Czechoslovakia 'at least until 20 September', i.e. until the planned closing day of the Extraordinary Congress. After that 'we shall see', Yakubovski added significantly.

Following these events Dubcek told Kosygin that the Karlovy Vary agreements had been 'infringed' in respect of the promised non-involvement of ground troops and the intended length of stay of Soviet formations. Finally on 23 June Yakubovski promised that Soviet troops would be out by the end of the month: Moscow's plans had evidently matured by then into a new form which was not to be put into operation until August.

While Soviet delegations were appearing uninvited, invitations for Czechoslovak personalities to appear in Moscow sometimes resembled ultimatums. One such case was the overnight trip by Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Cernik and Bilak on 3–4 May, for which no adequate explanation was given even in the subsequent interview with Dubcek printed in *Rude pravo*; it was just a routine bilateral consultation, apparently.

One of the advocates of thorough-going democratization, Petr Pithart (a Party member and son of the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Paris) expressed the universal feeling when he wrote that he hoped 'the war declared by Moscow on Prague would only be fought with words'. Alas, it was nothing more than a hope.

BY the second half of July it was equally clear in Prague and Moscow that there would have to be direct negotiations between the two countries. Czechoslovakia insisted both that they should be bilateral only, and that they should be held on her own territory. Moscow deliberately left Prague uncertain, and up to the last moment the Czechoslovak side did not know when talks would actually take place. Nevertheless careful preparation continued in Prague of all material relevant to the agenda, viz. the Warsaw Pact and its internal relations, the situation in Comecon, Czechoslovak relations with the socialist and capitalist countries and so forth. The two sides had exactly opposite hopes of the negotiations: Prague wanted a measure of independence within the Warsaw Pact framework, Moscow a 'tightening of discipline'.

Dubcek and his friends had no great illusions. They accepted the possibility that they would fail to move the Soviets and that positions on both sides would remain pretty well as they were. The Czechoslovak delegates drew up and had approved by both the Presidium and the whole Central Committee three fundamental points on which they would remain adamant:

1. Nothing had changed or should change in Czechoslovakia's foreign policy, her adherence to the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet alliance, Comecon, etc.
2. The Warsaw letter of 18 July should be annulled; mutual attacks and polemics in the press, radio and television of the socialist coun-

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tries should be stopped and any future arguments conducted between Party or state delegations.

3. Czechoslovak forces would be acknowledged as adequate for the defence of the western frontier.

These points were agreed at the preliminary consultation at Cierna, where the Czechoslovak delegates arrived on Sunday evening, 28 July. The delegation considered its position rather strong in view of the nation-wide signature campaign of the previous days; but it wanted to avoid the sterile and protracted ideological debates at which Soviet communists are so adept. The Cierna talks were scheduled to last a day or at most one-and-a-half days; Tito was due to arrive in Prague on the Wednesday and Ceausescu two days later.

The Soviet delegates arrived at Cierna at 9.52 a.m. on the morning of Monday, 29 July in a special armoured train with bullet-proof glass and its own radio link. Although Moscow had insisted on the entire presidial body of both Parties' Central Committees attending, two Soviet members in fact stayed behind: Kirilenko, a 'hard-liner', and Polyanski, a reputed moderate. There were extensive security precautions, especially round the actual site of the talks which was the railwaymen's clubhouse some 150 or 200 yards from the station. The Soviet guards had hand-grenades in their pockets and about a division of Soviet troops were deployed in the district of Chop, four or five kilometres away across the frontier.

Brezhnev reproached Dubcek from the start for the Czech failure to keep the venue a secret, contrary to the previous understanding. Dubcek admitted this, while suggesting that the Soviets had also been guilty of various indiscretions. The rucksack full of weapons 'discovered' by the Soviets at Sokolovo, for example, and imputed to Czechoslovak counter-revolutionary activities, had on it badly erased signs of its Soviet origin: '*Ruksak bolshoi, sort pervy, GUM.*'

The Soviet tactic was to attack, and Brezhnev's opening offensive was a four-hour monologue. It consisted of a stream of quotations from Czechoslovak newspapers, radio and television reports, mingled with demagogic denunciations of such 'counter-revolutionaries' as Cisar, Sik, Goldstücker, Svitak, Selucky and Kohout, ill-drawn conclusions and demands basically identical with those in the Warsaw letter. This tirade reduced the temperature of relations between the two sides to zero and they lunched separately. As the Soviets had intended, the Czechoslovaks felt they had been forced on to the defensive. Dubcek's answer that afternoon was nevertheless felt to have been skilful, moderate and at the same time firm, particularly in regard to the Party's post-January course.

The positions of the two sides were diametrically opposed and at times the negotiations resembled a dialogue of the deaf. When the day's session ended at 10.30 p.m. they appeared to be heading for a complete break-down. The Russians pulled back the 300 yards on to Soviet

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territory in their special train. The Czechoslovak delegation felt gloomy and isolated, knowing that even its own confidential telephone line to Prague was being tapped by the Russians. Unable to sleep, Dubcek spent the night chatting with the local railwaymen till 3.30 in the morning.

BEFORE talks were resumed on 30 July the Czechoslovaks learnt that a letter had appeared in *Pravda*, purportedly from 99 employees of the Auto-Praga factory and containing sharp criticism of the Party leadership.

The first speaker was General Svoboda, who stood pat on the previous day's Czechoslovak arguments and rejected the Russian ones as spurious. He particularly stressed the issue of national sovereignty and indicated that he would not continue as President if Czechoslovakia's independence was not fully respected.

Svoboda's adamant stand was an embarrassment to the Soviet delegates, who had assumed that he of all the Czechs would have been most willing to compromise. (They based this idea on Svoboda's wartime activity in command of Czechoslovak troops in Russia, and on such incidents as Khrushchev's inquiry after him when he visited Prague for the Eleventh Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1958; the Russian leader's interest had secured Svoboda's return from the humble provincial post to which this former Defence Minister and Lenin prize winner had been relegated when he fell from favour in the early fifties.) The Russians hoped that Svoboda, then, would line up with those dogmatist members of the Czechoslovak Presidium whose presence at Cierna they had ensured. After he had spoken, however, an excited and confused atmosphere arose with members of the two teams, as they sat on opposite sides of the long table with the candidate members of the respective Presidiums at the ends, talking out of turn and interrupting one another. There was even an outburst of anti-semitic venom against one of the Czechoslovak delegates, Frantisek Kriegel, who mildly inquired why he was objected to and got a loud retort from the Ukrainian, Shelest: 'You just *are*—we don't have to explain why!' Dubcek took Kriegel's part, banging the table with his fist and shouting in Russian: 'You're not going to treat *us* as underlings, comrades!' 'You'll get used to it, Alexander', Svoboda put in. 'Marshal Konev treated me as an underling all through the war.'

When the two delegations separated for lunch there was gloomy discussion on both sides as to the next step. The Czechoslovaks were ready to go back to Prague for a number of reasons. But at that moment four junior members of the Soviet delegation came to their train and urged the importance of continuing talks and reaching agreement. It was clear that the Russians did not want Cierna to end as a fiasco. So Dubcek had to ask for a postponement of Tito's visit to Prague—which also suited Brezhnev well.

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The afternoon's session was quieter but rather inconsequential. The Soviet side again raised the question of censorship; personnel changes in the Czechoslovak Party, the security force and the army; and the underestimation of 'anti-socialist forces' by the new Party leaders in Prague. Everything else could be regarded as Czechoslovakia's own domestic business, the Soviets now declared, and they were no longer very particular about the western border defence question. The shorthand record of the talks contains only a vague Soviet proposal that consideration be given to the question 'of seeking possible further improvements to common defence preparations in the Warsaw Pact framework'.

In Prague meanwhile an uneasy feeling spread. Central Committee Secretary Cisar, put in charge of Party affairs in the absence of the Presidium, had no news from Cierna. On Tuesday evening, when it was clear that negotiations were not yet concluded and so cannot have been smooth, discussion of various alternative procedures began. One suggestion was a meeting with Kadar and an attempt at unilateral annulment of the Warsaw letter. Finally it was decided to send a MiG to a Slovak airfield with another Central Committee Secretary, Sadovsky, on board; he was to find his way to the Czechoslovak delegates, apprise himself of the situation and return to Prague on Wednesday morning. Fortified with vodka, Sadovsky fulfilled this mission and brought back the credible report that the talks looked like breaking down. The atmosphere in the capital was hardly improved by reports from the Ministry of the Interior that an unprecedented number of Soviet tourists —almost all men, and all wearing boots of the same type—were streaming in; the Minister, Pavel, ordered them to be followed. Movements of tanks, military cars and aircraft were being noted by observers in Cinovec on the East German frontier. An unconfirmed rumour came from Slovakia that General Kodaj was treating with Soviet officers there. The Prague City Committee of the Communist Party proposed the immediate convocation of a congress.

WHEN the Soviet train backed into Cierna station all the members of the Soviet delegation emerged from it except Brezhnev. While the rest moved off to the conference room, Dubcek got into the Soviet train alone to speak to Brezhnev, who was said to be indisposed. The Russian certainly had reason to be ill at ease, for even those members of the Czechoslovak team he had most relied on, Kolder and Bilak, had ended by largely identifying themselves with the views of their colleagues. (Both, however, had qualified their statements by saying that 'on certain points they agreed with the criticism expressed in the Warsaw letter'.) Finally, Dubcek, too, arrived in the conference room, saying that Brezhnev would join them for the afternoon session.

During the lunch interval the various representatives took a stroll through the village. Tito's visit to Prague, already deferred to Thursday, was postponed again by telephone. Then talks were resumed between two teams of four: Brezhnev (now fully recovered), Podgorny, Kosygin

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and Suslov on the Soviet side; Dubcek, Cernik, Smrkovsky and Svoboda for Czechoslovakia. In this smaller forum the atmosphere turned out to have improved considerably in favour of the Czechoslovaks; the Russians seemed keen to reach agreement and the Warsaw letter was forgotten. The greatest surprise of all was a statement by Suslov, moderate and appeasing; he went so far as to call the Czechoslovak January policy 'in a certain sense, a renaissance of Marxism' and to agree that 'the Czechoslovak question must be settled by agreement if great harm is not to ensue for the international communist movement and its unity'.

The reasons for the Soviet change of mood lay outside Cierna. On 30 July two members of the Spanish Communist Party had flown into Moscow, asked for an immediate audience with Kirilenko and handed him a letter from 18 European communist parties demanding the cessation of Soviet interference in the domestic affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Otherwise the signatories threatened to convene a meeting to examine and possibly condemn the behaviour of the Five. At the same time warning letters also arrived in Moscow from Tito and Ceausescu—Tito's moderate and factual, Ceausescu's indignant and in Soviet eyes insulting.

These factors had no doubt influenced the Soviet delegates at Cierna. Brezhnev, Kosygin and in particular Suslov now adopted a conciliatory tone, especially when the Czechoslovak team renewed its assurances of loyalty to all obligations ensuing from membership in the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. They also gave verbal undertakings at the four-plus-four meeting that 'anti-socialist tendencies' would not be allowed to spread in Czechoslovakia, that the Social Democratic Party would not be revived and that the activities of clubs like the KAN and the 231 Club would be held in check. For their part the Soviets agreed that both the Warsaw letter, and the Czechoslovak reply to it, should be 'forgotten'. There was even talk of a Soviet loan; Brezhnev hinted that it would be easy to arrange, though most of it would be in rubles and grain rather than in gold or hard currency.

It remained to draft a final communiqué. Great difficulties arose over this. The preliminary versions sketched out by the two sides were diametrically different from one another. The Czechoslovak one ran to four pages and included explanations of various features of the reform programme which were important to Prague and with which the Russians had in any case expressed agreement. The Soviet side had prepared a vague and rhetorical text, not unlike the one issued from Bratislava three days later. Discussion of the drafts was long and inconclusive; the talks had to be extended by another day and Tito's visit called off once again. Evidently the Soviets were willing to wait as long as they got a written agreement. They continually returned to their bugbear: that the Czechoslovak press, radio and television were spreading reports 'both incorrect and outside Party control'.

Finally, on Wednesday evening, it was agreed that there would be an

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immediate end to polemics conducted by the mass media both of Czechoslovakia and of the five Warsaw Pact countries. This was the only way, said the Soviet delegates, of ensuring that the Czechoslovak Communist Party could calmly prepare the Extraordinary Congress now scheduled (with the Russians' approval) for 9 September.

At 11 p.m. that night Cernik telephoned Cisar to try to ensure compliance with the new agreement by the Czechoslovak media. Censorship having been abolished, this was easier said than done; the leading weeklies were already out, and *Literarni listy* carried, for example, an unflattering caricature of Ulbricht. Central Committee Secretary Mlynar frantically proposed confiscation both of this periodical and of *Reporter*; Pavel, the Minister of the Interior, refused to give any such instructions to the police and threatened to resign if any one else gave them. Another call was sent to Cernik, who decided to let things take their own course.

BREZHNEV started off the fourth day with complaints about caricatures in the Czechoslovak press as evidence that the Party 'has no firm grip on things'; fortunately the Czechoslovak delegation was able to quote in return the East German press of that day, which carried a condemnation of the Czechoslovak Party line by the American CP. Despite this the Russians were in a conciliatory mood, particularly Brezhnev himself, who had a 'new plan'. In view of the difficulties arising from drafting the communiqué, and particularly because questions had been touched upon which were the subject of discussion among the Five at Warsaw, a fresh consultation with all signatories of the Warsaw letter would be needed. They had in fact already agreed. Dubcek was somewhat taken aback by this, but after talking it over with his team agreed to the proposal, provided (a) the consultation was on Czechoslovak soil, (b) it did not deal with internal Czechoslovak matters, and (c) the Warsaw letter and Prague's reply to it were left out of the discussion. At this point the Soviets promised that their troops would definitely leave Czechoslovakia.

Arrangements were now quickly finalized. The consultation was fixed for 3 August in Bratislava; a brief joint communiqué was drafted; and a report on the curious ending to the Cierna talks was sent to Prague. There it was received with anxious reservations. The first impression was that another Munich had befallen the country, that Dubcek had retreated from his original decision to deal with the socialist countries only bilaterally, and that the hard-liners, Gomulka and Ulbricht, would be laying down the law at Bratislava. Fears were exacerbated by Svoboda's television speech relayed from Kosice, a speech drafted in vague, dogmatist language by one of Novotny's old aides and now head of the President's Chancellory, Dr Novak. Prague students gathered in the Old Town Square demanding 'the truth about Cierna'; dissatisfied with an explanation from Smrkovsky, who had come there straight from the airfield, they went on to the Prague City

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organization of the Party where they received comforting assurances from Simon with the same scepticism.

Next morning, 2 August, Cisar told journalists that the Cierna meeting had ended 'very favourably' for Czechoslovakia and no secret agreements had been made. Soviet forces were on their way out, but it was essential that the press should not give way to too much public jubilation; the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw letter signatories must be given a chance to back down with dignity. Let us, Cisar appealed to them, abstain from polemics. 'At least for 48 hours we must keep quiet.'

THE record made by the Czechoslovak delegation shows clearly that Dubcek and the others regarded the Cierna talks as a success, in fact as a 'Czechoslovak victory'. It had brought the annulment of the Warsaw letter with all its reproaches; the departure of Soviet troops was now guaranteed, and the country's sovereignty had been defended. The negotiators did not, however, see the result as a tactical manoeuvre but as an inter-allied obligation; they were determined to fulfil the agreements to strengthen the Warsaw Pact and so on with as much fanfare as necessary, hoping on the other hand that Moscow's distrust of them had now vanished.

Such was the mood of the Czechoslovak team which left for Bratislava on the Friday afternoon. A joint declaration had been drafted, but no one expected the Soviets to agree to this; indeed the Bratislava meeting was devoted to little else but horse-trading over the terms of the communiqué to be issued. The Soviet draft was taken as a basis and worked over paragraph by paragraph. The Czechoslovaks would constantly suggest amendments, then Ulbricht or Gomulka would support the original Soviet version, while Kadar pretty consistently echoed the Czechoslovak view. Finally Brezhnev, or even more frequently Suslov, would come up with a compromise formula. So it went on, and the declaration as finally published differed little in fundamentals from the first Soviet text.

(The second part of this documentary article, dealing with events from the Bratislava meeting until the dismissal of Alexander Dubcek, will appear in the next issue of Survey.)

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AUSTRIAN COMMUNISM AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Kevin Devlin

OF all the West European communist parties, the one which suffered most from the disruptive impact of the Czechoslovak crisis was the Communist Party of Austria (KPO). The post-invasion struggle within its ranks was exacerbated by the fact that the Party was preparing to hold its Twentieth Congress. And this Congress, held in Vienna from 3 to 6 January, was dominated by an unprecedented factional conflict which brought the KPO to the very brink of open schism, and a year later led to the expulsion from the Party of the well-known Marxist philosopher, Ernst Fischer.

The KPO's geopolitical involvement in the Czechoslovak crisis was reflected in the Politburo's prompt and vigorous condemnation of the invasion, and in the Party's subsequent efforts to assist the Czechoslovak reformers in the protracted political struggle which followed. This support was not entirely disinterested: at the mid-September plenum of the KPO Central Committee, Chairman Franz Muhri declared that it was a question of contributing to a political solution that would enable Czechoslovakia to 'continue on the path of socialist democratization . . . so that an example is created *which is a help to the whole West European movement* in the struggle for socialism'.[1]

The September plenum formally welcomed the Moscow agreement as a 'first step' toward such a solution, but insisted that the agreement (which included a non-interference clause) must be implemented by *both* sides, and that the only acceptable outcome was the full restoration of Czechoslovak sovereignty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The meeting also proposed that a conference of West European communist parties be held, with the aim of promoting this goal through 'a collective stand'.[2]

But the KPO's firm stand on the Czechoslovak crisis was deceptive, for a number of reasons. Muhri and his followers dominated the Politbureau; progressive communists controlled the Party organs *Weg and Ziel, Tagebuch* and, to a lesser extent, *Volksstimme;* the Central Committee elected at the revisionist Nineteenth Congress in 1965 did not accurately represent the attitudes of rank and file and apparat, particularly during a time of crisis involving relations with the CPSU. On the

1 *Volksstimme*, 15 September 1968.

2 Ibid. The call for a West European conference was evidently intended to bring indirect and premonitory pressure to bear upon the Russians. It was repeated by Muhri early in October, when he said that the Italians, the French and 'numerous other parties' favoured the plan. A week later, however, the French Party announced that it did not think a West European conference would be 'opportune in the present situation'—which effectively put an end to that gambit for the time being.

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other hand, some elements in the Party reacted much more strongly to the invasion than the Muhri leadership was prepared to do.

The leading representative of the latter tendency was the Party's most eminent intellectual, the veteran Central Committee member Ernst Fischer, who used the 'bourgeois' press and television to express his outraged feelings about the invasion. Urging that a conference of West European communist parties be convened to 'demand the immediate withdrawal of the occupation forces, the immediate restoration of sovereignty', Fischer declared that 'should this demand not be met, it would be time to break with the present Soviet leadership, to sever all relations with it. I consider this the moral and political duty of European communists.'[3] A similar stand was taken by 20 members of the editorial board of *Tagebuch*, who issued a manifesto attacking the 'degenerate leadership' of the USSR, declaring that there could be no solidarity with the 'reactionary authoritarian forces' responsible for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and that the way to a renewal of communism lay through 'the uncompromising establishment of the truth about the character of the Soviet leadership'.[4]

In his report to the September plenum Muhri criticized the anti-Soviet attitudes of Fischer and the *Tagebuch* group, but did so in significantly lenient terms. Their call for a break with the CPSU was 'incorrect', he explained: 'Thereby things would become still more complicated, and a peaceful political solution would become not easier but more difficult. We are of the opinion that . . . for us the way ahead can only lie in continuing the discussion and the contacts, in order to contribute to a solution.'[5]

More serious was the challenge from the other flank, to which Muhri devoted much less time in his report. While claiming that 'the majority' of the Party officials supported the leadership's stand on the invasion, he admitted that 'numerous' district organizations opposed it. He had himself attended many local discussions at which 'almost all' the participants attacked this stand. But these critics were loyal to the Party, and there should be no question of breaking with them. 'We can make no political concessions, but we must continue to exercise tolerance and loyalty.'

THE strength of this conservative challenge did not become apparent until mid-November, when *Volksstimme* began publishing contributions to the pre-Congress discussion. As we have noted, similar pro-Soviet reactions had emerged after the invasion among other West

[3] Austrian Television interview, 10 September 1968; see also Fischer's article, 'Alle Macht ist verseucht', *Neues Forum* (Vienna), October 1968. Fischer was violently attacked by Soviet and East German commentators; see, for example, I. Petrov's polemical article in *Pravda*, 5 October 1968.

[4] 'Zur Okkupation der CSSR: eine Erklärung' (three-page leaflet), Vienna, 31 August 1968. Two of the signatories, Fred Margulies and Theodor Prager, were among the four progressive leaders whom the conservatives tried to oust from the Central Committee at the Twentieth Congress.

[5] *Volksstimme*, 15 September 1968.

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European communist parties, often among lower-rank veterans who looked back nostalgically to the comforting class-struggle simplicities of the Stalinist years. In other countries, however, the pro-Soviet elements did not in general present a serious organizational threat to the leadership (except in Finland and Sweden, where the challenge was local rather than national). But there were special reasons why the situation should have been more serious in Austria.

In the first place, Austria was the only West European country which had remained under partial Soviet occupation for a whole decade (1945-55) until the signing of the peace treaty. During this period many communist officials in the Soviet Zone were appointed to administrative posts (for example, in the 102 industrial plants taken over for reparations); and it was hardly to be expected that revisionist arguments would now move them to oppose Soviet policies. Second, the sharp decline in the KPO's membership—from a post-war peak of 150,000 in the mid-fifties to 32,000 in 1968—had given older, more conservative communists a numerical preponderance that they did not have in other West European communist parties: the official figures given at the Congress showed that 63 per cent of the members were over 50 years old. Third, the revisionist course taken at the Nineteenth Congress in 1965, when the young centrist, Muhri, replaced the Stalinist veteran, Koplenig, as Chairman, had not been notably successful; the new left-alliance strategy had little effect on the deep-rooted anti-communism of the Socialist Party and the Austrian masses. This lack of political prospects strengthened the impulse of conservative members to criticize Muhri's stand on Czechoslovakia—for in doing so they were also attacking the revisionist course which had caused internal unrest without bringing the promised political gains.

Meanwhile, however, the October plenum of the Central Committee had increased conservative discontent, and aggravated the process of polarization, by producing a pre-Congress programmatic document [6] which upheld Muhri's centrist positions, with few or no concessions to extremists on either flank. The text condemned the invasion roundly as a violation of Czechoslovak state sovereignty and Party autonomy which could be justified by 'no norm, no document of the world communist movement'. In the view of the KPO a satisfactory solution of the crisis must include *all* the following points:

> Complete freedom for the lawful representatives of the Party, the government and other institutions to carry out their functions; non-interference in internal affairs and full restoration of the sovereignty of the CSSR, including the earliest possible withdrawal of the troops; continuation of the course which the CPCS has followed since January for the correction of mistakes, the further development of socialism and socialist democratization on the basis of the

[6] 'Diskussionsgrundlage zur Vorbereitung des 20. Parteitags und Entwurf eines Statuts der KPO', supplement to *Volksstimme*, 30 October 1968.

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> CPCS's Action Programme; a determined struggle against anti-socialist tendencies.

At the same time, however, the document stressed the need to avoid anything like a break with the Soviet regime, which would only make it more difficult to achieve such a solution. This warning in turn was balanced by criticism of the USSR: in recent years there had been in various fields 'not a development of socialist democracy ... but a stagnation, and even a certain scrapping (*Abbau*) of progressive goals'.

Shortly afterwards *Volksstimme* began publishing contributions to the pre-Congress discussion; and it soon became clear that something like a concerted conservative counter-offensive against Muhri's line was under way. In fact, this was less a discussion than an open polemical debate of an unrestrained bitterness unprecedented in a communist party still professing unity of action under democratic centralism.[7]

The most controversial contributions came from the ultra-progressives, since their opposite numbers on the conservative side were restrained by the demands of *partiinost*. One writer complained of the limit of 90 lines, remarking that 900 lines would not be enough to list all the offences committed by the Soviet Union 'against the elementary principles of human rights and international law, Leninistic norms and democratic centralism', adding bluntly that the CPSU could no longer be considered a 'fraternal party'. Another noted sardonically that about half of the contributors to the debate would be subject to severe repression if they voiced their opinions in the Soviet Union. Several observed that workers enjoyed more freedom and prosperity in capitalist Austria than in the communist regimes. A number of contributors attacked not only the conservatives but the Muhri leadership for having accepted as even a 'first step' agreements imposed by coercion on the Czechoslovaks.

By this time it had become fairly clear that an organized intensive campaign was going on—and that it was not being waged only by the Austrian conservatives. The secessionist, pro-Chinese 'Marxist-Leninist Party of Austria' (MLPO) had already noted that the Soviet Embassy in Vienna was quietly playing 'a very active role' in the rallying of conservative forces:

> Some of its representatives are obviously in constant and close contact with spokesmen and organizers of the 'pro-Soviet' wing of the KPO. Printed material has frequently turned up in district organizations of the KPO which ... defends the military occupation of Czechoslovakia with a great show of pseudo-revolutionary

[7] The Belgian Communist Party carried a similar pre-Congress discussion in the weekly *Drapeau Rouge* in October-November 1968. It, too, was dominated by the Czechoslovak issue; but, cumulatively, it did not approach the factional bitterness of the Austrian debate. One factor here was that in Belgium the local apparats (with some exceptions) were generally loyal to the central leadership. This was not the case in Austria.

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phraseology. Not all of this material originates in the Soviet Union or in the GDR.[8]

In one issue of *Volksstimme* (24 December) two contributors referred to this factionalist intervention. One spoke of the 'brochures and books [sent] from the Soviet Union and the GDR, attempting to justify the invasion'; the second noted that 'the [Soviet] White Book and other propaganda writings of the Warsaw five [are] reaching our Party members in all kinds of ways, and this also includes material from the GDR which makes direct attacks against our Party and various leading officials'.[9]

THE strength of the conservative challenge, and the organizational means employed, did not, however, become manifest until the Twentieth Congress convened on 3 January 1969. It was clear from Muhri's opening speech that he was not inclined to yield to that challenge. His remarks on Czechoslovakia contained some verbal modification but no substantial change. Welcoming moves towards 'a political solution and a normalization of the situation', he emphasized that by this the Austrian Party understood 'strict respect for the autonomy of the CPCS, full restoration of sovereignty, including the complete withdrawal of all troops as laid down in the Moscow agreement, the continuation of the post-January policy along the lines of the Action Programme of the CPCS and, last but not least, a determined struggle against all anti-socialist tendencies'.[10]

Then in the harsh light of publicity—for the first time the Congress was open to non-communist reporters and observers—the conservative counter-attack developed. It was not only the ultra-revisionists like Ernst Fischer, but also the centrists like Muhri who came under heavy fire. Speaker after speaker called for a change in leadership and for an expression of complete solidarity with the Soviet Party. (A progressive delegate later remarked that if the line-up on the first day had been accidental, he was prepared to believe in Santa Claus.) The strength of the conservative tendency lay in the Party bureaucracy; this was, in large measure, a rebellion of the apparat. At the close of the Congress, Muhri confirmed allegations by progressive speakers that there had been a 'violation of norms in the selection of delegates',

[8] K.P., 'Die Krise in der KPO', *Rote Fahne* (Vienna), no. 103, November 1968. The MLPO, led by Franz Strobl, was formed in February 1967, having previously existed for seven months as a 'Movement' (MLO). A split in late 1966 resulted in the formation of a rival faction, 'Young Marxist Revolutionaries' (organ: *Funke*).

[9] Similar factionalist intervention was also reported in other West European communist movements after the invasion. In his report to the October plenum of the French Central Committee Gaston Plissonnier stated that 'almost daily an abundance of propaganda material, originating in the USSR and in the GDR and seeking to justify the intervention, is distributed throughout France (*L'Humanité*, 23 October 1968).

[10] *Volksstimme*, 4 January 1969.

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adding that these would be investigated.[11] The incorrigible Ernst Fischer put it more bluntly in a broadcast commentary (which united conservative, centrist and progressive leaders in criticism of his anti-Party behaviour):

> The Twentieth Congress was marked by the counter-offensive of the Party apparatus. It was a counter-offensive directed from outside. It was a manipulated Party congress. An infamous agitation was organized against certain people. In electing delegates machinations were employed which are simply incredible. Many delegates were instructed immediately upon arrival as to whom they should and whom they should not cross off the list [of Central Committee candidates]. All this, I repeat, was organized not only from within the Party but also from outside.[12]

The role that conservative *apparatchiki* played in the selection of delegates was also reflected in the ages of the delegates. Of the 374 delegates, only three were under 20 and only 20 under 30, whereas 141 were over 50. To some extent the factional struggle was also a struggle between generations, in so far as spokesmen for the under-represented youth and student organizations were among the most vigorous critics of the conservative apparat.[13] This generational conflict was symbolized by Johann Koplenig, head of the Party for two Stalinist-Khrushchevist decades, and his daughter, Lisa Markstein: his last act before his death on 11 December was an appeal for the Party to return to pro-Soviet orthodoxy, while she was a signatory of the *Tagebuch* manifesto and lashed the conservatives in her Congress speech.

Alignments in the deeply divided Party became clearer during the Congress, as 96 speakers took the floor and almost as many more submitted written contributions. First, it was clear that the fight involved not only the Party's position on Czechoslovakia and its relations with the Soviet Union, but also the question of the fundamental orientation of the Party—revisionist adaptation to Austrian realities or a return to more orthodox habits of thought and action.

It also became obvious that this was not a clear-cut confrontation of opposing groups, but rather a conflict of political attitudes ranging from those held by such ultra-progressives as Theodor Prager (who met charges of bourgeois deviation with the unrepentant answer: 'A dose of bourgeois enlightenment would do our Party no harm') to

[11] After the first meeting of the new Central Committee in mid-January Muhri announced that it had been decided in the interests of unity and reconciliation not to set up the proposed commission of inquiry.

[12] Austrian Radio interview, 7 January 1969.

[13] See the Congress report by Fritz Zapf, Chairman of the *Freie Österreichische Jugend*. Many conservative speakers attacked the FOJ organ, *Jugend 68*, for having published articles which went far beyond the Party's position in attacking the Russians, and one speaker indicated that Party funds had been withheld from it. However, the appointment of Zapf to the new Politbureau showed that the intra-Party weight of the student and youth organizations had increased as a result of the stormy Congress.

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those held by the neo-Stalinists like Max Stern (who deplored revisionist control of the Party press).

THE climax of the stormy Congress came on the evening of Sunday, 5 January, with the election of the Central Committee. In an open letter to the Congress, Ernst Fischer declared that he would not be standing for re-election to the Central Committee for reasons of age and health, and called upon all other old members 'without exception' to follow his example and make way for younger militants. He summed up his political position by saying that the choice was between 'basing ourselves upon the Soviet model of socialism [and] taking our own path towards a free, democratic socialist society'.[14]

In the absence of Fischer, their *bête-noire*, some conservatives mounted a quiet lobbying campaign against four other progressives—Franz Marek, Theodor Prager, Egon Kodicek and Fred Margulies.[15] The result may have surpassed their expectations: all four failed to obtain the 50 per cent vote required for election to the Central Committee.

With the announcement of this unprecedented development anarchic turmoil reigned in the congress hall, as angry delegates exchanged insults and accusations. The reaction of the progressives was prompt and passionate: nearly a third of the newly-elected committee members declared that they would resign in protest. As the wrangling delegates dispersed, the KPO, its profound divisions laid bare, seemed on the verge of a final split.

But it was a Pyrrhic victory that the conservatives had gained. At the final session next morning Muhri declared that the election result had aggravated the internal crisis to the point of an open split, and therefore could not be accepted. Against a minority of three, the Presidium had decided to propose that an open, supplementary vote be taken on the candidacy of each of the four progressives—with a recommendation that Marek and Kodicek, but not the other two, be elected. But Muhri himself, it transpired, was among the minority; and, after a brief but bitter debate (during which progressives rejected this proposal),[16] he put forward his own solution.

[14] On the day before this open letter was published Muhri said in a television interview: 'We are planning a rejuvenation of the Central Committee, and therefore not every change should be evaluated as a political one. If Fischer goes, then it will be in the first place because of his age. But I would like to say openly that we are all in agreement with Fischer that democracy and socialism are indivisible, although there exist differences of opinion on other questions.' This remark illustrates Muhri's conciliatory attitude, which on different occasions was exploited by both the progressives and conservatives.

[15] During the Congress Marek was attacked by conservatives for his ultra-revisionist writings, notably the article 'Zur Struktur des Stalin-Mythos' (*Weg und Ziel*, November 1968), while Prager was assailed for an anti-Soviet article on Czechoslovakia published in the December issue of the Austrian trade union monthly, *Arbeit und Wirtschaft*. Both refused to recant.

[16] *Volksstimme*, 9 January 1969. During the debate Secretary Scharf criticized Muhri for protecting the progressives.

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This was that the first vote, taken by secret ballot in accordance with the statutes, be annulled, and a new, open vote taken on the original list of candidates—to be accepted or rejected as a whole. Muhri's proposal in fact involved a double violation of the statutes (as an East German commentator pointed out with righteous indignation), but the Chairman's warning that this was the only way to avert a split—and his threat to resign if it were rejected—carried the day. His peace-making solution was adopted by 222 votes to 110, with 16 abstentions.

This reassertion of centrism against conservative attacks was reflected in the political resolution which the Congress then adopted unanimously. Despite some conciliatory formulations, it contained no essential change in the Party's official stand on Czechoslovakia. On the domestic front it reaffirmed the KPO's commitment to struggle in alliance with other progressive forces for a peaceful approach to a society characterized by 'the broadest social democracy', which 'in very essential questions' would differ from that found in existing communist states. At the same time the domestic posture became noticeably more militant: the resolution stressed the KPO's role as *the* opposition party, attacked the Socialist Party with which the KPO had earlier and vainly sought to ally itself,[17] and emphasized the need to rally other opposition forces and engage in 'the necessary extra-parliamentary struggle'. This more aggressive domestic line, however, represented a concession not to the conservatives but to the youth and students who were both more militant and more progressive than the *apparatchiki*.[18]

In his closing speech to the Congress, Muhri strengthened his progressive-centrist position and at the same time took a conciliatory stance, as the leader who sought to bring the divided Party to a new unity of action. Differences of opinion would remain, and the KPO would continue to be a party of 'true discussion and the confrontation of ideas', but the main task now was to 'pull together and try to unite the whole Party or the great majority' in the implementation of Party policies, particularly in domestic affairs.[19]

The first meeting of the new Central Committee a week later brought further signs of progressive-centrist consolidation. After Muhri had been re-elected Chairman (but not unanimously) the new Politbureau was formed. First, the voluntary resignation of the progressive Marek

[17] In the 1966 general elections the KPO refrained from entering candidates (except for Muhri in Vienna) in order to work for the election of socialists; the result was that the socialists lost ground and had to go into opposition. The Twentieth Congress decided that the KPO would run candidates in all constituencies in the coming elections. The Party has not been represented in Parliament since 1959, through failure to clear the 'five per cent hurdle'.

[18] The first fruit of this line was a Vienna demonstration on Vietnam which led to bloody clashes with the police; it was addressed by the progressive communists Lauscher and Zapf. Cf. 'Ist die KPÖ Partner der revolutionären Studenten?' *Volksstimme*, 22 January 1969.

[19] *Volksstimme*, 9 January 1969.

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was balanced by the departure of the conservative Robert Dubowsky, dropped as being over the age limit. Most of the other members were re-elected, by 72 votes to three, with 10 abstentions, but the most significant change was the election of the youth leader, Fritz Zapf—a symbol of the process of rejuvenation of the leadership which, Muhri declared, would be continued. In this connexion it was announced that Secretary Fürnberg would resign his post within two years on the grounds of age and health. If there was compromise here, it favoured the progressive-centrists on balance. Of the 11 Politbureau members, six (Muhri, Kodicek, Lauscher, Urban, West and Zapf) were progressives, four conservatives of varying hues, and one of uncertain alignment (Kalt).

AFTER the plenum Muhri issued another ringing call for the restoration of unity in action. Having averted the split for which its adversaries had hoped, the KPO must now make a new beginning:

> With the conclusion of the Party Congress and the first plenum of the Central Committee, we want to start a new chapter; from no side should a new discussion be begun, or the behaviour and views of comrades before and during the Congress be made the subject of renewed controversy. We want to make a new beginning. That must apply to all.[20]

At the same time, he stressed that the new chapter in the Party's history must be dedicated to struggle for 'an Austrian way to socialism', continuing on the course charted by the Nineteenth Congress and based on 'autonomy and international solidarity, the indivisble unity of democracy and socialism'. In the same statement he announced that the plenum had decided that 'within the next two years there would be further steps towards a personal renewal, strengthening and rejuvenation of the Politbureau . . . [by bringing into it] a lot of new and young comrades'. This decision to rejuvenate the top leadership during the two-year period allowed for the withdrawal of Fürnberg was evidently part of the compromise reached at the plenum—and it boded ill for the conservative forces within the Party.

In the months following the Congress centrist-progressive predominance in the Party leadership was manifested in a number of ways. Thus, 'normalization' under Soviet pressure did not lead the KPO to modify its position on Czechoslovakia; and the Central Committee reacted to the replacement of Dubcek by Husak with a resolution reiterating its condemnation of 'the Warsaw Pact invasion' which was itself responsible for the growth of 'widespread anti-socialist and anti-Soviet tendencies'.[21] The Party's initial reaction to the Sino-Soviet frontier clashes was distinctly neutralist. Its critical attitude to the draft documents prepared for the international conference was closer to the position of the Italian Party than to that of, say, the French.

[20] *Volksstimme*, 18 January 1969.
[21] *Volksstimme* editorial of 19 April 1969 (on the replacement of Dubcek by Husak) and Central Committee resolution in *Volksstimme* of 16 May.

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But in the event Muhri's performance as head of the Austrian delegation at the June conference was disappointing. Unlike other 'liberal' Western communist spokesmen (Italian, British, Swiss, Australian, etc.), he meekly acceded to Husak's demand that 'the Czechoslovak events' should not be discussed, adding that it was obviously impossible to resolve the differences of opinion on this subject.[22] Similarly, his criticism of socialist regimes, and of past violations of inter-party norms, was muted, vague and indirect.

Why this gap between promise and performance? The basic answer seems to be that Muhri was more concerned with the unity of his own Party than with that of the international movement. In fact, the tension-charged settlement which he had imposed at the Congress was beginning to break down, as internal dissidence grew again within the KPO.

This was in part due to domestic developments, and particularly the serious setback which the Party suffered in the Vienna municipal elections, held in late April.[23] As happened also in Sweden and Finland, this was interpreted in different ways by the various tendencies, and so became another source of disunity: conservatives viewed the defeat as another demonstration of the bankruptcy of 'revisionist' policies; progressives concluded that it was necessary to pursue those policies with more vigour and integrity; centrists were inclined to blame factors outside the Party's control—meaning primarily Czechoslovakia.

Even more important, however, was the disruptive impact of Czechoslovak developments, particularly after the Husak-Strougal team took over in April and set about 'normalization' in grim earnest. On the progressive side the burden of contestation was borne by the bimonthly politico-cultural organ, *Tagebuch*. From the first *Tagebuch* had supported the Czechoslovak experiment in socialist democratization with idealistic fervour; as we have noted, it condemned the invasion in explicitly anti-Soviet terms which went far beyond the KPO's official position; after August it continued to present the protracted crisis as a test-case—'an expression of the struggle between two different, and in many respects contradictory, conceptions of socialism'.[24]

The group's reaction to the removal of Dubcek and the repressive measures which followed was, therefore, predictable. It found

[22] At a press conference outside the conference, however, Muhri did state, but without emphasis or elaboration, that the KPO had not changed its position on Czechoslovakia.

[23] Losing some 50 per cent of its vote the KPO for the first time since the war fell below the five per cent 'threshold' required for representation, with the result that it lost its last two seats in the city council. The Party had not had any deputies in the national parliament since 1959.

[24] Milos Rychnavsky, 'Es geht nicht nur um die CSSR', *Tagebuch*, Sept.–Oct. 1968, p. 5. The *Tagebuch* group evidently had its own contacts with progressive circles in Czechoslovakia; even after the invasion it published contributions by reformers like Miroslav Kusy, Michal Dzvonik and Peter Hanusch.

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uncompromising expression in an editorial article entitled 'Unsuccessful Experiment?', in the May-June issue of the magazine. This concluded that, having failed to suppress the 'Czechoslovak model' by military force in August, the Soviet leaders had finally succeeded in doing so by applying 'permanent pressure'. Yet, although suppressed, the Czechoslovak experiment had not been unsuccessful: for one thing, it had brought 'new insights' into what socialism meant and should mean. These new insights applied in the first place to the nature of the Soviet regime: '[We] must . . . free ourselves from all sentimental links with the Soviet Union, regarding it not as an ideal but as a reality—a reality worlds removed from the ideals of the communist movement'.[25]

This issue contained other controversial items—for example, an acerbic article by Marek on the Moscow conference and an editorial on the Vienna elections which, in advancing 'New Left' arguments, clearly questioned the vanguard role of the Communist Party. But the real challenge to the centrist leadership—not to speak of the embittered conservatives—lay in *Tagebuch's* advance to principled anti-Soviet positions; and it was a challenge that could hardly be evaded, bearing in mind that this was supposed to be an official organ of the KPO.

Its impact was increased, and Muhri's centrist position made still more difficult, by the fact that the conservatives chose this moment to mount an attack of their own. Almost simultaneously with the May-June issue of *Tagebuch* (out in early June) there appeared the first number of what could be termed its conservative counterpart, the monthly *Neue Politik*. Politically, of course, this was at the other pole from *Tagebuch;* but one other difference was crucial. Unlike *Tagebuch, Neue Politik* was not an organ of the KPO: it was simply a magazine published and supported by a group of conservative communists acting as private individuals. This meant that it was not subject to Party discipline in the way that *Tagebuch* was. At the same time it was, in fact if not juridically, the organ of the conservative faction. An editorial note claimed that the project was backed by more than 30 of the 87 Central Committee members, and First Secretary Scharf contributed a message welcoming the first issue.

Both this issue and the second (July-August) which followed some months later were solidly conservative in tone and content. *Neue Politik* repeatedly emphasized the leading role of the Communist Party and its guardianship of dogmatist verities; it denounced the 'counter-revolutionary' conspiracy which had been allowed to develop in Czechoslovakia under Dubcek; it manifested a special affection for the East German regime; it attacked self-styled communists like Fischer, who were to blame for 'the dilution of Marxism with liberal bilgewater, illusions about the dying down of the class struggle, the despicable imitation of bourgeois models, the fatal combination of pragmatism

[25] 'Misslungenes Experiment?', *Tagebuch*, May–June 1969, p. 22.

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and economism'.[26] Above all, it made loyalty to the Soviet Union the touchstone of true communism.

Muhri's response to this double challenge came at the Central Committee plenum held early in July. He began by reaffirming his centrist positions in a long policy statement containing many formulations (on Czechoslovakia, the conference, Party autonomy, pluralistic socialism, the right to criticize socialist regimes, etc.) designed to appease progressive sentiment. But then he moved on to an attack upon the *Tagebuch* group, quoting extensively from the offending article, 'Unsuccessful Experiment?' Since before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he revealed, Politbureau representatives had had repeated talks with the editorial board, in a comradely but unsuccessful attempt to bring the magazine into line with official Party positions. *Tagebuch's* adoption of an explicitly anti-Soviet stand had now created a situation which could not be tolerated. This, he added in a revealing parenthesis, was the view of 'the majority of the Politbureau'. He therefore asked that the leadership be authorized to make one last attempt to impose Party discipline on the publication; if this failed, 'then we . . . have the duty and the right to suppress *Tagebuch* as an organ of the Party'.[27]

The Chairman balanced this threat to some extent with a notably milder rebuke to the conservatives of *Neue Politik*. In his (very controversial) opinion, the contents of this publication—not, he stressed, an organ of the Party—'in many articles correspond essentially to the line of the Twentieth Congress'. Nevertheless, it was 'not correct' of those responsible to have brought it out without waiting for the considered judgment of the Politbureau—which was that it 'serves no useful purpose'. He therefore appealed to the group in question to stop publishing it.

On balance, it was an able performance in very difficult circumstances, calculated to rally some moderate progressives to centrist positions. The trouble was that it left Muhri committed to disciplinary action if the *Tagebuch* group decided to defy his threat. The first indication that this would be the case came with the plenum vote on the anti-*Tagebuch* resolution. It was adopted by 44 votes to 13, with one abstention. (There was no explanation as to the 25-odd 'missing' votes—did a quarter of the Central Committee members fail to attend this crucial plenum?)

What happened next was revealed only by events, for the intra-Party negotiations were kept secret by both sides. In any case, the *Tagebuch* board refused to accept the supervisory discipline of the Politbureau. The July-August issue was ready for the press when the leadership, exercising its legal right, prevented its publication. The

[26] Ernst Wimmer, 'Ist die Partei überflüssig?', *Neue Politik*, nos. 2–3, July–Aug. 1969, p. 10.

[27] *Volksstimme*, 11 July 1969.

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'Friends of the *Tagebuch*' reacted to this expected move by taking a leaf out of the conservative book. In late July the suppressed number appeared as the first number of the *Wiener Tagebuch*, published privately, with the same editor. Its masthead slogan might have been: 'The *Tagebuch* is dead, long live the *Tagebuch*!' Its uncompromising spirit was summed up in a phrase in an article by Franz Marek, urging West European communists to recognize that the Soviet 'model of Party and state rule is not a socialist model at all, for any country, not even for the Soviet Union'.[28]

The Party leadership's initial reaction to this fresh provocation was one of silence. For nearly two months there had been no official comment, and no mention of the *Wiener Tagebuch* in the Party press. But the internal struggle continued and, finally, in the middle of October the decision was taken by the Central Committee of the KPO to expel Ernst Fischer from the Party. However, out of the 87 members of the Central Committee 27 opposed Fischer's expulsion and in a statement published on 15 October they declared it 'unacceptable'. They pointed out that previously, on 29 May, the Central Committee rejected the proposal to expel Fischer and that the reversal of its earlier decision signifies 'the final blow against Party autonomy and its internal democracy, a decision which, like similar acts in Czechoslovakia, destroys the credibility and prestige of the Party'. They also affirmed that 'the differences of opinion in the Party . . . can only be overcome through political discussions and *not* through administrative acts'.

What would be the effect of all this on the disunited KPO? The conservatives are clearly in no mood to placate their adversaries in their struggle for a return to orthodox positions. A meeting of the Central Committee on 27–28 October confirmed the expulsion of Fischer and reprimanded the 27 of its members who had protested against it. It also dissolved the Party's youth movement. It is unlikely, however, that the steps taken against ultra-progressives like Fischer and Marek will end their influence on the Austrian—and European—communist movement.

What mattered, finally, was the symptomatic significance of the Austrian Party's crisis. This crisis has been highlighted by its stinging defeat in the Austrian labour council elections in September 1969, in which the Communist Party-backed council faction lost two-thirds of its 1964 votes which were now reduced to a mere 2.6 per cent of the total. This crisis may not be particularly relevant to the electoral prospects of other Western communist parties, but politically it was a phenomenon that had also manifested itself in other sectors of the West European communist movement (notably Scandinavia, Italy and France). It was a crisis of identity, a crisis of adaptation and transition —precipitated by, not originated by—the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

[28] F. Marek, 'Zur geistigen Krise im Kommunismus', *Wiener Tagebuch*, nos. 1–2, July–Aug. 1969, p. 33.

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

SOVIET SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATION

Raymond Hutchings

MESSRS Zaleski, Kozlowski, Wienert, Davies, Berry and Amann have produced a work of major importance.* Its statistics are impressive enough: over 600 pages; about 100 tables; eight very detailed charts; 10 main and 25 secondary appendices. The authors have earned the gratitude and admiration of everyone who is interested in Soviet science.

Their achievement is to present a complete panorama of Soviet scientific organization in its widest sense, including planning, co-ordination and financing. It is like viewing for the first time through a microscope a phenomenon which had previously only been presented to the naked eye. Many of the tables, in particular, are exceptionally interesting and important. But they demand very close attention, and it is surprising that no use is made of graphs for conveying an immediate visual impact. Use might also have been made of statistical techniques in analysis of the available data.

For a volume of this size and complication with multiple authorship the integration of its many sections is good, though there is a fair amount of duplication in detail. Annotation and cross-referencing are excellent and the proof-reading has been meticulous. There is a very useful glossary and an index.

M. Piganiol's General Introduction strikes generally the right note. Part I, by Eugène Zaleski, achieves adequate lucidity and sets the stage very well for what follows. Part II, by Joseph P. Kozlowski, is somewhat overweighted by appendices and tables in relation to a rather short text. Parts III and IV, by Helgard Wienert, demand the close attention of the reader, especially Part IV which describes the highly complicated system of higher educational establishments. These two Parts, by a single author, comprise one third of the whole book. In view of the relatively small share of higher educational establishments in research the amount of space devoted to these seems excessive. Part V, by R. Amann, M. J. Berry and R. W. Davies, from the Centre for Russian and East European Studies of the University of Birmingham, profits from the dual frame of reference of science in relation to industry. The Summary (pp. 559–82) is quite admirable.

YET the volume's title does not accurately describe its contents. Its subject is science organization rather than science *policy*, although

* E. Zaleski, J. P. Kozlowski, H. Wienert, R. W. Davies, M. J. Berry, R. Amann, *Science Policy in the U.S.S.R.* (Paris, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1969), 615 pp. Bibliography.

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a useful tabulation is provided of fields of research and priorities in certain annual and perspective plans (Table 7, p. 89).

Although a large amount of data is presented here, there remain very big gaps in our knowledge of the subject. Almost nothing is known about the internal distribution of powers within the central Party organs in R and D (p. 49), R and D plans are not published and therefore it is not possible to give precise answers concerning the degree of their fulfilment (p. 88), no detailed breakdown is available of R and D expenditure between different research objectives or industries (p. 561), only 12–13 per cent of total allocations for science can be identified, and information concerning the most important research projects is lacking (p. 101); only incidental information is available on time spent on research in VUZy (p. 329); 45 per cent of all scientists are classified as 'engineers' (p. 153), and there is apparently no further clue to their specialization. There is no information about the Academy of Sciences' perspective plan for 1959–65, and the same is largely true for the Five-Year Plan for 1966–70 (pp. 265–66). It is very difficult to gain a realistic perspective of the real importance of research works (p. 355). It is not known how the plan for 1967 was carried out (p. 79). Sometimes official instructions are so general as to be practically meaningless, such as a decree of 21 March 1961 as reported on page 325. Wide areas of Soviet science thus remain unilluminated. This is by no means the fault of the authors, who have done probably as well as anyone could do with the available material and the chosen method of approach.

Yet the limitations of the method need to be stressed. This is essentially a study of Soviet science from the outside. Primarily, the method is to study—and this is done in conscientious detail—the structure of Soviet science. The results considerably enlarge our knowledge of how Soviet science is organized, and to some extent of the manner in which it works. As to what Soviet science actually *does,* the projects and themes on which it is engaged, we are given interesting glimpses through the wall, but for the most part the wall hides what we would really like to see. Since we do not have a complete perspective of what Soviet scientists are doing, it seems perhaps premature to commence by saying that 'Very generally speaking, the USSR has consciously set up a structure intended both to permit the exercise of a true strategy of development and to prepare the way for a rational and humane civilization' (M. Piganiol, p. 23).

In Soviet circumstances (as elsewhere, *mutatis mutandis*) organizational reforms reflect physical features of the environment such as its large-scale and territorial spread; they offer some guide to government and Party intentions; indirectly they consequently reflect pressures from inside the system; they must enable historical continuity, in particular they must allow for growth; and they must fit in with other existing organizational forms. These requirements tend to promote organizational stability, so that there has never been a moment when inherited

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structures have not been influential (in which connexion I would disagree with the third sentence in the book, on page 23, which appears to assume that Russia in 1917 was a *tabula rasa*. Indeed, there is soon a reference to 'the existence of a powerful Academy which had been for a long time responsible for planning research'—p. 25).

And so, there exists an academy research system, which revolves round the now more than 200 years' old Academy of Sciences; an industrial research system; and a higher educational research system. All three have grown very large, so that the complexities of interaction between them are much magnified; naturally, organizational barriers and particularisms have sprung up. Khrushchev tried his hand at reorganizing Soviet science, as at reorganizing almost everything else. It seems at first that we have here merely a slightly distinctive variant of the structure and problems of the Soviet economy. This is also suggested by the affinity between scientific 'co-ordination Plans' for 1966–70 and economic 'continuous planning' (p. 81), and by the mutually supporting roles of science and industry. But whereas an economy is normally studied in front of a quantitative background in value and volume, in science no satisfactory aggregative measure is available. One may count up amounts spent, or numbers of institutions and scientists and scientific papers published. But all these are an inadequate chronicle of scientific progress.

In short, science lacks a truly relevant success-indicator (though great efforts are being made to construct such indicators, as is well described in the OECD volume); and since, within the state sector of Soviet activities, Soviet performance is governed by the suitability or otherwise of the success-indicator, where there is no suitable indicator one would expect poor or distorted performance. The system might be expected to perform badly, and on the whole it does so; this (grossly simplified) is the argument of Part V. And there is no doubt that in a number of areas it does perform badly. Pages 90–93 show that long periods of research often bring poor results. However, in aviation, rocketry, atomic energy, space exploration and iron and steel, the system does rather well (pp. 435–38). While the success of the first four might, perhaps, be explained by special factors—such as government priorities, an unusual lavishness of equipment, or the determination and brilliance of the scientists engaged in these fields—the last evokes a greater doubt as to whether the organizational approach is the correct one. If iron and steel have succeeded over a long period in overcoming the obstacles to innovation without any special organizational arrangements (p. 438), may not this signify that the organizational obstacles are not quite as formidable as is here suggested?

One might consider whether there could be alternative explanations of success in one field, as contrasted with failure in others. Perhaps, for example, the flow of information from abroad has been larger in one case than in another? May the actual technology of iron and steel-making be easier to transfer across frontiers than other types of

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technology? Was the USSR all that much behindhand even at the beginning? While the difficulty of answering such questions is obvious, until they are answered there is no basis for judging how much blame is due to organizational peculiarities. Such questions are outside the scope of the present work.

A more definitive conclusion in regard to the degree of success that has been achieved in individual fields, and why, could perhaps be reached only after a study in detail of economic and technical as well as organizational aspects, in a particular industry or a particular branch of science. This, however, would be a much more complex and time-consuming task than is tackled here, and indeed in the present state of the 'science of science' in general, not to speak of our knowledge of Soviet science in particular, it is hardly a practicable task. In the meantime, an organizational approach is probably the best available one. Yet in Soviet science (probably even more than in Soviet industry), organization is likely to offer only a partial key for unlocking the riddle, while reorganizations decreed from above will not generate changes in behaviour to the extent desired.

The general unfavourable assessment of the Soviet scientific effort in relation to the numbers taking part, by comparison with the United States or with other Western nations, is bound to attract the most attention. Such a comparison is, however, what the survey is least well qualified to make, since it professes to study only the Soviet scientific system. When Western practice is referred to, there is a tendency to describe what should happen 'when the system is working properly' (p. 428) or the situation 'in the best Western firms' (p. 429). While this is not the intention of the authors, the Soviet average tends to be compared with the Western above-average.

Soviet science is evidently less efficient than American science. Yet there is really little reason why it should be as efficient, for various reasons: it has a different starting point, pursues narrower objectives, enjoys a less lavish ratio of funds to personnel, has incorporated infinitely fewer people from foreign countries into its scientific corpus. Soviet internal security barriers are stricter, Soviet contacts with science in the outside world less abundant. Several of these features may, indeed, be ascribed in large measure to the nature of the regime, although not solely to its system of scientific organization.

SECRECY and reticence are more pervasive in Soviet science than in the Soviet economy. This is already suggested by the list of unknowns, given earlier. The lack of any data on engineers employed in non-ferrous metallurgy (including ore extraction) after 1 December 1961 (Table 6 in Part II, p. 146), is another illustration. Where there are unknowns, one can only fall back on guessing and speculation, but these are excluded from the OECD work, which at one point is so cautious as only to presume that exposure in the press 'seems to be a

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fairly common occurrence in the USSR' (p. 429). A slightly greater boldness in speculation might have been welcome.

Evidence both for and against a particular conclusion is reported apparently to the fullest extent possible. Yet one might tentatively question the unspoken assumption that the sources give, on the whole, an objective and complete picture, if only enough quoted statements can be assembled. For instance, Appendix B presents Soviet statements at plenums of the Central Committee on the comparative technological level of the USSR and the West. This is a useful compilation but what conclusions one may draw from it depends in part on what one supposes to have been the purpose of making such comparisons in public. Ideally, an attempt might be made to assign degrees of probability or reliability to conclusions according to the apparent objectivity of the source-material on which they are based. Where no data at all are provided, one might speculate as to why.

Changes in the level of financial allocations from the Budget are not examined from as many angles as might, I think, be possible. (Curiously, neither 'Budget' nor 'Budgetary' appear as headings in the Index.) However, here as everywhere else in the book a very useful clarification and tabulation of the available data are achieved: any future research in this field must take the OECD work as its starting point. There is much useful, and to me novel, information concerning financial arrangements, especially on the expanding contractual links between science and industry.

Ideology is almost completely ignored apart from fleeting yet significant references (e.g. pp. 301 and 345). One thus gathers an impression of a rationalistic bureaucracy into which the individual idiosyncrasies do not intrude.

The extent to which we still do not understand what has actually happened tends to be minimized. For example (p. 68), despite the abolition of 25 industrial ministries in 1957 allocations from the state budget to the R and D effort of all-union ministries and state committees increased from 84·8 per cent of the total allocations to science in 1956 to 86·6 per cent in 1961. A major problem of reconciliation of these apparently contradictory trends is concealed here. Zaleski argues that 'the cost of the most important research projects (space and atomic) evidently rose so quickly that it more than compensated for the losses in the union budget resulting from the shift of scientific establishments to the regional economic councils and the republican planning committees'. One can scarcely say that this was 'evidently' so, even though this certainly is a possible explanation, which is perhaps further supported by the trend of physico-technical and mathematical expenditures.

Comparisons are made predominantly with the United States. On page 392, Soviet R and D appears to be judged to be 'uneven' because it differs from the situation in the United States; the United States, even if the best measure that we have, is not an absolute standard. More

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comparisons with other member-states of OECD (besides France, mentioned in the General Introduction), or with non-member states, would have been welcome.

There is occasionally a tendency to reproduce Soviet evaluations of their own products, in relation to those made in the West, without subjecting those evaluations themselves to any critical examination. The little Zaporozhets car appears three times (pp. 90, 400 and 429) in illustration of various alleged deficiencies. The Russians have had comparatively little experience in producing small popular cars, and it is not a huge disgrace if they failed to beat the Volkswagen. Similarly, page 90 refers to a 'scarcity of enterprises' engaged in research work. Here it is not clear what would be regarded as sufficiency (or abundance): on page 410 it is pointed out that in all economies R and D effort is concentrated in a minority of factories.

An unconscious adoption of Soviet standards is evident in the narrative concerning doctorates (Part IV, Section C). It is not self-evident that the average age of those receiving Doctor of Sciences degrees is excessively high, nor—in the absence of a benchmark reference—does a total of 800 new doctorates a year seem especially low. It is surely not because doctorates are presented by older persons that by the time the thesis is presented a good part of the original research is outdated (p. 338), but because working up a theme to doctorate standard inevitably takes a good deal of time. Sometimes reliance on Soviet critics is, indeed, inevitable, as in the evaluation of the research plans of the Academy system (para. 662).

Occasionally the tendency is the other way: a somewhat too favourable conclusion is drawn. The stability of distribution of employment of persons with higher education is considered to 'reflect a planned and systematic allocation of professional manpower by sectors of the national economy' (p. 185). Surely it might be due to inertia? One might rather suppose that *lack* of stability would reflect planned and systematic allocation.

In Part V, R and D arrangements are examined in four industries: the iron and steel industry, the chemical industry, the general field of engineering and the machine-tool industry. About two pages are devoted to each. These case-studies are interesting but no reason is given for this particular selection.

In Appendix C, R. W. Davies and M. J. Berry rework the manpower data made by R. W. Davies, G. R. Barker and R. Fakiolas in C. Freeman and A. Young, *The R & D Effort in Western Europe, North America and the Soviet Union in 1962* (Paris, OECD, 1965). The substantial value of this intricate and extremely long methodological appendix has to be qualified by the wide range between the now proposed 'cautious' and 'more generous' estimates.

One of the major gaps in our knowledge concerns the distribution of financial allocations of republican academies of sciences between different branches of science. Data even of very broad groups of expendi-

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ture are available only in respect of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and only between 1960 and 1965 (Table 14 of Part I, p. 108). Zaleski (p. 107) and Wienert (p. 254, footnote 3) claim that some idea of recent general trends may be obtained from the Ukrainian figures. This may be so, yet it is difficult to feel great confidence that these data are representative, nor are they very informative. As far as they go, however, they suggest a further concentration on the physico-technical and mathematical sciences, to the comparative detriment of the rest, including the social sciences. In view of the increase in attention paid to the social sciences during this period this trend is surprising. According to Zaleski, the reduction in the share of the social sciences 'seems to be due less to a change in governmental policy than to the fact that the social sciences are primarily theoretical and exploratory, thereby requiring smaller credits for a given project (*tema*) or problem studied' (p. 107). However, this difference, if correctly stated, would explain the smaller total cost of research in the social sciences at a particular time, not a reduction in their share over time. But also during this period sociological investigations of a fieldwork type began to become much more common, i.e. the theoretical and exploratory element in such investigations should have begun to diminish, so that their total cost should have risen faster than before. Analysis of the percentage changes from year to year shows that the social sciences percentage in fact rose from 1964 to 1965 (from 4·2 per cent to 5·4 per cent). It is also interesting to notice that almost half the rise in the percentage share of the physico-technical and mathematical sciences occurred in 1961, the year of Gagarin.

A somewhat analogous distribution of scientists in higher educational establishments by branches of science in 1950–1965 is presented in Table 6 of Part IV (p. 317). (These data are also referred to on p. 316.) The 1965 totals are *extrapolated*, as a continuation of the 1950–1960 trend. It is extremely doubtful whether extrapolation is a legitimate method here, particularly as biology would be shown as trending downwards between 1960 and 1965, whereas the Party decree of January 1963 on biological research reflected an increased expenditure in the Section of Chemical and Biological Sciences in the Academy budget for 1963 (pp. 268–69).

Page 104 (para. 225), which describes the movement of total investments in science as given in Table 11 of Part I (pp. 102–3), states that 'it appears that the sums in the Capital Investment Plan allotted to research establishments, laboratories, etc. rose rapidly from 1959 to 1962, remained stationary from 1962 to 1966 and rose rapidly again in 1967'. The table shows rather that such allotments rose rapidly from 1960 to 1962, remained stationary in 1962–63, then increased slowly from 1963 to 1966, and finally were planned to increase rapidly in 1967.

These comments, largely on matters of detail, hardly amount to criticisms of a volume which must be assessed as a landmark in Western study of Soviet science. I would, however, suggest that in future work

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in this sphere more attention might be concentrated on the method to be followed, perhaps with a view to determining the place of science in Soviet society, rather than on amassing still more information primarily of an organizational nature. There is nothing wrong with the method employed in the book, but by itself it will not suffice. As is pointed out in the introduction, a science policy needs an ' overall approach '.

RELEVANT HISTORY

Melvin Croan

JUST how ought one to treat the claims of a self-styled ' historian by inclination '? Coming from a veteran communist party boss and entrenched head of state, Walter Ulbricht's expressed predisposition toward the historical muse merits serious attention. By the same token, it also demands a careful appraisal in keeping with standards of judgment more exacting than those often employed to evaluate, say, the artistic legacy of certain Western statesmen whose extramural propensities ran to apolitical water colours and oils.

This is all the more the case in as much as the present translation into English of Ulbricht's selected speeches and essays (or portions therefrom) * has been designed to appeal to a wide international audience. Its unmistakable purpose is to establish Ulbricht's credentials not only as a wooer of the muse but also as a major historical figure in his own right. Although these two volumes of his pronouncements on the German ' national question ' and ' socialist construction ' in the GDR have been editorially reworked by others, their labours need not prove too obtrusive. In any case, Ulbricht's obliging publishers are at pains to give credit where it is due. Accordingly, they deem it a ' happy coincidence ' that the second of these volumes should have made its appearance just in time for the celebration of the author's 75th birthday and offer the assurance that, read together, both books will ' convey an idea of Walter Ulbricht's life '.

Well, almost. There is, to be sure, no indication of ' Comrade Cell's ' part in the bolshevization of the Weimar KPD. But that minor oversight may be readily forgiven, if only because Ulbricht's role in this particular respect has already been unduly exaggerated by other official encomia. As might only be expected, there is no documentation of Ulbricht's nasty polemics against the German social democrats as ' social fascists ' at a time when the Weimar Republic was struggling for its very survival. But perhaps that omission can be forgiven too, since some three decades later Ulbricht went on record elsewhere as having

* Walter Ulbricht, *Whither Germany?* (Dresden, 1966) and *On Questions of Socialist Construction in the GDR* (Dresden, 1968).

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always been steadfastly (!) opposed to the suicidal internecine struggle ordered by Moscow. But wait one moment. Surely it was inadvisable to have touched on the years 1930–33 in any way whatsoever. For what purpose, one wonders, is the effort to supply documentary evidence of the timely advocacy of a united front, especially since the *type* of united front (from 'below', i.e. against the SPD and trade union leadership) is barely disguised in the single Ulbricht pronouncement, dated February 1933, that is offered? Well, perhaps the editorial staff members should be called to task after all. Still, treatment of the 1939–41 interlude offers a better example of their talents. The single item from that subsequently embarrassing period—an impeccably anti-nazi statement, warning of Hitler's designs on Danzig (and dated, if you please, 24 August 1939)—must have been culled with consummate care. As for more recent times, discretion is the overriding imperative. Despite Stalin's apparent Second Coming by the mid-sixties, it would be asking too much to expect the reproduction of Ulbricht's earlier sychophantic adulation of the late Soviet dictator. On the other hand, it would certainly have been unwise to include Ulbricht's 1956 downgrading of the sometime 'genius-like' Kremlin leader from the status of a 'classicist of Marxism'. So one will find neither the one nor the other. This is truly ingenious impartiality; a commendable twist on the bourgeois political practice of equal time into equal non-space. If there is any hitch to all of this, it is simply that it is, of course, quite impossible to 'convey an idea of Walter Ulbricht's life' without *some* reference to Stalin.

NO matter. What these volumes may lack in the way of half-way plausible biography, they more than compensate for in their forceful exposition of the German Democratic Republic's official rationale. And what has characterized East Germany's political development, if not utter consistency? First, the smashing of German imperialism by the Soviet Union (and, in fact quite parenthetically, its wartime allies). Next, the laying of the foundations of an anti-fascist democratic order, leading to the formal establishment of the GDR as a state, once the 'restoration forces of German monopoly capital, supported by the Anglo-American occupation powers, had split off the three Western zones from the German national community'. Then, the 'construction of socialism' and, of course, its safeguarding when the 'state borders of the Republic' were 'secured' in August 1961, thereby thwarting 'the plans of West German generals for a military annexation' of East Germany. In sum, a GDR that has 'consistently adhered to its policy serving peace, social progress and national unity'. And who has presided, once again with consistency and a measure of implied clairvoyance, over such an agreeable state of affairs? 'As a leading politician of the German working class, Walter Ulbricht had a considerable share in working out this path . . .', according to the preface to *Whither Germany?* Or, somewhat less modestly, the tribute proffered

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by the preface to *Questions of Socialist Construction*, viz. 'A close fellow combatant of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, of Ernst Thälmann, Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl, he preserves and carries on their political testament as the highest representative of the German Democratic Republic and its Marxist party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany'.

It may seem a bit ungracious to challenge so generous a 75th birthday salute, but it must be done all the same. For neither volume contains any mention of Ulbricht's stubborn insistence on pushing ahead with Stalinist economic programmes in the spring of 1953 when the Kremlin's new leaders advised otherwise, nor treats what happened immediately thereafter when the pressure had to be relaxed and the East German workers rose in revolt. There is also no recollection of either the economic tribulations and intellectual dissidence of the mid-fifties or, for that matter, of the inter-party factionalism aimed at ousting Ulbricht from power. There is no indication, finally, of Ulbricht's personal distaste for genuine political reform elsewhere in Eastern Europe, nor of the polemics his spokesmen have waged against less narrow-minded communist parties in the West, nor yet of his regime's increased rigidity in the face of a more flexible policy on the 'national question' from Bonn.

Of course, it can be argued that something is always lost in translation, or at least in selection and abridgement for purposes of translation. And, although these are weighty tomes (together totalling about 1,150 pages), they do not even begin to compare with Walter Ulbricht's collected works available in German. At the last count, no less than 10 full-sized volumes (together with two special supplements) of Ulbricht's *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung* had already appeared. Barring an unexpected de-Ulbrichtization, still more volumes in this series are bound to come. Add to this other, only partly repetitive collections, such as the two recent volumes, entitled *An die Jugend* (531 pages) and *Zum ökonomischen System des Sozialismus in der DDR* (1,488 pages), and one has fairly substantial makings for a Little Ulbricht Library. Yet, even this vast output in the original language—besides itself being badly at odds with the precepts of the 'economic system of socialism in the DDR', or so one might think—is really not *that* much more instructive than the present English language abridged offering.

One must look elsewhere for consolation. But it can be found. As expensively—even if not quite handsomely—produced books, these two English language volumes do provide a generous allotment of space at the outer margin. Thus the reader who may perchance wish to indulge himself in the old-fashioned practice of 'bourgeois objectivism' as concerns history will find a ready place to begin his own critical edition of Ulbrichtiana. Over and above that, there is another source of potentially far deeper satisfaction. For, given the mindlessness of so many of today's protagonists of 'relevance' on the New Left, it may be downright salutary that an old Stalinist has reminded us all to what

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recurrently dishonest and frequently absurd lengths the criterion of political relevance can lead. And this, it should be said, is no mean accomplishment for a mere 'historian by inclination'.

SOVIET SOCIOLOGY

Elizabeth Weinberg

SOCIOLOGY, the Cinderella of the social sciences in the Soviet Union, has recently come under increasing scrutiny by Western scholars.* Alex Simirenko's *Soviet Sociology: Historical Antecedents and Current Appraisals* is a collection of various Western appraisals of this discipline and its Russian interpreters. With the exception of Simirenko's introduction and his chapter on the concept of industrial society, all of the articles in this anthology have been previously published. Here they are arranged so as to provide background material for present research, beginning with sociology of the Russian Empire, then the Stalin era, the post-Stalin era, and current research and problems.

A major criticism of the book lies in the choice of the subject-matter of certain essays. Thus, while pre-Revolutionary thinkers cited here, such as Mikhailovski and Kovalevski, were sociologists, it seems to be stretching the point to include Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin as proper sociologists, though to be sure they all were concerned with 'social' problems, such as revolution. For example, Isaac Deutcher's contribution, 'Leon Trotsky as a Historian and Sociologist of Revolution' (reproduced from *The Prophet Outcast*), bears little relation to this title: Trotsky is examined here almost exclusively as a historian. The choice of essays certainly might have been more judicious or even specifically 'commissioned' for this volume, although the more current articles in the anthology do indeed help to sketch sociology's recent growth.

Simirenko's introductory essay on the history of Soviet sociology concentrates primarily on the period of its revival since 1956. The basic problem in this essay is Simirenko's artificial division of this past decade. Many examples of sociological research would show that a rigid separation of the so-called stages of Soviet sociological growth is unwise, first, because research is often begun prior to the

* Alex Simirenko, ed., *Soviet Sociology: Historical Antecedents and Current Appraisals* (Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1966), 384 pp.
George Fischer, ed., *Science and Ideology in Soviet Society* (New York, Atherton Press, 1967), 176 pp.
Allen Kassof, ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 586 pp.
Alex Inkeles, *Social Change in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968), 475 pp.

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so-called new stage, second, publishing practices obviously lag behind actual research and prohibit and/or delay definitive judgments, and third, the evolution, if punctuated by more or less positive and negative periods, has essentially been a gradual process.

A more updated and detailed view of the current state of the discipline is provided by George Fischer. Having contributed two articles to Simirenko's book, he has himself compiled a volume of four essays, *Science and Ideology in Soviet Society*. Each of these lucid essays, presented simply enough for the layman, focuses on the relation evolving in the 1960s between ideology and science, notably sociology, philosophy, cybernetics, or economics. Fischer sums up the general consensus of the authors: 'specifically, they [the authors] hold—in varying degrees—that in the 1960s Soviet science . . . may in fact help to sustain the established system and its ideology rather than weaken or erode them' (p. viii). One might have liked to see this overall view of rapport between these sciences and ideology recapitulated in a short, inclusive final chapter.

Fischer's contribution on sociology proceeds from a similar but earlier analysis in his *Science and Politics: The New Sociology in the Soviet Union* (1964). After tracing the 'new sociology's' increasing link-up with specialized social research, Fischer distinguishes between a 'future orientation' and a 'concrete orientation' in Soviet sociological research. Documented exceptionally well, this description of recent sociological work is most useful for the period since 1964.

All in all both volumes, while summing up the past evolution of this rather neglected discipline, present a cautious but optimistic view of the future.

PROFESSOR Allen Kassof in *Prospects for Soviet Society* has gathered together an impressive group of 18 scholars, each writing an essay on his speciality and each contributing to some phase of the broadly conceived theme of the sources of social change in the Soviet Union. The collection, with an introduction and conclusion by the editor, is arranged in five sections: Soviet society after 50 years, the formation and control of policy, resources and their management, changing aspects of social structure, and prospects. And within these broad classifications are found discussions on the Party and interest groups, industry and agriculture, family and leisure, etc.

The volume, although written by individual authors, is cohesive and well integrated, while at the same time expressing the mildly differing views of its contributors. To a large extent the essays follow a similar form, namely, the given topic is presented so as to include a historical account (sometimes referring to Tsarist as well as Soviet matters), the contemporary situation, and finally, the future outlook. By this approach the authors are able to indicate patterns of stability and change in the past as well as in the future. Furthermore, the 'goings

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on' inside the Soviet Union are not presented in isolation: although those phenomena which have and those which may occur within the country receive most attention, the international scene—and its effects—is not entirely ignored. Nor is the role of the Soviet Union as a modernizing, industrializing country, or, for that matter, the Russian heritage. It must be added, moreover, that concern about too many generalizations and too few 'facts and figures' (as well as insufficient bibliographic data) in a volume such as this is unfounded. (In fact, Cyril Black's article on 'Soviet Society: A Comparative View' seems to have too many figures, many of which neither illuminated nor were relevant to his argument.)

All in all, the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution proved a justifiable pretext for this volume: with the spate of books marking the anniversary, one on Soviet society is more than welcome. While the predictions and conjectures about the future are obviously the most ticklish parts of the book, the bases for the prospects of Soviet society are admirably explored in Professor Kassof's collection.

One would have hoped for the same in the collection by Alex Inkeles. In *Social Change in Soviet Russia,* Inkeles presents 21 of his essays, the overwhelming majority of which first appeared during the 1950s. The essays focus on Soviet politics, social stratification, family, church, nationalities, mass communications, propaganda, and comparative perspectives for the future.

Inkeles notes in his introductory remarks that there is relatively little sociological writing about the Soviet Union. He wishes to redress the balance and consequently offers his essays as a 'broad sociological survey of Soviet social institutions'. And it is precisely because of this that his book is of value.

However, most of the essays, based on the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, picture the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Inkeles justifies this by indicating the value of examining and tracing how Soviet society has been studied in the recent past. He then tries to update the essays by adding factual and interpretative material in footnote form. But surely this is not adequate for, in fact, it sidesteps the very warning given by Inkeles himself in a 1967 essay: 'As Soviet society develops and changes, so we are obliged either to develop and change our models or run the risk of analysing Soviet affairs with conceptual tools which do not answer to reality.'

In conclusion, Inkeles' book does indeed trace those fields of social inquiry with which he has been concerned since the 1950s and his essays therefore offer an historical and sociological perspective of Soviet social development. But it is regrettable that more current material (including recent Soviet sociological research) is not more in evidence.

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INDUSTRIALISM AND REVOLUTION

James D. Young

THE industrialization of England between 1780 and 1832 and the response of the pre-industrial labour force to that cataclysmic social, economic, cultural and political experience is the central motif of E. P. Thompson's brilliant and fascinating book.* *The Making of the English Working Class* was first published in 1963, and Thompson has added a postscript to this new Pelican edition of his work in which he impressively defends himself against his critics and detractors. He has, of course, very little difficulty in demolishing the criticisms and arguments of the dominant British school of right-wing economic historians who still persist in regarding working people as statistical fodder in the evolution of what Thompson characterizes as their 'Pilgrim's Progress orthodoxy'. Nevertheless, his persistent use of the word *ideology* in the pejorative sense against economic historians is rather odd in a man who places himself in the Marxist tradition.

This study of the 'making' of the English proletariat has, however, raised as many questions as it answers; and the low theoretical level of Marxist historiography and the general lack of knowledge concerning Marxism among so-called 'bourgeois' historians is such that many important historical problems are neglected by historians and sociologists alike. It is, for example, difficult to see how Thompson could square the Brechtian values he attributes to the English pre-industrial labour force with the general Marxist criticism of the 'primitive rebels' who litter historical territory. This problem touches on the role of human consciousness in history and in the evolution of society.

E. P. Thompson's description of the 'secret history' of the English resistance to industrialization brings us against the fact that many of the British revolutionaries of this period were either déclassé elements or they were culturally alienated from their own society. Marxist historians in the West are now vaguely aware of the continuity of 'cultural alienation' among Irish revolutionaries from John Doherty to Willie Gallacher, and this recognition has created problems for them which they are not really conscious of. Since Marxists hold that 'false consciousness' is the consciousness of individuals in 'a condition of alienation', how could this continuity of cultural alienation represent either working-class consciousness or working-class culture? And why were there so few authentic working men contributing to the 'radical culture' which Thompson regards as one of the great achievements of the Industrial Revolution? Perhaps such questions are too heretical for even dissident thinkers like Thompson.

E. P. Thompson's contribution to historiography is considerable.

* E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (Pelican), 958 pp.

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Moreover, his efforts to 'rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the "obsolete" hand-loom weaver, the "utopian" artisan, and even the deluded follower of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous condescension of posterity' are admirable; and his re-discovery of the important dimension of human agency in the history-making-process should help to mitigate the dangers of a one-dimensional society evolving in the future. But his hatred of industrialism—and the agencies creating industrialism—is so fierce that the historian who wrote *William Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary* in 1955 is probably mapping out a title for his own biographer: *Revolutionary to Romantic.*

THE work * by E. J. Hobsbawm, a stimulating and gifted historian of the orthodox Marxist persuasion, is an impressive history of the economic and social convulsions which have transformed Britain since the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution. In a somewhat haughty, aloof and élitist manner he vividly describes the origins, developments and social consequences of the first and second Industrial Revolution. He takes full account of the impact of industrialization on the formation of class consciousness among proletarians and entrepreneurs alike; but he ignores the same cultural patterns in the 'socialist countries' (sic!) he contrasts with the advanced industrial societies in Western Europe. He accepts the traditional view that the Industrial Revolution represents a fundamental watershed in world history, yet he is not aware of the revolutionary character of the entrepreneurs in the eighteenth century. They were, in fact, far more revolutionary than the proletariat.

E. J. Hobsbawm's description of the origins and social consequences of the Industrial Revolution is distinctive and interesting, but hardly original. The main criticism of *Industry and Empire* is that (like its predecessor, *Reformation to Industrial Revolution* by Christopher Hill) it often reads like a synthesis of the arguments and debates which rage in the *Economic History Review*. His chapter on 'the beginnings of the decline' abounds in useful new insights into the causes of the so-called 'Great Depression' between 1873 and 1896. Here Dr Hobsbawm convincingly argues that the British Empire which made the metropolis, in Marx's phrase, 'the despot of the world market', eventually resulted in Britain's relative decline as an industrial nation. Also he admits that the backwardness of our educational system, the social stigma linked to any form of technical education, and the barriers against social and labour mobility are not easily explained in either economic or social terms. He is nevertheless on very strong ground when he says that the politicians and entrepreneurs in the metropolis 'always had a line of retreat open. . . . We could retreat further into both Empire and Free Trade—into our monopoly of as yet undeveloped regions, which in itself helped to keep them unindustrialized, and into our functions

* Eric J. Hobsbawm, *An Economic and Social History of Britain Since 1730* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson), 336 pp.

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as the hub of the world's trading, shipping, and financial transactions. We did not have to compete but could evade.'

Dr Hobsbawm also thinks that by 1848 socialism had, as he puts it, 'disappeared from the land of its birth'. Furthermore, 'there were no socialists to dream of a new society. There were trade unions, seeking to exploit the laws of political economy in order to create a scarcity of their kind of labour and thus increase their members' wages.' In the 1960s socialism is, he thinks, stone dead. This conclusion springs from the misconception that working-class socialism is essentially 'belly socialism'. But socialism has on the basis of Dr Hobsbawm's own internal evidence been a long time a-dying. In the general field of labour history he overrates the importance of the 'aristocracy of labour', and in my own—admittedly subjective—experience as a youth in a 'lower' working-class environment, he creates an artificial dichotomy between the manual and the skilled workers in his evaluation of working-class culture. His basic shortcoming as a social historian is that he has no imaginative insight into the ethos of working-class life; and so he bemoans the passing of working-class 'culture' and the impersonality of the new housing estates, and all the rest of the romantic 'look-back-in-anger' elements in our café society culture. Experience in the 'lower depths' would have cured him of these illusions, and therefore equipped him to recognize the positive features of the new council housing estates. But the criticism that one can level against him is a tribute to his stature as a major British historian. He is a sort of A. J. P. Taylor who is more committed to an intransigent puritan socialist morality, interlaced with non-working-class interests, and crowned by the guilt complexes of an upper-class Englishman.

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DOCUMENTS: SOVIET UNION

LETTERS FROM SOLZHENITSYN

I FEEL that I have not told you everything, that I have not fully clarified my thoughts. Here then are a few more words.

Justice has been the common patrimony of humanity throughout the ages. It does not cease to exist for the majority even when it is twisted in some ('exclusive') circles. Obviously it is a concept which is inherent in man, since it cannot be traced to any other source. Justice exists even if there are only a few individuals who recognize it as such. The love of justice seems to me to be a different sentiment from the love of people (or at least the two coincide only partially). And in periods of mass decadence, when the question is posed, 'Why bother? What are the sacrifices for?', it is possible to answer with certainty: 'For justice'. There is nothing relative about justice, as there is nothing relative about conscience. Indeed, justice *is* conscience, not a personal conscience but the conscience of the whole of humanity. Those who clearly recognize the voice of their own conscience usually recognize also the voice of justice. I consider that in all questions, social or historical (if we are aware of them, not from hearsay or books, but are touched by them spiritually), justice will always suggest a way to act (or judge) which will not conflict with our conscience.

As our intelligence is usually not sufficient to grasp, to understand, and to foresee the course of history (and, as you say, it has been demonstrated that to 'plan' it is absurd) you will never err if you act in any social situation in accordance with justice (the old way of saying it in Russian is: to live by truth*). In this way you will always be able to act and not just be a passive witness.

And please do not tell me that 'everybody understands justice in his own way'. No! They can shout, they can take you by the throat, they can tear your breast, but convictions based on conscience are as infallible as the internal rhythm of the heart (and one knows that in private life it is the voice of conscience which we often try to suppress).

For example, I am sure that the best among the Arabs understand that—according to justice—Israel has a right to exist and to live.

Ryazan, October 1967

(*This letter was sent by Alexander Solzhenitsyn to three students who visited him at his* dacha. *His recent expulsion from the Writers' Union gives it an added significance. The letter that follows was sent by Solzhenitsyn to the Writers' Union in protest against his expulsion.*)

IT is shameful that you trample your own statutes underfoot in this manner. You have expelled me in my absence, as if there were a fire,

* The words truth (*pravda*) and justice (*spravedlivost*) have the same root in Russian.

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without even sending me a summons or a telegram, without even giving me the four hours necessary to come from Ryazan to be present at the meeting.

You have clearly demonstrated that the decision preceded the 'investigation'. Was it easier for you to find new charges in my absence? Were you afraid of being obliged to grant me 10 minutes to make my answer?

I am compelled therefore to send this letter in reply.

Blow the dust off the clock. Your watches are slow in relation to our times. Draw open the heavy curtains which you treasure so much. You do not even suspect that it is daylight outside. It is no longer the time of the deaf, the sombre period with no way out when it pleased you to expel Akhmatova. Nor is it any longer the period of timidity and frost when you expelled Pasternak, hurling abuse at him. Was this shame not enough for you?

Do you want to make it greater? But the hour is near when each one of you will try to efface the signature which he put under the resolution taken today.

Blind leading the blind, you do not even notice that you are going in the opposite direction from the one you yourselves indicated. At this critical time, you are incapable of suggesting anything constructive, anything good for our society which is gravely ill; you have only your hatred, your vigilance, your 'let's hold on and not let go'.

Your lumbering statements fall flat; your stupidity stirs feebly; you have no arguments. There is only the unanimous vote and the administrative repression. And this is why neither Sholokhov nor any of you dared to reply to the letter of Lidia Chukovskaya who is the pride of Russian committed literature. But the administrative pincers will close in on her. How can one dare read a book which has not been published? Once the authorities decide not to publish you, then stifle yourself, cease to exist, refuse to allow anyone to read what you have written.

They are also considering the expulsion of Lev Kopelev, the front-line veteran, who has already served 10 years in a camp, although he was completely innocent. But today he is guilty. Why did he intervene on behalf of the persecuted? Why did he reveal the facts about his secret meetings with an influential person? But why, then, do you arrange such conversations which are kept secret from the people? Were we not promised 50 years ago that never again would there be any secret diplomacy, secret meetings, secret and incomprehensible appointments and dismissals, and that the masses would discuss everything out in the open?

'The enemy will overhear'—that is your excuse. The 'enemies', eternal and ever present, provide an easy justification for your functions and for your very existence. But what would you do without enemies? You could not survive without enemies. Hatred, hatred as evil as racial hatred, has become your sterile atmosphere. Thus it is

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that one loses sight of common humanity and moves to perdition. Should the Antarctic ice melt tomorrow, all mankind would drown, and into whose heads would you then be drilling your concepts of 'class struggle'?

And I am not even talking about what would happen when the few surviving bipeds wander across a radioactive earth to die. It is high time to remember that we belong first and foremost to humanity, that man has distinguished himself from animals by thought and language. Men naturally should be free, and if they are put in chains, we will return to the animal stage.

Public recognition of facts, complete and honest, that is the first condition of health in all societies, including our own. He who refuses this, cares nothing for the fatherland and thinks only of his own interest. He who refuses this for the fatherland, cannot cure our illnesses but only repress them and induce putrefaction.

November 1969. Alexander Solzhenitsyn

STUDIES IN SOVIET THOUGHT

A Quarterly Review Published Jointly by the Institute of East-European Studies at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, and the Russian Philosophical Studies Program at Boston College

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MANYA HARARI

WHEN I asked Manya Harari to write a review of Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward* I did not know that shortly before she had learned that she herself was suffering from cancer. Characteristically, Manya did not disclose this fact till the end, even to her closest friends, and this made conversation with her in the last year of her life particularly poignant. The truth about her condition reached me soon after the publication of her review but it was never mentioned in our conversations, although at some point she must have realized, endowed as she was with an extremely sensitive intuition, that I knew, just as she did, the gravity of the situation. It remained a *sous-entendu* during our talks when she was still at home and even during my visits to the clinic where, despite medical attention, she was getting weaker, and one could see that her life, like the flame of a candle, was flickering, soon to be extinguished altogether. Yet such was her strength of will that almost until the last moment, when she still had some energy left, she continued to work on the translation of a book by Andrei Amalrik. All along she wanted to prevent news about her illness from spreading; she was concerned that her husband (who died four months before her) should not learn about it and wanted to spare her family as long as possible the pain of acquiring this knowledge. This epitomizes two fundamental traits of her character: she was always more concerned about others than about herself, and she was very determined. In fact, the contrast between her frail physique and the strength of her spirit was striking. She was a personal friend and a friend of *Survey* for many years. She wrote articles on Soviet literature (her last contribution to *Survey* appeared in October 1968) and translated many contemporary Russian writers: Nekrasov, Ehrenburg, Paustovski, Solzhenitsyn, Sinyavski. She was passionately concerned about intellectual freedom and for many years did her best to support its cause in her native Russia. She was always ready to help with any action which would make the public understand the issues involved in the struggle of Soviet writers and intellectuals for self-expression, and put into this cause her heart and intellect. She was deceptively mild and unassuming but was always ready to work day and night for the things she believed in. It was her personality which appealed most to her friends. Small, thin, usually dressed in black, and giving the impression of living on nothing more than black coffee and cigarettes, she was amazingly single-minded when she decided that a given cause deserved her support. She was indefatigable in her effort to promote it and she was usually very successful, although she had only two instruments at her disposal: the telephone to her very many friends in public life, and her pen. She used both very effectively.

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WHEN Manya Harari was writing her review of Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward* she knew that she was dying of cancer, but did not dwell on the many passages in the book which must have been painfully relevant. She avoided giving any indication of self-pity, although Solzhenitsyn's book offered not one but many mirrors of her own predicament. She concentrated instead on the wider, more impersonal issues raised in the book. To indicate her metaphysical quest and moral self-discipline it is perhaps best to quote her review of a book where the question of individual suffering is intertwined with the question of political oppression. Ultimately, the human illness, cancer, and the social illness, dictatorship, raise the same question of the need for spiritual courage. Manya Harari had this courage. She also knew that it had to be based on a vision which reaches for the significance of the human, and not just of the social, condition. This is how she ended her review:

> *Soon after his conversation with Shulyubin, Kostoglotov is discharged from hospital. Cured, at any rate for the time being (but this is more than he had hoped), he comes out into a new-born world in which everything is a delight and where temptation assails him. He spends more than he can afford on a meal of shashlyk and a glass of mediocre wine. Then he follows the crowd into a department store. Almost everything is beyond his means but everything fascinates him—until a well-dressed man about town next to him asks the assistant for a silk shirt size 50 with a collar size 37. At this Kostoglotov is overcome with disgust: to think that, in a world where all these years men have been dying in trenches and in camps, there are still people who remember the size of their collars! He turns his back on the supermarket and goes to the zoo.*
>
> *What makes the strongest impression on him here is an empty cage. It was that of a rhesus monkey; a note fixed to the bars says that 'a wicked man', out of sheer 'senseless cruelty', threw tobacco in the monkey's eyes and blinded it.*
>
> *This dreadful story haunts him all day, while he is preparing to leave the town and go back to his friends in the remote province which is his place of exile. Clearly, for Solzhenitsyn, as for Kostoglotov, the problem of the blinded monkey and the problem of Stalin's* univers concentrationnaire *is that of a* crime gratuit. *It is both extremely puzzling and very simple. The last words in the book are:*
>
> > *A wicked man threw tobacco in the rhesus monkey's eyes. Just like that!*
>
> *Some concentration camp victims have said that they were helped to survive by their curiosity: 'How could this happen? How will it end?' Solzhenitsyn's curiosity has taken him further than most—to an almost comprehensive view of the world and of human nature. In his quest for life he survived the man-made hell of the concentration camps and he won the battle against cancer. But*

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when he came back into the world the first thing he once again encounters is Dostoevsky's agonized question about the problem of evil.

In April 1966 Manya Harari wrote in *Survey* an obituary note on François de Liencourt:

The quality which comes to mind when I think of him is an immense generosity of mind and character which, even through the great suffering caused by his illness, never ceased to bring to others a stronger sense of the value of life and friendship.

How aptly these words express my own feelings about Manya.

L.L.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

I HAVE admired for many years this vivid and scholarly review and have also been often enlightened by your own terse replies in polemical exchanges in other publications. It is therefore with a feeling of sadness and dismay that I feel urged to protest against the general tone and some particular remarks in your 'Quarterly Notes' in the Spring issue of *Survey*. I shall limit my remarks to your note and footnote about Mary McCarthy, on page 248, ending with the sentence: 'An anthology of such highlights of Miss McCarthy's stylistic precision about the whole human experience—from defloration to defecation—might well be entitled "A Vassar Pilgrim's Progress".'

I think that even a person who has not read recent American novels by authors like John Updike, Philip Roth and Gore Vidal would realize that Mary McCarthy's writing is rather puritanical than prurient. The description of a loss of virginity or of toilet facilities in North Vietnam has a note of detached satirical observation of social 'mores', and does not try at all to excite or to shock the reader. You have no need to share this opinion. However, *Survey* has never been interested in literary criticism as such. In this case, a literary judgement is used to strengthen an attack on an author's politics. It has been for a long time the habit of the more orthodox Soviet Russian critics to 'destroy' a politically unwelcome author by explaining that he is morally corrupt and worthless. I fear that for once you have been contaminated by this style of 'total' polemics with which as a scholar you are so familiar and which, I am sure, as a writer, you normally abhor. However, in this footnote you have judged an author's work apart from her political opinion on a basis of non-literary criteria and intentions. This strikes me as neither convincing nor fair.

Paris **François Bondy**

(I appreciate M. Bondy's gallant defence of a friend and an esteemed colleague. But surely he knows my work too well to believe that in this or any other case it could be contaminated by a 'total' style of polemics. I leave it to the reader to decide whether my remarks, which mixed facts and comment with a slight touch of mild satire, were really very wide of the mark.—L.L.)

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Quarterly Notes

NEW LEFT—OLD LEFT

Il Manifesto

EVER since Stalin's death, the assessment of world political prospects has hinged upon the root question of the character of the evolution of the communist parties, East and West. According to a widely accepted view 'destalinization' in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was to be followed by further 'liberalization', this being part of the general process of convergence of different political and social systems. Such hopes have not been confirmed by Soviet and East European developments.

According to another widely held view, Western communists were expected to undergo some kind of social-democratic transformation which would turn them from revolutionaries into reformist and parliamentary animals. After Czechoslovakia, this prospect can hardly be seen as a corollary to the democratization of the communist regimes. What are the indications that such a democratic transformation may nevertheless result from the general process of communist polycentrism? Is the reaction of Western communist parties to Czechoslovakia a pointer in this direction? The case of the Austrian Communist Party is discussed at length in this issue of *Survey*, but it is the Italian Communist Party (PCI) which, because of its liberal image, its size and its political potential, is usually cast in the role of harbinger of a democratic metamorphosis of a communist party in a democratic environment.[1]

Recent developments inside this Party, and in particular the handling of two issues which flared up in internal Party discussions, provide food for thought about the prospects of its evolution. The two issues in question were: the historiographical debate about Stalin and Togliatti and a directly political debate about the publication of an unofficial communist magazine, *Il Manifesto*.

Like other communist parties, the PCI has some skeletons in its historical cupboard. They cannot be easily concealed and their ghosts cannot be exorcized when it comes to the writing of Party history.

[1] Cf. for instance Robert L. Mott in the *International Herald Tribune* (30 October 1969): '. . . some observers see an eventual regrouping of Italian political parties with something like the British Labour party evolving from the existing Communist party and the left wing of both the Socialists and Christian Democrats'. Some others look at the example of the participation of the Finnish communists in the government. Apart from the geo-political differences, the situation is dissimilar in at least one respect: in Finland those communists who are in the government, as Amendola wants to be in Italy, disapprove of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and those who, like Amendola, are making their obeisances to the Soviets, censured their comrades precisely for the kind of political attitude for which Amendola castigated Berti.

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As elsewhere, it is at the same time a most difficult and a most expensive political exercise, fraught with contemporary political implications.

Some of the embarrassing aspects of the Italian communists' past were first dealt with from inside the Party by the communist senator Giuseppe Berti in his introduction to the collection of the Tasca documents about the first 10 years of Italian communism.[2] Its second volume (which brought the story up to 1939) has recently been published (*Annali Feltrinelli 1968*). The 'right'-wing communist leader Giorgio Amendola attacked it even more forcefully than he did the first volume for its historical disclosures and criticism of the Party's Stalinist past. In his articles in *l'Unità* (4 July and 1 August 1969) and *Rinascita* (21 August 1969) he condemned Berti for using the Tasca archives 'to bring about a trial of Stalin and Stalinism'. He rejected it as an 'attempt to use historical studies to achieve a political aim, to destroy—and this is the political crux of the matter—the precious legacy of Togliatti . . .'. He announced that 'this attempt to hit at the Party through Togliatti will be vigorously repulsed . . .'.

In defending the myth of Togliatti, Amendola defended the political past of the present PCI leadership. A truthful account of Togliatti's political history would directly undermine the position of his heirs; Amendola also knows that one cannot whitewash him without at the same time whitewashing Stalin.

Berti replied in *Rinascita* (22 August 1969) that Togliatti and the group of leaders around him, of which Berti himself was one, had rendered the attitude of 'cynical political opportunism (*tatticismo*)', which was the essence of Stalinism, more acceptable to the Party by assimilating it into the Italian scene. This Stalinism *alla Italiana* is the most important present danger:

> The political problem of today is not to judge the way in which this or that comrade was a Stalinist 30 years ago, but to see what was his political evolution after the Twentieth Congress and above all what is his position today vis-à-vis the tremendous tenacity which Stalinism still demonstrates. . . . The important thing is to leave Stalinism behind once and for all, without making any concessions which would inevitably bring us, step by step, to the ways of the past.

ANOTHER book which evoked the ghosts of the past no less forcefully was the second volume of *Storia del partito communista italiano* by Paolo Spriano. Although it is not an official history, the author was given access to the archives of the PCI and used them effectively to destroy the myth of Togliatti. Although his style is more diplomatic than Berti's, his choice of documents and presentation are such that they leave the reader with little doubt about Spriano's attitude towards the Party's Stalinist past and Togliatti's role in it.

[2] *Annali Feltrinelli 1966*, reviewed by Gino Bianco in *Survey*, no. 67.

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It is not surprising that for such a relatively explicit treatment of these taboo subjects he was furiously attacked by Amendola and by another communist leader, Giuliano Pajetta, who accused him of presenting the historical materials in a 'false light'.

In his reply, Paolo Spriano pointedly referred to the 'lunar emptiness' of Soviet historiography in which, 'despite the Twentieth and Twenty-second Congresses, one cannot mention the names of Bolshevik leaders physically liquidated by Stalin', and emphasized the value of documents to a historian. While his book is undoubtedly a great step forward in the sordid business of Party historiography, it still suffers from residual inhibitions. Ignazio Silone pointed out in *Critica Sociale* (20 August 1969) that 'in his book Spriano recorded many truths about Togliatti, but passed over in silence certain others, perhaps through lack of information', like the unexplained role of Togliatti in Stalin's extermination of foreign communists such as Bela Kun, the leaders of the Polish Communist Party and the Comintern functionaries who took part in the Spanish Civil War. But the most serious gap in Spriano's book is the absence of a discussion of one major factor in the history of the Party without which it is like 'Hamlet without a Prince', *viz.* the relevance for it of the policy of the Soviet state.

While the debate about Paolo Spriano's book has been taking place, the communist weekly, *Vie Nuove*, serialized in the summer excerpts from General Shtemenko's notorious book glorifying Stalin's role in the Second World War, and *l'Unità* conducted in its correspondence column a debate about Stalin, soft-pedalling in its editorial comment some of the criticisms of him, while retaining others. This balancing act, which is in the best tradition of Togliatti's own *doppiogiocismo*, will no doubt find its final consecration in the official inquiry which is to be made by the Party's research institute into the causes of Stalin's 'errors and degeneration'. The character of this 'inquiry' and of its conclusions can be anticipated not only from the general background of the attacks on Berti and Spriano, but also from the comment by *l'Unità* (30 October 1969) on the subject of this 'research': 'It may be best that the term *Stalinism* cannot be considered sufficient to characterize a long period and to solve problems which are still to be studied and reflected upon.'

THE *Il Manifesto* affair was another issue deeply disturbing to the Party, and the way it was treated by the Party leadership was also highly indicative. It arose out of the publication of a magazine of this title, the first issue of which appeared in June 1969. It is edited by Lucio Magri and Rossana Rossanda; its collaborators include Luigi Pinter, Vittorio Foa, Aldo Natoli—all of them prominent members of the Party's 'New Left', a small but very active group which was already in evidence during the Twelfth Party Congress in February. The critical attitude of these dissidents notwithstanding, the Party

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leadership then nominated Rossanda, Pinter and Natoli for re-election to the Central Committee, a 'democratic' decision which was also taken in the case of its only member who supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Donini.

After the Congress, the 'New Left' continued to oppose official Party policies and was criticized for this in the Party press. A reply sent in by the 'New Left' was not printed. Soon afterwards, Rossana Rossanda and her colleagues decided to publish a magazine of their own; in a short time its circulation had reached the astonishing figure of 130,000.

Its first issue reflected both the independence of mind and confusion of the group, whose appeal is in the old tradition of Italian *massimalismo*. It is at the same time more honest in its radicalism than the official Party's *tatticismo* and more extreme in its politics. It is more resolutely anti-Stalinist, deploring the Party's ambiguity on the subject and its diplomatic evasions in dealing with Brezhnev's neo-Stalinist policies; it stresses the relevance for the Italian Party of Dubcek's abortive reforms (*Il Manifesto* published the draft of the new programme submitted to the clandestine Fourteenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Party). But if, unlike other 'New Leftists', it sympathizes with the 1968 'Prague Spring' and does not consider it a 'rightist' deviation, its anti-Stalinism contrasts strangely with its sympathetic attitude towards Maoist China, notwithstanding China's 'personality cult' of Mao (and Stalin). It propagates a 'Cultural Revolution' in Italy, but this does not mean that it is Maoist, only that it presses for a strong lead to be given by the Communist Party to students and other radical elements. It strongly criticizes the Party's failure to put itself at the head of the students' movement. It condemns the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and admires Castro who approved it. In short, if the PCI leadership professes communist ecumenism, its 'New Left' ideological stand is communist syncretism. Intellectually it may be more refreshing than the hackneyed double-talk of the Party bureaucrats and less irritating than their tired rhetoric of concealment, but it is only a contrast between cultivated ambiguity and political confusion.

The appearance of *Il Manifesto* without the approval of the Party authorities, an insolence defying the long-established tradition of democratic centralism', has (predictably) produced a hostile reaction from the leadership. However, if its reaction was similar to that of the French Communist Party vis-à-vis *Politique d'aujourd'hui* and that of the Austrian Communist Party towards *Tagebuch*, it was also more cautious. The offenders were not expelled from the Party or its Central Committee. The Italian communist leaders, unlike the French ones, try to avoid alienating their intellectuals and, unlike the Austrian ones, have to take into account the electoral effect of their internal affairs. Their efforts to give themselves a democratic image limit their internal manoeuvrability. If the young Soviet rebels take at face value the

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freedoms provided in the Soviet Constitution, the Soviet *apparatchiki* have the political police to provide the appropriate interpretation of such rights. If Rossana Rossanda refers to the democratic assurances of the Italian Party leaders, they have to take into account the effect which their reaction may have on Italian public opinion.

ONE of the first major salvos against the rebels was fired in the official *Rinascita* by the communist senator Bufalini, who criticized *Il Manifesto* for giving purely ideological information about the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution'. In her reply which was published in *Rinascita* (24 July 1969), Rossana Rossanda referred ironically to coverage of it in the Party daily *l'Unità* as being based on the information provided by 'the imperialist press agencies in Tokyo and Hong Kong which are faithfully reproduced by TASS'. She also expressed her disapproval of the undemocratic procedures at the meetings of the Party's Central Committee, which is becoming 'a place for discussing decisions which have already been made'. And she went on to ask an embarrassing question:

> Why is it that while the Italian Communist Party has proposed the rule of diversity and the institutionalization of dissent in the international communist movement, these are to be excluded in the internal affairs of the Party? What sense then was there in positively welcoming the new course in Prague?

Bufalini's dry reply to this was that the PCI and its Central Committee desire constructive critical discussion, 'but it is precisely this kind of discussion that comrades from *Il Manifesto* refuse to contribute to and take part in, having chosen a quite different road' (*Rinascita*, 24 July 1969).

The so-called 'Fifth Commission' of the PCI was charged with the task of examining 'the case of *Il Manifesto*'. The verdict of this was rendered more difficult by the fact that the heretics were to be condemned just at the moment when the PCI's proclaimed aim is to enter the government and, with that aim in view, it is insisting *urbi et orbi* on its democratic nature. A harsh and intransigent condemnation of the dissidents, making short shrift of their argument that the way to settle differences of political opinion would be through a democratic discussion inside the Party, would have been even more embarrassing, because it would have come at the time when Dubcek and other Czechoslovak reformers were being purged in Prague. The juxtaposition would not have enhanced its democratic image.

The two conflicting concerns—'democratic centralism' inside the Party and the stress on democratic credentials outside it—conditioned the handling of the issue by the PCI leadership. While the internal authority of Togliatti's heirs and their 'democratic centralist' legitimacy remained paramount motivations, it was important to minimize the damage to the Party's democratic credibility resulting from too brusque

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an excommunication of the dissenters. This explains the initial leniency in their treatment which was limited to verbal attacks. It also explains a striking contrast between the toughness of their condemnation by the Party authorities in their reports and resolutions and the slowness in drawing 'organizational conclusions' from it. The former line was basically addressed to the Party faithfuls and designed to isolate the rebels in a situation where they clearly have some potential following inside the Party. They had to be ideologically isolated to maintain Party discipline. The slow method of Party debate was chosen in order not to offend too much the democratic susceptibilities of outside observers. That this decision did not reflect a democratic evolution of the PCI can be seen from the fact that the right of the dissenters to their own point of view was not granted and they were repeatedly accused of 'factionalism'. In his summing up of the *Il Manifesto* case presented to the Central Committee the rapporteur, Alessandro Natta, concluded his accusation in the following words: 'The [Fifth] Commission is of the opinion that the Party faces inadmissible factionalist activity, an attack on the policy of the Party, its unity and its basic revolutionary characteristics' (*l'Unità*, 16 October 1969). These words echoed the indictment of the *Il Manifesto* group by the Party secretary, Luigi Longo:

> There are comrades who believe that they can ignore Party demands and claim some alleged rights, who strike attitudes and support theses which if implemented would lead to the liquidation of the Party as a fighting organization which it should be (*Avanti*, 15 October 1969).

He and his deputy, Enrico Berlinguer, stressed that they had no intention of renouncing the monolithic concept of the Party. According to Giancarlo Pajetta the demands of the 'New Left' for internal democracy amounted in effect to the transformation of Party life into 'a guerrilla warfare of currents and groups'. According to Longo this 'demonstrates that they do not understand the fundamental principles of the international communist movement'.

THE two traditional antagonists, the leader of the 'New Right' within the Party, Amendola, and the leader of the 'Old Left', Ingrao, displayed solidarity in their condemnation of the *Il Manifesto* group, notwithstanding their own differences on some of the issues raised by the affair (such as Czechoslovakia, participation in the government, the attitude to the Stalinist past and to present Soviet policies —on all of which they disagree). This in itself shows: a) that the 'right' and 'left' labels are not very helpful in the analysis of political lines of division inside the Party; and b) that when it comes to the challenge of the Party intelligentsia—and the 'intellectual fantasies' of the New Left, as Longo called them, were half-heartedly supported at the meeting of the Central Committee by its two intellectuals, Luporini and Lombardo Radice (*l'Unità*, 17 and 18 October 1969)—

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the *apparatchiki* take a united stand against it, as they invariably do in all other communist parties, ruling or not. The differences are in the way the opposition is handled, and here, admittedly, the Italian communists with their national and Party traditions present a special case. But it is not a question of democratic transformation, but of the manner of eliminating heterodoxy.

In the list of the ideologico-political sins of the *Il Manifesto* group two issues were of crucial importance to the Party leaders: the explicit criticism of the traditional communist concept of the Party and the demand to draw conclusions from the Party's critical attitude towards Stalinist practices by subjecting the Soviet experience to a searching analysis. This last demand was formally granted when Luigi Longo announced that the Party's research institute would conduct an 'inquiry' into the subject. As mentioned above, however, the results of this inquiry are not likely to satisfy the critics. Longo himself reaffirmed on the occasion of the fifty-second anniversary of the October Revolution his Party's attachment to the Soviet example. Other guardians of orthodoxy, defenders of 'Togliattismo', persistently levelled against the Party's 'New Left' the charge that their too explicit criticism of Soviet experience would jeopardize the relations between the PCI and the CPSU. One of them, Aldo Torterella, referred in *Rinascita* (3 October 1969) to the *Il Manifesto* editorial on Czechoslovakia, saying that 'in it our Party is invited in effect to an open break with the countries of the socialist world'. The same charge was made in other places.[3]

The anger of Togliatti's heirs at reading articles almost devoid of the usual ritual cant is understandable. They have developed obfuscation to a high art and the last thing they want is the clarification of the issues. An article like Rossana Rossanda's 'The Roots of the Division', printed in *Il Manifesto* (1 June 1969), which analysed the process of communist polycentrism in terms which have never before been used from inside the Party, can naturally give them a fit. It is also natural that this type of approach should appeal more to the intelligentsia outside the Party than to its functionaries. What has also annoyed the Party leadership is the fact that the *Il Manifesto* group has established some links with the left Catholics whom the Party itself is assiduously wooing.

[3] *Quod licet Jovi, net licet bovi.* At the same time as these charges were made, the official communist press was furious at Kochetov's latest novel (which will be reviewed in a subsequent issue of *Survey*) for its attack on the Italian communists. Giancarlo Pajetta condemned it sharply in *l'Unità* (2 October 1969) and defended the Italian communist specialist on Soviet literature, Vittorio Strada (lampooned in the novel as Benito Spada), from 'vulgar attacks' by a 'literary hack'. Later, after the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn from the Writers' Union, *l'Unità* (11 November 1969) disclosed that Strada was prevented by Soviet customs officials from bringing out Solzhenitsyn's letter, in which he dissociated himself from the publication of his books abroad. But another copy of the letter reached *l'Unità* later on and was published.

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Despite the appeals to the rebels to submit, they remained obstinately defiant. Rossana Rossanda defended *Il Manifesto's* right to existence in the name of internal Party democracy:

> When one sees in *Il Manifesto*, as the Fifth Commission does, not an instrument of political discussion but an inadmissible attack on the Party, the issue in question is shifted from the plane of a debate, perhaps a bitter one, to the plane of a destructive campaign which the communist movement has known in the past, and which inevitably leads to the liquidation of every opposition.

However, to fortify her political stand Rossana Rossanda chose a particularly inept historical argument which can hardly provide a proper ideological legitimacy for her plea for the institutionalization of internal Party democracy. She argued that it is not necessary to choose between the alternatives of 'centralism' and 'factionalism' and this, according to her, is indicated by the 'experience of the Bolshevik Party between 1921 and 1927'. Ironically, what is supposed to serve as a model of Party democracy was a transitional period between Lenin's prohibition of the Party factions and the emergence of Stalin's dictatorship, when all the opposition groups were gradually strangled and of course not a single one of them was ever allowed to publish its own journal.[4]

The position of *Il Manifesto* on international issues was defended at the meeting of the Central Committee by Luigi Pinter and Aldo Natoli (*l'Unità*, 18 October 1969). Pinter said that no one wants 'a break with the socialist countries, but it is a fact that there are different evaluations of grave and intricate events of which Czechoslovakia is only one example'. Natoli declared that in the present situation of 'normalization' in Czechoslovakia 'one could only mistrust and disagree with the ruling groups in socialist countries'. He added that the 'New Left' faced a difficult problem which it could not baulk, that of defending the position taken by the Party after 21 August 1968.

IN their replies (18 October 1969) Party leaders emphasized two opposite points. On the one hand, they made a great song and dance about their attachment to democracy, of which the debate on the case of *Il Manifesto* was presented as a striking demonstration; on the other, they demanded in the name of 'democratic centralism' the submission of the dissenters. It is a combination of which Togliatti himself would be proud.

[4] In a discussion organized by the weekly *L'Expresso* on the occasion Paolo Spriano said that a simple 'return to Leninism is not sufficient', and that for a free circulation of ideas (which has become a condition of the development of Marxism) 'it is not sufficient to have internal democracy in a one-party system, but it is necessary to have forms of pluralism'. But the Party organized a special seminar in its Institute of Communist Studies which was devoted to the defence of the Leninist concept of 'democratic centralism'.

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Natta walked a tightrope between these mutually exclusive points, giving democratic assurance to the rebels and calling them to give up their 'factionalist' activities:

> Our call is not for discipline, still less for obedience; we are not threatening you with excommunication. We ask you instead to accept our vision of democratic centralism, and this means, in the first place, self-discipline; we ask you to accept our 'rules of the game' which signifies that every one of us must find his autonomy and freedom inside the Party.

Similarly, Berlinguer stressed in his summary that the Party leadership was both lenient and democratic: 'We deliberately wanted to avoid a judgment which might have been severe, to draw hasty organizational conclusions. We have not proposed here any administrative measures. . . .'

Berlinguer argued that this decision was not taken 'for tactical reasons': 'The real reason is that we want to proceed until the very end along the most democratic road. . . .' But there was a sting in the tail, just in case the dissidents should fail to appreciate the democratic essence of the request that they stop publishing *Il Manifesto* and cease their 'factionalist activity'. Berlinguer warned them that if they did not submit to these demands, it would then be 'pure illusion to think that the Party will be able to make compromises'.

Less than a month later *l'Unità* (12 November 1969) published a communiqué of the Party Directorate harshly condemning the new issue of *Il Manifesto* and in particular the editorial in which it found to its dismay that 'exactly the same political positions [as were previously condemned] are reiterated and reasserted':

> This means that comrades who promote the journal and who are responsible for it did not want to accept the request addressed to them by the Central Committee and the Central Commission of Control to desist from activity which follows the logic of a faction. . . . The new issue of the journal once again makes unfounded and inadmissible attacks on other communist parties. . . . The character of the group and of the pressure exercised from outside proves that these comrades aspire to and propose a transformation of the nature of the Party on the basis of concepts and principles completely different from the ones adopted at the Twelfth Party Congress. . . . They have not in fact grasped the significance and value of the recent meeting of the CC and of the CCC.

There could have been little doubt about the outcome of the November meeting of the two Party bodies convened again to discuss 'the latest developments in the position of comrades from *Il Manifesto*'. The purpose of the exercise, as the communiqué made clear, was to take steps leading to 'the strengthening of the Party'. This time it could only mean drawing 'organizational conclusions' against the leaders of the Party 'New Left', and *Il Manifesto* had no illusions about it.

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The November issue of the magazine, which has sold out, was reprinted with a new editorial saying that the communiqué of the Party Directorate of 12 November 'has already given us to understand what the intended end of the affair will be'. On 26 November the three "New Left" members of the Central Committee were duly expelled.

The Party decision should clarify some of the points raised in the polemic on the *Il Manifesto* affair between the communist *l'Unità* and the socialist *Avanti*. It centred on the issue of the 'democratic evolution' of the PCI away from the monolithic concept of the Party. The socialist organ has rightly taken the affair of *Il Manifesto* as a test case of such an evolution. This visibly annoyed the PCI leaders and *l'Unità* wrote several angry replies to the editorials of *Avanti*. Giancarlo Pajetta referred ironically in *l'Unità* (15 October 1969) to those people, according to whom 'some of our militants have already abandoned Leninism', and explained authoritatively that 'to reject the idea of a Party fragmented into factions and groups is not only a doctrinal imperative, but also a lesson from the recent past, and for many people a tormenting and paralysing experience of the Socialist Party'. A day later, the editor of *Avanti*, Gaetano Arfé, declared that 'the great importance we attach to the affair of *Il Manifesto*' is due to the fact that its treatment by the Communist Party would indicate whether it wants to remain 'anchored in the monolithic concept of the Party, in a bureaucratic posture in its relation to the masses'. Three days later, after the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party devoted to the debate on *Il Manifesto*, Arfé commented in *Avanti* that the debate

> has thrown light on the limitations of the opposing positions, the limitations of the doctrinaire schematism of the *Il Manifesto* group and the limitations of the different scope and character of the majority leadership which appears not to be able to overcome, in theory and in practice, the concept of the Party, the criticism of which is written in decades of history, to overcome the concept of internationalism which is by now mythical, degraded as it is by its reduction to a solidarity with the ruling groups whose cultural obscurantism and politically reactionary character have found in Prague the latest tragic demonstration. . . .

The editorial exchange between *Avanti* and *l'Unità* went on, with the latter repeating, much as before, that the Communist Party 'has not accepted and will not accept its fragmentation' (14 November 1969).

The 'organizational conclusions' about to be drawn by the communist leaders from this position (which was repeatedly made clear by them from the beginning of the debate) should permit some of those who, starting from the premise of the 'social-democratic transformation' of the PCI, expected a different outcome from this debate, to see its true significance. Their hopes, at least in the foreseeable future, are likely to be disappointed. Like those who expected a different outcome from Soviet and East European 'destalinization',

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their premise was based on a false dichotomy which postulated an 'either/or' evolution with two alternatives only. In both cases it was a mixture of wishful thinking or of mistaken historical analogies. After all, Italian communist leaders have been trying to create the impression that the Party is becoming democratic, not social-democratic. Their instinctive reaction, like that of *apparatchiki* everywhere when faced with an unorthodox challenge to their authority, is to isolate and extinguish it. The political problem which this creates for the Party which is not in power and which makes assurances about its democratic character, is of course different from the one which the ruling or the revolutionary communist parties are facing. But this is another story.

The Age of Reason

THE phenomenon of the 'New Left' is based on the persistence of old illusions in a new guise. Its young adherents acquire them for the first time, but for members of the 'Old Left' who move to the 'new' position it is part of a continuing process of self-delusion. Nobody can illustrate this better than Sartre.

It is his non-political writings, in particular his brilliantly written autobiographical account of his boyhood, *Words*, which will be read by future generations. His philosophical disquisitions can only serve future historians of ideas as a case study in subtle self-deception and sophisticated confusion. His political history is one of the best illustrations in this century of the political obtuseness of 'progressive' intellectuals (and there is no dearth of examples). In the field of political ideas his intellectual brilliance only makes the fatuity of his political opinions more striking.

He has protested against the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn from the Soviet Writers' Union, which was of course the right thing to do. But how is it that he has never repudiated the statement which can still be read in his *Saint Genet*: 'Bukharin was a conspirator and a traitor who humbly confessed to his betrayal. . . .'

It is most unlikely that Sartre is still such a political ass as to believe this,[5] or that he can even now consider the Moscow Trials as a necessary part of the dialectics of historical progress. After the Soviet invasion of Hungary he wrote (in *The Spectre of Stalin*) that 'in the state policy which the USSR invokes today, the concrete struggle of the masses is drowned in blood in the name of pure abstraction, which is presented as essential and which throws into insignificance all men of flesh and blood. . . .' Why then does he not admit openly his past errors and try to re-examine their roots? Why does he plunge

[5] Will the next edition of *Saint Genet* contain a reference to Robert Conquest's *The Great Terror* or George Katkov's *The Trial of Bukharin*? It is more likely that it will contain a new disquisition on the latest work of Jean Genet, *Funeral Rites* (euphorically described in the *New York Times Book Review* as a dazzling 'argument for the masturbatory, cannibalistic, evil nature of literature . . . a view of literature as the Hitlerism of the spirit. . . .').

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into a 'New Left' future without seriously reappraising his 'Old Left' past? These questions can of course be addressed to more than one person, but not many have played such a prominent role at one time in influencing the politics of his intellectual milieu.

Exercising dialectical reason, Sartre, the existentialist parvenu of Marxism, argued in 1952 that the Communist Party is the embodiment of history itself. He ironically asked in *The Communists and Peace*: 'How can you *at the same time* believe in the historic mission of the proletariat and in the perfidy of the Communist Party when you notice that the one votes for the other?' He reiterated this point a year later in *An Answer to Claude Lefort*: 'How can the revolutionary masses *submit* to the counter-revolutionary action of the Party?' Obviously, as they do so submit to the Party, it must be in a revolutionary communion with History.

In 1956, after Khrushchev's speech and Hungary, he still believed in the mythical role of the French Communist Party and wrote in *The Spectre of Stalin*: 'That Party is our affair, we are familiar with it, we have all, for a shorter or longer time, been its fellow-travellers: it is on this Party that we must, that we can, act.' But in 1968 Sartre declared that 'the communists are afraid of the revolution' and accepted the idea that a revolutionary movement should develop outside the Communist Party.[6]

Sartre can of course alter his views, but if he now considers that the French CP has not been revolutionary 'since 1945', what does he think of his 1952–53 arguments about it being a revolutionary instrument of History? Should he not take the trouble to be a bit more explicit about all this? Perhaps his knowledge of the intentions of History (with a capital H) was not all that intimate? The French Communist Party still receives the same percentage of votes from the same working class, so how can Sartre change his political views without changing the philosophical premises on which they were based? Perhaps his dialectical reason is not all that reliable? Perhaps, *horribile dictu*, it is what less subtle people simply call rationalization? We will not know until the master of words will produce another dazzling dialectical explanation.

The Seed of the New Man or Lester's complaint

JULIUS LESTER is a Black revolutionary. He writes a regular column[7] in what used to be the old Stalinist New York weekly, the *Guardian*, a journal which has undergone a transformation and is now an organ of the 'New Left'. His latest book, *Search for a New Land* (called by the author a 'three part fugue with variations') has been enthusiastically reviewed ('invaluable piece of truth about the Black Experience') in the *New York Times Review of Books* (2 November

[6] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Les Communistes ont peur de le Révolution*, Paris, 1968.
[7] Cf. *Survey*, no. 69, pp. 162–63.

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1969). His previous book, *Revolutionary Notes*, has been advertised in *The New York Review of Books* (10 July 1969) as 'originally scheduled for the Fall, but too hot to hold'. In the book, Mr Lester expressed a not very original view that 'there is no higher calling for any man than to be a revolutionary. . . . He carries within him the seed of the New Man.' Since then he produced more of such hot stuff.

Here for example is his elegy on the death of Ho Chi Minh which was published in the *Guardian* (20 September 1969):

The Third of September

Half awakened by the light of morning
choking in the greyness
of a third of September Wednesday,
I reached out for the
roundness
softness
fullness
allness of her
and she, awakened,
began to move,
softly,
silently,
gently,
and my hand found that place,
that hidden place,
that secret place,
that
won-
der-
ful place
and in the quiescent light of
a third of September Wednesday morning,
I felt my penis being taken into the
salty
thick
fluidity
of her swirling movement
easily
softly
gently
(as the children were waking).

Afterwards,
my penis, moist and warm,
resting on my thigh like some
fish washed onto the beach by full moontide,
I turned on the radio
and we heard that
Ho Chi Minh lay dying.
(The fog covered the seagulls that
sit on the rocky beach when the tide is out.)

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I retreated from her,
not talking that day as the radio told us
(every hour on the hour)
that Ho Chi Minh lay dying.
Finally, when night had covered the fog,
we heard that
Ho Chi Minh was dead
and I came back to her.
Ho Chi Minh was dead.
I wanted her again.
The softness
the roundness
the fullness
the allness.

Ho Chi Minh was dead.

The Editors of the *Guardian* accompanied the poem with the following note:

> This poem was intended by the author for publication in last week's *Guardian*—the issue where the death of Ho Chi Minh was reported. The *Guardian* staff decided to postpone publication a week—substituting a poem by Ho instead—because it believed the nature of the above poem in proximity with the news of Ho's death might not be understood to be the appreciation of the Vietnamese leader that it actually is. Julius Lester disagrees with this decision and maintains that by delaying the poem a week the *Guardian* in effect practiced censorship over his column.

Obviously, for some Mr Lester's stuff is too hot to hold and others hold it up because it is too hot. What is, however, perplexing is his sudden concern with the principle of censorship: he did not disapprove either of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 or of Czechoslovakia in 1968, in their roundness, fullness, allness.

L. L.

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Comparative Studies in Society and History

Volume 11, Number 4. October 1969

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